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General Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 “La più grande ricchezza è la salute”
 Virgilio 
More than 2000 years ago, Virgil, one of the great ancient Roman poets, remarked that “the greatest 
wealth is health”. Today, a long life in good health is still considered one of the most important 
wishes in human life. Fortunately for the average person living in our age, the wealth of health has 
increased considerably compared to those living in the era of Virgil. Remarkable increases in longevity 
and quality of life have been achieved, especially during the past century.[1,2] While these increases 
were partly achieved through advances in public health, air quality and water and sewage systems, 
improved (access to) healthcare contributed significantly as well.[3] New healthcare technologies 
provided possibilities to prevent and cure diseases that were associated with high morbidity and 
mortality in previous centuries. An important example is the reduction in early age mortality caused 
by infectious diseases due to the discovery and use of antibiotics (such as penicillin).  
These accomplishments also raise new challenges. In healthcare, an epidemiological transition 
is witnessed in which non-communicable rather than communicable diseases are increasingly 
important in explaining remaining morbidity and mortality. Lifestyle-related diseases, for instance, 
related to smoking or obesity, strongly add to this. The burden of such often chronic diseases entails a 
much wider range of negative health effects than death alone. Having a chronic disease or a disability 
affects people’s quality of life for a longer period of time. This raises pressing questions on how to 
counter such diseases and thus further improve the ‘(future) health of nations’. 
A longer life in good health requires delaying the onset of diseases or the prevention of diseases 
entirely. Achieving this goal requires (also) a focus on future health and action. First, at a policy level, 
those actions and interventions effectively and efficiently contributing to the promotion of a longer 
life in good health should be implemented in healthcare systems. Second, also given the impact 
of lifestyle-related diseases, at an individual level, awareness of the consequences of current health 
behaviours and changes in such behaviours for future health are required. 
This thesis offers two perspectives on future health. It aims to further knowledge on the decision-
making process at the policy level as well as at the individual level. Therefore, the main objective of 
this thesis is twofold. First, this thesis studies decisions regarding the investment in future health at 
a policy level. Second, this thesis explores individuals’ consideration of the future consequences of 
their health behaviours and expectations about their own future health. Below, both perspectives on 
future health will be briefly introduced, including the questions addressed in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1
1.2 PART I: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
 “Healthy citizens are the greatest asset any country can have”
          Winston Churchill 
Ageing populations and healthcare expenditure
Societies in which the number and proportion of older adults grow, may face a wide range of 
challenges in relation to the welfare state. One of these challenges relates to the future sustainability 
of the healthcare system, in terms of financing and planning.[4] Alongside the demographic trend 
of ageing populations, many developed countries face rising healthcare expenditures.[5] 1,2  While 
increased longevity is typically considered to be a desirable trend, the opposite holds for rising 
healthcare spending. Therefore, current as well as projected future rising healthcare expenditures, 
both in absolute and relative terms, is an important area of concern.
Investment in future health through prevention is sometimes put forward as a promising strategy 
to preserve people’s health and increase longevity while containing the financial consequences of 
population ageing. The main rationale behind this is that many illnesses, as well as disabilities and 
premature deaths, may be avoided, mitigated or delayed. Indeed, a substantial part of the global 
burden of disease is related to modifiable (behavioural) risk factors or lifestyle, such as tobacco use, 
diet and physical (in)activity.[11-14] Hence, the claim is made that preventive strategies aimed at lifestyle 
modification, but also, for example, participation in early detection and vaccination programmes, 
can play an important role in improving health and alleviating the negative consequences related 
to ageing populations.[15-17] However, this view may be too optimistic. If disease prevention increases 
life expectancy, it may also increase the burden of other (‘competing’) diseases associated with old 
age during these additional life-years. These diseases cause additional healthcare costs.[18-20] Therefore, 
whether prevention leads to compression of disease (i.e., fewer years spent in poor health) and a 
reduction in healthcare expenditures is contestable and needs further study. 
Moreover, whenever (effective) interventions allow the improvement of future health, the actual 
implementation of such preventive strategies and therewith the materialisation of their potential 
benefits, depends on the willingness to invest in future health. This willingness to invest is not self-
evident from a policy point of view, as it requires a trade-off between short-term costs and long-
1 It should be noted that, in recent years, the trend in healthcare spending showed a more moderate (relative and 
absolute) growth in several OECD countries. In some countries, healthcare expenditures even declined.[5,6] Virtually 
all OECD countries had to face the consequences of the financial crisis (e.g., income decline). To what extent the 
healthcare cuts are related to the financial crisis, is still debated.[7,8]
2 The consequences of population ageing in terms of increased burden of disease, disability and healthcare 
expenditures have been extensively discussed elsewhere.[9,10] 
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term (sometimes uncertain) benefits.3 Indeed, public expenditure on prevention and public health 
is still relatively low in many developed countries.[21] For example, in the Netherlands, in 2012 just 
2.7% of healthcare expenditures was spent on prevention and public health programmes.[5] Moreover, 
spending on prevention has even decreased in the last decade,[5] despite important recommendations 
to increase investments in future health. Clearly, the debate on healthcare expenditures encompasses 
more than the actual height of healthcare spending. The allocation of available resources matters as 
well. In order to ascertain whether prevention is a preferable strategy and to set priorities appropriately, 
it is important (i) that the decision criteria to set priorities in this context are clear, transparent and 
justified and (ii) that good information on the costs and benefits of prevention is available. Therefore, 
in this thesis, the Dutch decision-making framework and (the operationalisation of ) its criteria are 
discussed in relation to the costs and benefits of prevention. 
The Dutch decision-making framework
The basic benefits package or ‘health basket’ contains the healthcare benefits that all socially insured 
citizens are entitled to. Its main aim is to secure access to predefined healthcare technologies and 
interventions for these insured citizens. It may be clear that the delineation of the basic benefits 
package can be an important cost driver (as well as benefit driver) in the healthcare sector. Limiting 
or expanding the package will affect access to care and healthcare expenditures and benefits 
accordingly. Therefore, the basic benefits package is also an important instrument that can address 
the challenges of rationalising healthcare provision and allocating the available resources. This applies 
particularly to healthcare systems that aim to ration demand rather than supply.4 
Delineating the basic benefits package is by no means a straightforward matter. In fact, differences 
between European countries in terms of process and in terms of criteria are substantial.[22] However, 
its importance suggests the need for a transparent and clear decision-making framework that defines 
the entitlements included in the benefits package. Here, a decision-making framework can be viewed 
as a set of criteria and the decision rule based on those decision criteria to decide whether to include a 
technology in the basic benefits package. The Netherlands has a long tradition in thinking about such 
a decision-making framework, including the required decision criteria.[23-27] The criteria that currently 
constitute a central part of the Dutch decision-making framework are necessity, effectiveness and 
efficiency (or cost-effectiveness). These criteria were already proposed more than 20 years ago, in a 
publication of the Committee on Choices in Health Care (also known as the Dunning Committee).
[23] However, their operationalisation and systematic use is still a much debated area. In chapter 2, 
the Dutch decision-making framework and the three main criteria are discussed in-depth. Several 
normative choices that are required in order to fully operationalise these criteria are highlighted. The 
emphasis here is on the implications for interventions aimed at modifying individual health lifestyle. 
3 The same accounts for actors at the meso-level, like healthcare insurers, municipalities or hospitals, depending on the 
organisation of the healthcare system. This level is, however, not within the scope of this thesis. 
4 Another instrument in a demand-driven healthcare system is that of co-payments, which normally means that 
people have to pay part of the expenses out of pocket. 
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Costs in economic evaluations
An important component of the Dutch decision-making framework is the economic evaluation 
of healthcare interventions. Economic evaluations of healthcare interventions assess the balance 
between the incremental costs and benefits of an intervention, in relation to some comparator.[28] 
Several types of economic evaluations exist, differing in the way the benefits are expressed. The type 
of evaluation that is typically used in the Dutch decision-making framework is cost-utility analysis 
(CUA). In a CUA, the costs are expressed in monetary terms, while the effects are expressed in terms 
of quality adjusted life-years (QALYs). A QALY is a generic utility measure comprising both length and 
quality of life, where every life-year is weighed for the quality of life during that year. The criterion 
of cost-effectiveness is usually expressed as incremental costs per QALY gained. This indicates 
how much costs one needs to incur in order to produce one additional healthy life-year (QALY) in 
relation to the chosen comparator. CUA is increasingly accepted and used in healthcare decision-
making.[29-31] However, several (normative) methodological issues regarding the performance of CUA 
still lead to considerable debate. One area of much debate concerns the costs to be included in 
economic evaluations. Next to other (non-medical) cost categories, two types of medical costs can be 
distinguished: direct medical costs and indirect medical costs. Direct medical costs are directly related 
to the intervention under study (e.g., costs of diagnostic tests), whereas indirect medical costs are 
medical costs in life-years gained by a life-prolonging intervention. Usually, related indirect medical 
costs and unrelated indirect medical costs are distinguished. The first type of costs is directly related to 
the life-prolonging intervention (e.g., anti-rejection medication after a life-saving liver-transplantation). 
The latter type of costs is not (e.g., costs of a knee surgery in life-years gained because of the life-saving 
liver-transplantation). The inclusion of these unrelated indirect medical costs in life-years gained in 
economic evaluations is an important area of debate. Moreover, it is especially relevant in the context 
of life-prolonging preventive interventions. This issue is further discussed in chapter 2, while chapter 3 
presents a review of the debate on these unrelated medical costs in life-years gained. 
Saving costs?
The fact that spending on prevention is relatively low despite its potential benefits in terms of future 
health may indicate that prevention gets relatively low priority. This could be related to the current 
decision-making context and operationalisation of the three main decision criteria as highlighted 
above. 
An alternative explanation could be that within the decision-making framework, prevention may 
be judged more stringently than curative interventions. In other words, the decision rule (i.e., some 
relevant threshold value of costs per QALY) used to decide upon the inclusion of an intervention in the 
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   12 23-03-16   10:15
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basic benefits package may differ according to the type of intervention (i.e., prevention, care or cure).5 
This could relate to the claim that prevention saves costs. If evaluations of preventive policies reject this 
claim, this may lead to a reduction in such investments, even though these strategies may well offer 
value for money.[33] Imposing the strict requirement of being cost saving on preventive interventions 
is difficult to explain if such a requirement is absent in the context of curative interventions.
This discrepancy and other important aspects in the debate regarding the funding of preventive 
interventions are discussed in more detail in chapter 4. In chapter 5, using the example of obesity - 
one of the major, modern public health threats - it is assessed to what extent prevention may actually 
induce cost savings. It is demonstrated that obesity prevention may indeed lead to cost savings 
in specific healthcare segments, while at the same time causing higher costs in other healthcare 
segments. This stresses the need for careful balancing of realistically estimated costs and benefits of 
all types of healthcare interventions. 
The main research questions regarding part I of this thesis, focusing on the policy perspective with an 
emphasis on the Dutch context, can be summed up as follows:
1) How does the operationalisation of the primary decision criteria for delineating the Dutch basic 
benefits package influence the evaluation of lifestyle interventions?
2) Should unrelated medical costs in life-years gained be included in economic evaluations of 
healthcare interventions?
3) Should prevention save costs in order to be an attractive healthcare strategy?
4) What is the effect of obesity prevention on lifetime healthcare expenditure? 
1.3 PART II: AN INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE
 “If I’d known I was going to live so long, I’d have taken better care of myself” 
 Leon Eldred
Future time perspective
Back in the 1930’s, Lewin stated that “persons at all ages are influenced by the manner in which they 
see the future”.[34] Many individuals will probably have some idea of what their future will look like. 
Indeed, in the context of health, most individuals will have some sort of expectation of whether 
they will grow old and how they will grow old. These future thoughts may vary across individuals. 
5 In this context, a threshold value of €20,000 per QALY has been mentioned in the Netherlands, often in relation to 
preventive drug treatments (such as vaccinations). This value seems to originate from a Dutch clinical guideline for 
treatment and prevention of high cholesterol,[32] but it seems to lack a proper foundation. The cost-effectiveness of 
many curative interventions allowed into the basic benefits package would exceed this value.
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Moreover, individuals also appear to vary in how important the future is to them and, as Lewin 
already recognised, the extent to which their present actions are influenced by their views of the 
future.[35] Depending on what definition is used, such notions as described above may be viewed 
as different conceptualisations of a broader construct called future time perspective (FTP). In absence 
of a consistently applied definition of FTP in the literature, various definitions have been used, 
including “personal time horizon”[36,37], “a generalised concern for future events and experiences”[38], 
“the consideration of future consequences”[35], and “future-orientedness”[39].  According to Sansone et 
al.[40] these diverse FTP constructs “share a common emphasis on the way individuals consider temporal 
factors in order to explain behaviours that might have implications for health status and longevity.[41,42]”. 
The importance of FTP in the context of health-related behaviour is increasingly being demonstrated 
in research.[39-41,43-47] However, the operationalisation and measurement of future-focused thoughts 
and considerations has led to various debates and the development of valid and reliable instruments 
has been advocated. Therefore, in the second part of this thesis, two important conceptualisations of 
FTP and their measurement are explored in more detail: (i) the extent to which individuals consider 
the future (versus immediate) consequences of their decisions and (ii) individuals’ beliefs about their 
remaining lifetime and health status at later stages in life. Moreover, both constructs are described in 
the context of different types of health investments, such as lifestyle choices.  
Consideration of future consequences
Considerations of time frame may be of importance for individual decision-making. This particularly 
applies to health-related choices. In part, this is a consequence of the temporal component in the 
trade-off between the costs and benefits of certain unhealthy behaviours. For example, smoking 
may provide immediate benefits in terms of reduced stress (and relatively few immediate costs), 
but relatively high costs in the long-term in terms of chronic disease and mortality. Indeed, smoking 
may substantially decrease the chances of reaching a high age relative to not smoking. An important 
explanation why people start or continue smoking despite the well-known long-term risks, could be 
that people typically attach less weight to the future than to the present. Moreover, they may not take 
these long-term consequences into consideration when deciding upon smoking. In other words, the 
perceived short-term benefits outweigh the future disadvantages. This phenomenon may also be 
relevant for the explanation for other everyday lifestyle behaviours besides smoking, for example, 
physical inactivity and having an unhealthy diet.
The extent to which individuals consider the possible future outcomes of their current actions and the 
extent to which they are influenced by these outcomes, is often considered to be a stable personality 
trait. It is referred to as the consideration of future consequences (CFC).[35] The CFC construct is one of 
the most frequently used FTP constructs in social psychological research and can be measured using 
the 12-item CFC Scale proposed by Strathman et al.[35] Despite the relevance of the CFC construct, also 
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   14 23-03-16   10:15
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in the context of individual investments in future health, little empirical evidence is available about 
the exact properties of the CFC Scale in terms of factor structure, validity and reliability. Following 
the initial publication of Strathman et al.[35], Petrocelli[48] was the first to examine the properties (i.e., 
underlying factor structure) of the 12-item CFC Scale in a larger sample. Petrocelli[48] reported some 
instability of the CFC Scale. However, the study of Petrocelli[48] was performed in a highly selective 
convenience sample of academics, and thus it remained unclear how the scale would perform in 
other settings. This question is addressed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Subjective life expectancy
Subjective expectations about the future are personal beliefs formed by individuals themselves. Such 
expectations may be relevant for individual behaviour and economic decisions regarding retirement, 
saving, pension plans, etcetera. Indeed, individuals’ expectations about their longevity, i.e. their 
subjective life expectancy, are acknowledged as an essential variable for making decisions in these 
domains. For example, low length of life expectations (as perceived by individuals) may negatively 
influence long-term goal striving.[49] In recent years, attention for longevity expectations in the context 
of individual health behaviour has increased. The rationale behind this is that investments in future 
health may importantly depend on (the accuracy of ) an individual’s own predicted life expectancy. 
Moreover, subjective expectations may contain personally held information that is not incorporated 
in objective or actuarial life expectancies.[50] Examples of private information are the longevity of 
one’s parents, one’s lifestyle, etcetera. An important issue is how to obtain valid subjective longevity 
estimates. 
Eliciting subjective expectations
In general, two elicitation formats for subjective expectations can be distinguished: the probabilistic 
and the non-probabilistic format. The probabilistic format, called subjective survival probability (SSP), 
assesses an individual’s personal probability judgment of surviving to a certain (target) age. The use of 
such subjective survival probabilities in large household surveys and as input to econometric analyses 
has increased considerably. However, more knowledge is warranted on how individuals assess their 
own mortality risks, also in relation to unhealthy behaviours. In chapter 7 of this thesis, subjective 
survival probabilities across Europe are explored in-depth.
An important area of attention in this context is also whether people understand probabilities. In 
other words, whether they are able to express their personal beliefs using probabilities. This is still 
not well understood. A common, non-probabilistic approach for eliciting expectations is obtaining a 
point estimate of subjective life expectancy directly. In chapter 8, the advantages and disadvantages 
of both elicitation methods are discussed and empirical results are compared in a sample of the 
general public from the Netherlands.
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   15 23-03-16   10:15
16
Chapter 1
Subjective expectations regarding future health-related quality of life
An area of research that has received very little attention thus far is that of subjective expectations 
regarding future health-related quality of life. While it is important to understand expectations 
regarding longevity (how old one becomes), expectations regarding future quality of life (how one 
becomes old) arguably are equally important. They remain understudied so far, however. Jung and 
Huynh[51] argued that expectations about future health are significantly different from expectations 
about future mortality, so that the latter are not a proxy of the former. Hence, more research into 
these expectations is warranted. They may be of particular interest in relation to investments in future 
health, for instance, in the context of interventions aimed at improving health behaviour. In chapter 
9 subjective expectations regarding future health-related quality of life are explored in more detail.
The main research questions regarding part II of this thesis therefore are:
5) How reliable and valid is the original 12-item Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale?
6) To what extent do subjective survival probabilities differ across Europe, also in relation to lifestyle? 
7) How do subjective survival probabilities relate to point estimates of subjective life expectancy?
8) How can subjective expectations regarding future health-related quality of life be measured and 
combined with subjective expectations regarding length of life? 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The remainder of this thesis is structured in two main parts. The first part addresses the policy 
perspective (chapters 2 to 5), while the second part addresses the individual perspective (chapters 
6 to 9). 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed insight into the Dutch decision-making framework that is used to 
delineate the basic benefits package. In particular, the operationalisation of the three main decision 
criteria ‘necessity’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’ is discussed, with a focus on several normative 
issues related to the operationalisation of the criteria. In addition, this chapter focuses on the extent 
to which these issues may influence the evaluation of lifestyle interventions. 
An important tool in the context of delineating the basic benefits package is the economic 
evaluation of healthcare interventions. The debate about the inclusion of unrelated future medical 
costs in such economic evaluations is discussed in chapter 3. This chapter also reviews the current 
recommendations in several national guidelines for pharmacoeconomic research. What is more, 
an example of a smoking-cessation intervention is presented to demonstrate the consequences of 
different practices of accounting for unrelated future medical costs. 
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   16 23-03-16   10:15
117
General Introduction
Chapter 4 extends the discussion in the previous chapters by addressing the evaluation and value 
of preventive interventions in relation to curative ones, arguing that fair comparisons of both are 
required.
In chapter 5, the effects of obesity prevention on annual and lifetime healthcare expenditure are 
estimated for different healthcare sectors. For this purpose, the Chronic Disease Model of the Dutch 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) and Dutch Cost of Illness data are 
used. 
The second part of this thesis starts with chapter 6 in which the properties of the CFC Scale are 
investigated in terms of reliability and validity. For this purpose, factor analysis is conducted on data of 
a sample of Dutch young adolescents to identify the factor structure of the 12-item CFC Scale. Next, 
the CFC Scale and the underlying factors are related to other measures of individuals’ appreciation 
and expectations of the future, including subjective life expectancy, future health expectancy and 
different types of health investments (i.e., improving diet). 
In chapter 7, subjective survival probabilities across Europe are studied, in particular in relation to 
unhealthy behaviour. Data on European elders from the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is used for this purpose. 
Chapter 8 explores how subjective survival probabilities relate to a point estimate of subjective life 
expectancy. To this end, a web-based survey aimed at investigating how Dutch people aged 18-65 
years old think about future health and choices in healthcare is developed and administered. The 
questionnaire contains both elicitation methods. 
Data from the same survey presented in chapter 8, is also used in chapter 9. In this chapter, the 
focus is on expectations regarding future health-related quality of life combined with subjective life 
expectations. The EQ-5D instrument[52] is used to elicit respondents’ expected future health states 
and subjective life expectancy is expressed as a point estimate. Furthermore, the relation between 
expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life and lifestyle is described. 
Finally, chapter 10 discusses the main findings of this thesis as well as its main limitations. Implications 
of the findings for future research and healthcare policy are also addressed. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Chronic disease morbidity and premature mortality related to unhealthy lifestyles are now a major 
threat to public health worldwide.[1-3] Indeed, non-communicable diseases, of which its most important 
behavioural risk factors are related to tobacco use, diet, physical activity and alcohol consumption, 
accounted for almost two-thirds of all deaths, as well as a large part of the burden of disease globally.
[3] Much evidence shows, however, that lifestyle interventions, for example, interventions aimed at 
smoking cessation, changing dietary behaviour and alcohol consumption or increasing physical 
activity, can be an effective and cost-effective strategy for counteracting such preventable morbidity, 
disability and mortality.[e.g., 4-12] In fact, some authors even argue that up to 50% of all current disease 
burden can be avoided,[13] although it needs noting that, due to competing diseases, the burden of 
other diseases would subsequently increase.[e.g., 14] In spite of the possible health gains and reduced 
time with disabilities from lifestyle interventions, spending on prevention constitutes only a relatively 
small share of total healthcare expenditures.1 Apparently, prevention (still) does not receive much 
priority when allocating budgets.
Indeed, priority setting is inevitable in healthcare. Scarce healthcare resources and increasing 
medical expenditures force healthcare policy makers to make choices about allocating resources in 
order to preserve the (future) sustainability of healthcare systems.[e.g., 18,19] The inevitability of making 
such important choices suggests the need for a transparent, common decision-making framework. 
However, the design of such a decision-making framework, or put differently, the definition of the 
appropriate decision rule and its subsequent application in practice, have by no means proven to be 
a straightforward matter.[20] In fact, decisions on what interventions should be reimbursed from public 
money often rather seem to be the result of an implicit and inconsistent decision process, based on 
historical patterns or influenced by various stakeholders,[18,20] than based on the systematic application 
of a transparent decision rule.
The Netherlands has a long tradition of thinking about a decision-making framework for the allocation 
of healthcare resources. The National Healthcare Institute (ZiNL)2, which is the primary advisor of 
the Dutch government regarding healthcare reimbursement decisions, has recently defined such 
a framework on the basis of previous initiatives.[21,22] 3 This framework includes explicit decision 
criteria, most prominently ‘necessity’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’. Up until now, the decision-making 
framework has been infrequently applied and predominantly used in reimbursement decisions 
1 Estimates of the proportion of the Dutch healthcare budget spent on prevention generally vary between 4.0% 
and 5.5%.[15-17] Spending on health promotion activities constitutes only a small part of these expenditures: 3% of 
spending on prevention. Spending on prevention is higher when expenditures beyond the healthcare budget are 
considered.[17]
2 The Dutch Healthcare Insurance Board (CVZ) became the National Healthcare Institute (ZiNL) on April 1, 2014. In this 
thesis, reference is made to CVZ for publications prior to that date, otherwise ZiNL is used.
3  The Dutch Council for Public Health and Care had a substantial role in the realisation of the current framework.[23,24]
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about pharmaceuticals. The intention of ZiNL, however, is to extend its scope to all of the types of 
care that are eligible for inclusion in the basic benefits package covered under the Health Insurance 
Act. In other words, the ultimate aim is to create one comprehensive decision-making framework to 
facilitate decisions about which interventions – curative and preventive – should be reimbursed. This 
ambitious proposition raises a variety of questions, one of which is whether the use of such a common 
framework is likely to result in a higher priority for – and therefore more spending on – preventive 
interventions than is currently the case. Moreover, using the framework to evaluate preventive 
lifestyle interventions involves some important challenges regarding the operationalisation of the 
different decision criteria. It is important to investigate how preventive or lifestyle interventions will 
be evaluated using the proposed decision criteria within the Dutch context, especially since the 
(previous) Dutch government expressed the intention to dedicate more resources to prevention and 
especially lifestyle interventions.[25]
In this chapter, we focus on the main criteria used in the decision-making framework used in the 
Netherlands. With the decision-making framework, we mean here a set of important criteria and the 
decision rule based on those criteria. In particular, we highlight several important normative issues 
that need attention when operationalising the criteria used in the framework, which are especially 
relevant for lifestyle interventions. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we 
briefly discuss the proposed decision-making framework in the Netherlands. Then, we highlight some 
of the normative choices required to make the criteria ‘necessity’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’ 
fully operational. Then, we focus on how these choices may influence the evaluation of lifestyle 
interventions. We end this chapter with a short conclusion.
2.2 THE DUTCH FRAMEWORK
The decision-making framework adopted in the Netherlands may be viewed as the result of a long-
lasting process. The ‘Dunning Report (1991)’ of the Committee on Choices in Healthcare – better known 
as the Dunning Committee – importantly spurred the debate in this area.[26] The Dunning Committee 
proposed a framework, depicted as a funnel with sieves, consisting of four explicit selection criteria 
to be used in funding decisions: necessity, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness (or efficiency) and own 
responsibility/payment. The first three criteria of Dunning – necessity, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness 
– are still used as such by ZiNL and constitute the central part of the first phase in the decision-making 
process: the assessment phase. The fourth criterion of the Dunning Committee, ‘own responsibility/
payment’, appears to have a less-prominent role now but is incorporated, to some extent, in the 
‘necessity’ criterion.
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In the assessment phase, a quantitative evaluation on the basis of the three main decision criteria takes 
place. This addresses the question of whether an intervention should, in principle, be reimbursed (by 
uptake within the basic benefits package). Although the ZiNL model does not include the fourth 
criterion of the Dunning Committee, it does include a different fourth criterion in the assessment 
phase – the so-called ‘feasibility criterion’. The feasibility criterion considers whether implementing 
an intervention is feasible in terms of available resources, accessibility, legal restrictions, moral 
restrictions, etc. It thus considers the current and future impact on the sustainability of the healthcare 
system. This criterion is clearly important, although, to date, it is less developed than the first three. 
One may view the criterion as, on the one hand, investigating whether an intervention would fit the 
legal, ethical, organisational and financial boundaries the healthcare sector is faced with. This can be 
viewed as (partially) preceding all other considerations. On the other hand, it also considers more 
practical issues related to the successful implementation of interventions. We do note that elements 
of feasibility can be particularly important, especially for lifestyle interventions. For instance, questions 
may be raised regarding the ‘medicalisation’ of health problems caused by unhealthy behaviour and 
regarding the desirability of having solidarity when healthcare expenditures are made because of 
‘consciously chosen’ habits. Especially, as many of these considerations are intervention specific, and 
as the criterion of feasibility remains less developed, we focus here on the other criteria of necessity, 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. This choice is also motivated by the fact that the ‘decision rule’ 
used in the assessment phase, highlighted below, only includes these three criteria.
The assessment phase involves the collection and assessment of information on the four above-
named criteria and culminates in a preliminary decision (based on effectiveness, cost-effectiveness 
and necessity) about whether the intervention should be included in the basic benefits package. 
This phase is followed by the so-called appraisal phase, where more qualitative arguments for or 
against reimbursement (including those related to feasibility) can be weighed against the preliminary 
conclusion reached in the assessment phase. We will now first highlight the three most prominent 
criteria in the assessment phase, after which we discuss the appraisal phase.
The assessment phase: three main decision criteria
First, the necessity criterion embodies the question whether the disease or required care justifies a 
claim on solidarity.[21,22] 4 Within the Dutch context, necessity is commonly operationalised in terms of 
a particular definition of disease burden: proportional shortfall.[21-24,27-29] 5 Proportional shortfall has been 
proposed as combining two important existing equity concepts: fair innings and prospective health. 
The fair innings approach argues that every individual is entitled to a certain amount of health over 
his or her entire lifespan.[e.g., 30] Priority is given to people who are further away from achieving this ‘fair 
4 Note that there is no hierarchy among the criteria. Usually the effectiveness of an intervention is determined first.
5 Note that ZiNL distinguishes two incongruent dimensions within this criterion: ‘disease burden’ and ‘necessity to 
insure’. The latter dimension importantly relates to the height of the costs and whether these justify insurance of the 
treatment.
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share’ of health. Prospective health, on the other hand, can be viewed as looking at the prospective 
health (gain or loss), rather than considering prior health consumption as well. Stolk et al.[29] point out 
that ‘‘proportional shortfall has in common with fair innings that the size of the health gap is relevant, but it 
agrees with severity of illness that also the remaining no-treatment QALY expectation should be taken into 
account’’. It must be noted that Stolk et al.[29] use the term ‘severity of illness’ here rather than prospective 
health. Their definition of severity of illness is prospective health, which implies a narrower view of the 
concept severity of illness than proposed elsewhere.[e.g., 31] In fact, in a broader definition, proportional 
shortfall can be seen as a severity of illness measure. For the current study, such definitional issues 
are less important than the operationalisation of the necessity measure in practice. Proportional 
shortfall aims to prioritise on the basis of the fraction of remaining quality adjusted life-years (QALYs) 
or health in the normal lifespan that will be forgone if a condition remains untreated. In other words, 
proportional shortfall determines the worse-off not by looking at absolute health achievements, but 
rather by looking at health achievements in relative terms – see equation 1[28,29,32]:
Proportional shortfall = QALYs lived without disease – QALYs lived with disease   (1)
         
             QALYs lived without disease
The nominator in equation 1 shows the loss of QALYs in case of no treatment (normal QALY expectancy 
minus QALY expectancy with disease but without treatment), whereas the denominator contains the 
remaining QALY expectation without the disease (usually based on gender and age-specific quality of 
life data). The range of proportional shortfall varies from 0 (no QALY loss) to 1 (total loss of remaining 
QALYs). For example, consider a 40-year-old man who suffers from acute heart failure, which will lead, 
without treatment, to immediate death. If without heart failure he would live until 80 years of age 
(for simplicity, all these years are lived in full health), he may lose all 40 remaining QALYs (healthy 
years). In this case, the proportional shortfall will be 100% or 1 (40 QALYs/40 QALYs). If instead he 
would suffer from a non-life-threatening illness, living until 80 years in a health state that is valued at 
0.5 QALY so that each year counts for 0.5 QALY and therefore that 40 x 0.5 or 20 QALYs are lost, the 
proportional shortfall will be 0.5 (i.e., 20/40). By now, proportional shortfall has been calculated for 
numerous diseases.[e.g., 23]
The other two criteria are effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, where the latter criterion comprises 
the former, obviously. Information on the (cost-)effectiveness of an intervention is usually acquired 
through a cost–utility analysis, a specific type of economic evaluation.[33] The effectiveness criterion is 
the most accepted and explicitly applied criterion of the three main decision-making criteria. It is well 
accepted that an intervention should at least result in a desired effect. In other words, care should 
reduce a healthcare need or prevent it from increasing.6 Within a cost-effectiveness study, effects are 
6 Note that besides this more clinical effectiveness, ZiNL also refers to effectiveness in a broader sense that comprises, 
among other things, safety and user-friendliness.[21]
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typically expressed in terms of QALYs. This is a quantitative utility measure, which captures both length 
and quality of life. Every lived life-year is weighted for the quality of life during that year. QALY scores 
usually range between 0 (death) and 1 (perfect health), although they may take negative values as 
well for very poor health states, which are evaluated to be ‘worse than dead’.
When the effects of an intervention, in terms of QALYs gained relative to some comparator, are 
established, they may subsequently be confronted with the costs of that intervention (again relative 
to the comparator). Cost-effectiveness is increasingly becoming an important and accepted decision 
criterion in healthcare decision-making.[e.g., 34-36] Given the societal perspective advocated in the 
Netherlands, the costs should comprise all relevant societal costs, including for instance productivity 
costs and costs of informal care. Thus, an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is determined, 
which divides the QALYs gained by the incremental societal costs incurred.
The provisional decision
Once information on both the necessity and the cost-effectiveness of an intervention is gathered, this 
can be used to reach a (preliminary) decision on the desirability of the intervention to be included in 
the basic benefits package. The common decision rule used in this context is to evaluate the ICER in 
relation to some relevant threshold value of costs per QALY.[e.g., 37,38] This threshold is a much-debated 
topic. Not only is there discussion about what the threshold should represent (some social value of 
a QALY or rather the marginal cost-effectiveness of current spending in the healthcare sector[34] 7) 
but also the height of the threshold.[39-41] However, in the Dutch context, the threshold appears to 
represent the social value of a QALY,[42] the height and nature of the threshold are not yet clear. Often 
mentioned threshold values in the Dutch context were €18,000 and €20,000 per QALY. These values, 
however, lacked a proper foundation.[42] Moreover, increasingly it was acknowledged that having one 
threshold value for the costs per QALY was incompatible with the full decision framework, which links 
the necessity criterion to that of cost-effectiveness. The final decision rule is based on the assumption 
that society might be willing to spend more per QALY in case of interventions that target a disease 
that imposes a higher disease burden. This implies that higher costs per QALY are accepted when the 
disease causes a higher burden, that is, has a higher proportional shortfall (see Figure 2.1). Stolk et al.[28] 
show that this equity-weighted cost-effectiveness threshold may better explain past reimbursement 
decisions than a fixed threshold value. They also provide normative arguments in favour of such a 
‘flexible’ threshold.
To apply the decision framework and rule, ZiNL and the Dutch Council for Public Health and 
Healthcare Council (RVZ) tentatively argue that a maximum threshold value of €80,000 may be 
considered appropriate.[22,23] Moreover, they argue that for those illnesses where the disease burden 
7 In relation to a fixed budget, that represents the health forgone by allowing the intervention under study in the 
package. All other things equal, allowing something in the package with a more favourable ICER will then result in 
more health gained with the budget, otherwise, the total amount of health produced will drop.
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may be considered minimal, a very low (or even zero) societal willingness to pay per QALY may be 
applicable (hence the dotted starting point of the threshold line in Figure 2.1). Nevertheless, there 
is no consensus on the exact form of the relationship between proportional shortfall and cost-
effectiveness (here drawn as a linear line), as well as the starting point and end point of the line. The 
currently mentioned threshold values lack a sound empirical basis.[42] 8
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FIGURE 2.1 The decision framework for the assessment phase: a shifting threshold according to necessity
The appraisal phase
Despite the importance of decision criteria, it is also increasingly recognised that strict adherence to a 
rational, non-contradictory set of criteria may not be feasible, as important normative, ‘unquantifiable’ 
judgments may then be disregarded. Therefore, the assessment phase is followed by an appraisal 
phase. The appraisal phase constitutes a societal verification of the preliminary decision reached in 
the assessment phase by an independent committee of experts with different societal roles. This 
committee reviews the material gathered in the assessment phase and then decides whether to 
include the technology in the basic benefits package, after taking the preliminary decision and other 
aspects (feasibility, ethical, societal, etc.) into consideration. The meetings are open to the public and 
the minutes of the meeting are available to all. The inclusion of this appraisal phase was intended 
to increase public support for conclusions about reimbursement drawn by ZiNL. When this second 
phase is completed, advice regarding reimbursement of the intervention is presented by ZiNL to the 
Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport.
8 Note that, indeed, regarding the latter, RVZ argues in favour of withholding treatment from funding for which the 
disease causes only very low disease burden; according to RVZ, this boundary could be set at a loss of 10% or less of 
total remaining health as shown in the figure.
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2.3 THE DECISION FRAMEWORK AND LIFESTYLE INTERVENTIONS
In this section, we will further address the different elements and phases in the decision-making 
framework in relation to lifestyle interventions.
Necessity
Two (underexplored) issues regarding the use of proportional shortfall as operationalisation of 
necessity may be of particular relevance to the measurement of proportional shortfall regarding 
lifestyle interventions: the (sub-)group in which proportional shortfall is measured and the moment 
that the measurement of proportional shortfall begins.9
Regarding the first issue, consider some preventive treatment for a group of 100 individuals who all 
have high cholesterol. Suppose now that only 10 of them will incur health losses when untreated 
and thus will benefit from this treatment. Two options for measuring proportional shortfall may be 
distinguished.[28] First, one may include only those people who would actually incur health losses as a 
consequence of high cholesterol (i.e., only 10 out of the 100 people) or, alternatively, one may include 
all individuals undergoing treatment, including the ones for whom treatment is unnecessary, as they 
would not experience any health losses without prevention. Not surprisingly, average proportional 
shortfall will be much lower in the latter case, as 90 individuals will have a proportional shortfall of 0.
Stolk et al.[28] offer several arguments in favour of measuring the average proportional shortfall only 
in the subgroup that actually experiences the health losses for which treatment is considered. First, 
cost–utility analyses of preventive interventions include the costs of all individuals undergoing 
the preventive intervention, including the costs for those individuals who do not benefit from the 
treatment (as it is usually impossible to identify a priori only those people who actually benefit from 
the treatment). Although few will contest this practice, the logical result is a less-favourable cost–
utility ratio (more costs but same effects). Doing the same when measuring proportional shortfall may 
be considered ‘double counting’, as the intervention is blamed twice for the same characteristic (i.e., 
lack of identification of individuals who actually benefit). Thus, individuals in need of this preventive 
intervention who already face a higher cost–utility ratio, would then also be confronted with their 
condition receiving a lower equity weight.
A second argument is that an equity measure is concerned with the worse-off, and therefore it is 
important to consider on what condition we base our assessment of the worse-off, that is, the specific 
health losses the treatment is trying to prevent. In our example, treatment is obviously aimed at 
9 Note that these two issues are also relevant when using other equity concepts. Moreover, note that equity here refers 
especially to the situation of patients on a micro level, as opposed to a macro level. This distinguishes it from burden 
of illness approaches where prevalence is important. For the calculation of current equity weights, prevalence is 
irrelevant.
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avoiding health losses (in terms of quality of life or life-years) as a consequence of coronary heart 
disease and not high cholesterol itself. Stolk et al.[28] argue that it would be appropriate to perform 
the equity measurement only on those individuals who incur heart disease (instead of on all those 
who have high cholesterol). Then the equity measurement would be ‘‘independent of the prevalence 
of cardiovascular events in a particular group, and of diagnostic accuracy in identifying the patients at the 
highest risk’’[28]. In other words, who we consider to be worse-off is then independent of the success, in 
terms of health gains, of a treatment.
A second important issue in measuring proportional shortfall is when to start calculating the shortfall. 
Think of a 40-year-old patient with high cholesterol who will die after heart failure at the age of 60 
without preventive treatment (with treatment he would live in perfect health to become 80 years 
old). A first option is to measure proportional shortfall at the point when the preventive intervention 
is given (at age 40). Alternatively, measurement could start when the potentially prevented health 
problems would actually occur (at age 60). In case of the latter option, a shorter time frame is 
considered (20 years instead of 40 years), and therefore proportional shortfall will be higher (losing 20 
years out of 20 years makes a proportional shortfall of 1, while losing 20 years out of 40 years makes 
0.5). Stolk et al.[28] argue in favour of starting the measurement of proportional shortfall at the time 
of the treatment instead of the moment the illness actually occurs. This argument is based on the 
concept of urgency. People may prefer treatment among those in danger of imminent, severe health 
loss or immediate death, than treatment among those who face a similar fate in 20 years time (and 
now are still healthy).[43]
It is clear that the priority given to lifestyle interventions may be strongly affected by these inherently 
normative choices. In practice, both methodological choices mentioned above may indeed result 
in more than significant differences in outcome.[28] Stolk et al.[28] explicitly call for more debate and 
research in this area, stating that ‘‘… it is insufficient to scrutinise just the general ideas behind an equity 
concept and … just as much attention should be directed to the methodological choices in adopting each 
one of them’’. To date, however, it remains unclear how necessity should be exactly operationalised, 
but still it is operationalised (when used at all) along the lines proposed by Stolk et al.[28] 10
Effectiveness
An important problem arising when applying the decision criteria in practice is that high-quality 
data or evidence on effectiveness is often lacking.[22] For example, Stolk et al.[36] argue that for medical 
specialist care this problem often arises. This is also true for lifestyle interventions. When establishing 
10 Note that there are other normative choices regarding the measurement of proportional shortfall. One that does 
not especially affect the evaluation of preventive treatments, but deserves mentioning, is the use of additional 
age weights. According to the proportional shortfall approach, treatment of two persons may be deemed equally 
necessary, even though their ages differ remarkably. However, society may prefer treatment among the young over 
the old. To correct for this, additional age weights may be used to reflect society’s preferences.[28,32]
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the (cost-)effectiveness of an intervention, Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) are considered to 
be the state of the art, by ZiNL. However, for preventive interventions, especially those aimed at 
lifestyle changes, such evidence may be hard to come by, also in pragmatic trials. There are several 
possible explanations why this is the case. First, a well-designed RCT requires a controlled setting in 
which possible confounding factors are neutralised so that any significant effects can be adequately 
ascribed to the intervention. As RCTs of lifestyle interventions are often pragmatic and situated in 
the ‘real world’, it may be more difficult to rule out confounding in investigating the effectiveness of 
such interventions,[44] especially when it is difficult to randomise. Second, long follow-ups are often 
required for the evaluation of lifestyle interventions, as the effects will usually only show many years 
later. This is often problematic. Third, effectiveness of lifestyle interventions are often reported in 
intermediate health outcomes, such as weight loss.[44] Although such outcome measures may indeed 
result in increased health, and may have some clinical meaning themselves,[33] policy makers in charge 
of allocating healthcare resources may be more interested in final health outcomes. Final outcomes 
may, among other things, increase the comparability of different types of treatment. Thus, when 
intermediate outcomes are used, a link needs to be made to final health outcomes using decision 
modelling based on epidemiological data.[33] This is, however, not an easy task, nor may it always be 
considered as ‘high-quality evidence’. Finally, in contrast to, for instance, the pharmaceutical sector, 
it is unclear who will provide for and finance evidence regarding necessity and (cost-)effectiveness 
when applying for funding of an intervention in the context of the basic benefits package. Although 
pharmaceutical companies commonly have to provide the evidence themselves, funding for such 
research is often not (automatically) available in other areas.
In the area of lifestyle interventions, these difficulties regarding data collection may have important 
additional implications. Lifestyle interventions often consist of drugs, behavioural support (e.g., 
consultations) or a combination of both. The lack of data may lead to the impression that the 
behavioural or combined interventions are not (cost-)effective. The drug option might receive priority, 
although it may be the less-optimal solution. Hence, more effort is advocated to resolve the difficulties 
associated with gathering evidence for lifestyle interventions.[22]
Cost-effectiveness
Three issues that may particularly influence the cost-effectiveness of lifestyle interventions are 
discussed next: the perspective of the analysis, the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years 
gained and discounting of costs and effects. ZiNL offers guidance on how to deal with these issues.[21] 
Several methodological issues are, however, still subject of considerable debate in the international 
literature. Moreover, in some instances, the guidelines seem to lack a proper theoretical foundation.
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The Dutch guidelines currently promote the use of a societal perspective in economic evaluations.[21] 
From a societal perspective, several cost categories can be distinguished: direct medical costs, direct 
non-medical costs, indirect non-medical costs and indirect medical costs.[45] Direct medical costs are 
directly related to the intervention under study (e.g., costs of tests, medication, etc.). Direct non-medical 
costs are also directly related to the relevant intervention or condition, but do not fall within the 
formal healthcare sector. Examples are costs of informal care and patients’ travel costs and time costs. 
Indirect non-medical costs are predominantly related to the changes in the productivity of individuals 
as a consequence of an intervention.[e.g., 46] Finally, indirect medical costs are medical expenditures in 
life-years gained because of a life-prolonging intervention. These costs refer to medical costs incurred 
in gained life-years and are usually further broken down into related and unrelated costs. The related 
indirect medical costs are related to the intervention (e.g., anti-rejection medication after a life-saving 
long transplant), whereas the unrelated indirect medical costs are not directly related to the life-
prolonging treatment (e.g., costs of a hip surgery in life-years gained because of the life-saving long 
transplant).
Adopting the societal perspective implies that all relevant costs and benefits should be considered 
in an evaluation, regardless of where they fall. For example, if preventive lifestyle interventions 
involve activities in the education sector, the costs incurred there should not go unnoticed in an 
economic evaluation. Doing so would result in a misrepresentation of the cost-effectiveness of such 
an intervention.
Nevertheless, surprisingly, the Dutch guidelines for economic evaluation explicitly recommend the 
exclusion of one particular type of costs, that is, unrelated medical costs in gained life-years.[21] This is 
despite the fact that the literature appears to argue strongly in favour of inclusion of these costs for 
reasons of consistency and optimality (for a review, see Rappange et al.[47]). It has been argued that it 
would be inconsistent to ignore these unrelated medical costs in life-years gained, as the denominator 
of the cost–utility ratio (i.e., the benefits side expressed in terms of QALYs) implicitly assumes normal 
care consumption in these life-years gained.[48] In addition, Meltzer[49] argues that excluding these 
costs would lead to a non-optimal allocation of healthcare resources. The consideration of unrelated 
medical costs in life-years gained in the economic evaluation of healthcare interventions may have 
several important implications for cost-effectiveness results and subsequent decision-making.[50] 
Including these future costs worsens the cost-effectiveness of life-prolonging interventions relative 
to quality of life improving interventions, thus potentially re-allocating resources away from life-
prolonging intervention towards quality of life improving interventions. Furthermore, van Baal et al.[50] 
show that including these costs may favour interventions targeted at the young over those targeted 
at the elderly, as the former incur these future additional unrelated medical costs further in the future 
and are therefore discounted relatively more. Given that preventive lifestyle interventions may indeed 
importantly prolong life (e.g., smoking cessation), current guidelines result in biased cost-effectiveness 
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results. This point is compounded by the fact that non-medical costs in added life-years are typically 
ignored as well, which reflects the considerable controversy around these costs in the international 
literature.[e.g., 48,51-54]
A final issue that may importantly affect the cost-effectiveness of lifestyle interventions is discounting. 
Applying discount rates for future costs and effects is widely accepted and a common practice 
in economic evaluations.[33] However, more controversy exists on the height of the discount rates 
for costs and effects. Preventive interventions often incur immediate costs, yet yield health effects 
(far) in the future. Hence, applying higher discount rates will generally make the cost-effectiveness 
ratio of a preventive intervention less favourable, especially compared with curative interventions. 
Recently, arguments have been put forward in favour of differential discounting – using two distinct 
discount rates, one for costs and one for effects. The main argument for this is that if the social value 
of health increases over time (which seems uncontroversial but is not accounted for in common 
cost–utility analyses), this may be corrected for by using a lower discount rate for effects relative to 
that for costs.[e.g., 37,55-57] In the Netherlands, such differential discounting is currently prescribed: 4% 
for costs and 1.5% for health effects.[21] Opponents of differential discounting normally indicate that 
using two distinct discount rates would be inconsistent[e.g., 58] or would lead to infinite postponement 
of interventions, as postponing the intervention results in more favourable ICERs the longer the 
postponement lasts when the discount rate for costs is higher than that for effects[59]. However, these 
arguments have been countered in the literature[e.g., 37,56] and it appears that it is increasingly accepted 
that there is no inherent need for equal discount rates for costs and effects[57]. More attention for the 
(intergenerational) equity aspects of discounting seems warranted as well. People may weight health 
gains in different generations differently for equity reasons, for instance, giving lower weight to gains 
in generations with a relatively high life expectancy.[e.g., 60]
Using a lower discount rate for effects than for costs (as commonly advocated by proponents of 
differential discounting), which thus implicitly implies attaching more weight to future health benefits, 
may substantially lower – thus more favourable – ICERs for preventive interventions. Further, when 
judged against some (more or less) fixed threshold or compared with more curative interventions, 
the choices regarding discount rates may directly influence the chances of an intervention to be 
implemented. The issue of discounting is still subject of much debate, yet the current discount rules 
applied by ZiNL in an international context are favourable for prevention.
Decision rule and appraisal phase
In terms of the decision rule, it is clear that the decision framework is not completely operational 
yet. There is no clear consensus regarding the appropriate threshold for costs per QALY or how 
that exactly should vary with severity of illness. The debate on appropriate thresholds is increasing, 
internationally as well. Both the nature of the threshold (what it should represent) and, related, the 
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appropriate height of the threshold (in different contexts) are matters of debate and study.[e.g., 19,40,57] 
It will be crucial to further set appropriate thresholds in order to be able to use the framework in 
practice. In that sense, it is not only clear that internationally very little is known regarding the value of 
QALY gains[61] and even less so about how this varies with specific disease contexts,[62] but also that the 
underpinning of the currently proposed threshold range (from €10,000 to €80,000) is very weak[42]. It 
is important to have better justified thresholds for QALY gains if aiming to apply the decision-making 
framework in practice.
One of the interesting questions in this context is whether the thresholds should be equal for 
curative and preventive interventions. Especially for preventive interventions where it is unclear 
which person exactly benefits from the intervention (i.e., have a more anonymous, statistical nature), 
although beneficiaries of curative interventions are identifiable, it is interesting to note that it has 
been argued that the value of a statistical life is lower than that of an identifiable life. Like Dranove[63] 
noted: ‘‘There is no reason to expect that the value of a statistical life would equal the value of an identified 
life’’. This obviously is rather relevant for evaluating preventive interventions. However, although this 
discrepancy in values may be observable in empirical studies, it is rather questionable whether a 
government would want to apply different thresholds for these situations. The normative grounds 
for this distinction are unclear. Moreover, when considering an example when choosing between a 
preventive action today that tomorrow will reduce the occurrence of an acute disease for which a 
curative intervention exists, the inconsistency of having two thresholds becomes obvious.
Nevertheless, even with better knowledge of the threshold, it is clear that besides an assessment phase, 
an appraisal phase remains necessary. Several considerations enter this phase that may be of particular 
interest in case of lifestyle interventions. One of these considerations concerns the culpability and own 
responsibility argument. This is related to the question whether a specific intervention should be paid 
from individuals’ own pocket (which was prominent in the fourth Dunning criterion). Clear criteria for 
when something can be left to an individuals’ own responsibility are lacking. Moreover, interventions 
targeting the consequences of (consciously) taking health risks (e.g., smoking, drinking and not 
exercising) may be viewed differently than those targeting illnesses that are not related to lifestyle. In 
case of the former, the degree of solidarity that society has with the involved individuals may be less 
than otherwise. It seems, however, that such arguments not only use a notion of responsibility that 
may be debatable (e.g., given the overrepresentation of smokers in low socio-economic groups), they 
are also not always used consistently. For instance, more emphasis seems to be placed on culpability 
in case of lifestyle interventions than in case of curative interventions (e.g., smoking vs. lung cancer). 
Moreover, it is important to note that current Dutch law prohibits denying reimbursement on the 
grounds of culpability.
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It is important to avoid arbitrariness in the appraisal phase and to make all considerations explicit and 
use them as consistently as possible. The fact that some arguments cannot be quantified should not 
result in inconsistencies in or lack of transparency of the appraisal phase.
2.4 TOWARDS IMPROVED EVALUATION OF PREVENTIVE LIFESTYLE 
INTERVENTIONS
The search for the decision criteria that should play a role in healthcare priority setting has been 
a longstanding process. Recently, as discussed, a healthcare decision-making framework was 
developed and proposed in which the criteria ‘necessity’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’ play a central role. 
Many normative choices, however, need to be made explicit to make these decision criteria, and thus 
the decision framework operational, transparent and legitimate. In this chapter, we have indicated 
that this operationalisation process is by no means trivial and that many issues remain open.
The success of the decision-making framework will, to a large extent, also depend on whether the 
scope of applying the decision criteria can be extended to all types of healthcare interventions and 
technologies. An important barrier in this context regards the collection of evidence for interventions 
such as preventive lifestyle interventions. The question of how to deal with ‘lower’ levels of evidence 
for such interventions is important. Moreover, when considering necessity, the way in which the 
necessity score is being calculated requires more public attention than it received so far. The same 
holds for normative choices underlying the measurement of cost-effectiveness, for example, regarding 
discounting and the inclusion of controversial costs. It seems that many challenges remain before the 
decision-making framework and its criteria can be successfully applied in practice.
Moreover, it requires a consistent use of the framework itself. For instance, ZiNL recently evaluated 
a smoking cessation programme, combining therapeutic and drug therapies, for uptake within the 
basic benefits package. Regarding the ‘necessity’ criterion, ZiNL concluded that smoking results in 
a high disease burden.[64] Interestingly, disease burden is expressed in disability adjusted life-years 
(DALYs) instead of proportional shortfall, and thus, here, refers to an absolute measure of overall 
disease burden rather than severity of illness. The effectiveness of the combined smoking cessation 
treatment has been assessed before (success rates varying between 8% and 20%) and is anchored in 
a recently updated clinical guideline.[65] The ICER was relatively favourable (compared with the current 
standard, i.e., only therapeutic therapy), that is, €19,000. This ICER did include the indirect medical 
costs (although guidelines advice not to) and adopted a discount rate of 4% for both costs and effects 
(whereas guidelines advice a 1.5% discount rate for effects). ZiNL argues that the ICER would be much 
lower (reducing the ICER by some 50%) if a lower discount rate for effects would have been used. The 
cost-effectiveness study took a healthcare perspective rather than the prescribed societal perspective, 
and therefore excludes important costs such as those related to productivity changes.[64] Therefore, it 
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seems that ZiNL currently does not strictly adhere to its own decision-making framework. Although 
there may be reasons for this, both general ones (e.g., the lack of clarity on the exact height and shape 
of the threshold line) and particular ones (e.g., availability of good studies taking the preferred societal 
perspective, etc.), attempting to be as consistent as possible in using the framework is crucial.
Therefore, to obtain sound evaluations of lifestyle interventions, it is important to further develop 
and justify the current decision-making framework and examine its current operationalisation, as well 
as consider the specific aspects of interventions such as lifestyle interventions. These interventions 
need to be evaluated using the same decision-making framework in order to ensure consistency, 
but it needs to be ensured that the (operationalisation of the) framework is suitable for this purpose. 
Currently, the Dutch healthcare system is (still) characterised by relatively low investments in 
programmes promoting healthy behaviour. Clearly, current investments in such interventions are at 
variance with the increased impact of unhealthy behaviour on population health, that is, preventable 
disease burden. Whether spending more money on prevention is justified can only be determined 
by comparing interventions (curative and preventive) within a similar framework, which comprises 
all aspects considered relevant.[66] In this context, it is important to realise that choices on how to 
operationalise the decision criteria need not be made such as to promote prevention, but such as to 
arrive at an appropriate, consistent and transparent framework for setting priorities.[19,66] This indeed 
should be high on the priority list.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Economic evaluations are usually used to inform policy makers about the costs and benefits of a 
given change in resource allocation (e.g., introducing a particular healthcare intervention). The 
general idea behind such evaluations is that a particular intervention should only be introduced if the 
associated benefits are found to outweigh the associated costs. Therefore, it is obviously important to 
determine which costs and benefits should be included in an economic evaluation. The theoretical 
welfare economic answer is simple: if we really want to know whether the benefits outweigh the 
costs, we need to include all the costs and benefits, and neither exclude anything relevant nor count 
anything twice. However, in practice, the issue of what to consider in economic evaluations of health 
technologies has been and remains an area of much controversy. Some[1-3] promote a broad societal 
perspective that theoretically should comprise all relevant costs and effects. Others[4] suggest a 
narrower perspective, most notably a healthcare perspective, as being most relevant in the context 
of healthcare decision-making. If the latter option is chosen, costs (and effects) falling outside of this 
perspective are systematically ignored and deemed irrelevant for the healthcare decision-maker. For 
example, the inclusion or exclusion of productivity costs depends on the perspective chosen,[1,5,6] as 
they do not fall under the healthcare budget, but do represent real societal costs.
Unrelated future medical costs are a potentially important yet often ignored cost that is relevant in 
both these perspectives. These costs, also referred to as indirect medical costs or survivor medical 
costs, are an indirect result of an intervention that has successfully prolonged the life of an individual. 
During these added years of life, this individual, just like any other person, may fall ill and consume 
healthcare. This healthcare consumption may be termed either related or unrelated to the life-saving 
intervention. For example, Bob is a 60-year-old male with acute heart failure. Immediate treatment, 
involving bypass surgery, has prevented Bob from dying. He recovers completely, although he does 
require lifelong medication for his heart condition. Bob will now live on to the age of 80 years; however, 
at age 75 years, Bob trips over and breaks his hip. After a total hip replacement and much therapy, 
Bob is mobile again. When calculating the cost-effectiveness of the bypass surgery that prolongs 
Bob’s life by 20 years, we normally take into account the related costs during these added life-years 
(i.e., the costs of the required medication). The unrelated medical costs are those related to the hip 
replacement. Should they be included in the analysis of the heart surgery as well?
The answer may be considered straightforward. Indeed, since all medical consumption during the 
gained life-years would not have occurred if the initial intervention (i.e., the bypass surgery) had not 
taken place, and since it represents actual medical resource use, the inclusion of these costs seems 
required in order to reach optimal and informed funding decisions. But while this inclusion of related 
costs in gained life-years is uncontroversial,[7] the inclusion of unrelated costs is still very contentious. 
Using the example above, some would argue that the bypass surgery should be judged ‘in isolation’ 
and that it cannot be blamed for subsequent decisions or interventions such as hip replacement.[8]
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Others have argued that inclusion is irrelevant so long as the practice of inclusion or exclusion is 
consistently executed, since it would only entail adding a constant to cost-effectiveness ratios, 
which does not alter the relative efficiency of different interventions and, therefore, does not affect 
subsequent prioritisation of interventions (or decision-making).[9] However, arguments in favour of 
inclusion of these costs as being real healthcare costs are increasing, and practical ways to do so 
have been explored.[10-13] This controversy is persistent and many guidelines for economic evaluations 
of health technologies either instruct analysts to exclude these costs or leave inclusion up to the 
discretion of the analyst. For instance, the Dutch guidelines for pharmacoeconomic evaluations[14] 
explicitly state that unrelated medical costs in life-years gained should be excluded from the analysis. 
Indeed, excluding these unrelated medical costs is common practice in most economic evaluation 
studies.[15-17]
However, recent arguments in favour of including such survivor costs of unrelated medical care appear 
to be gaining support.[10-13,18,19] 1 One of the main arguments in favour of including unrelated future 
medical costs has been labelled the internal consistency argument.[11,13] This argues that what is being 
projected as gains (benefits) in an economic evaluation needs to be consistent with what is being 
counted as costs in that same evaluation. Since most projections of QALY gains (e.g., based on average 
healthy life expectancy in the population) implicitly assume normal medical care consumption 
during added life-years (without which the healthy life expectancy cannot be attained), it would be 
inconsistent to exclude the associated costs. For example, if we calculate the QALY gain for Bob due to 
the bypass surgery by using the actual predicted health level until the age of 80 years, achieving this 
health level requires the hip replacement. Projecting the gain due to the hip replacement but not the 
associated costs would thus be inconsistent. Another crucial argument, most forcefully put forward 
by Meltzer[18] is that ignoring future medical costs is not consistent with lifetime utility maximisation. 
Thus, ignoring these costs does not result in optimal decision-making.
Therefore, it appears timely to reconsider the current practice of ignoring unrelated medical costs. 
This will especially change the outcomes of economic evaluations of interventions that substantially 
prolong life, for example, in the curative sector (i.e., neonatal surgery) and in the preventive sector 
(i.e., reducing risk factors such as obesity or smoking).[21] We provide an overview of the literature so 
far and highlight the consequences of different practices of accounting for costs and effects in cost-
effectiveness analyses, using a preventive intervention example based on a recent study by van Baal 
et al.[13]
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief description of different cost 
categories that can be distinguished in economic evaluations; section 3.3 highlights the debate about 
unrelated future medical costs as well as some current recommendations regarding their inclusion 
1  However, it must be noted that the debate does continue.[20]
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   46 23-03-16   10:15
347
Unrelated Medical Costs in Life-Years Gained
in US, Dutch, UK and Swedish guidelines. Section 3.4 presents some recent developments in the 
literature and in section 3.5, we use an example of a smoking-cessation intervention[13] to present four 
different cost-utility ratios to demonstrate the consequences of different practices of accounting for 
unrelated future medical costs. Finally, section 3.6 concludes this chapter by drawing some lessons for 
the inclusion of these controversial costs in economic evaluations.
3.2 ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS AND COST CATEGORIES
Economic evaluations in healthcare compare the costs and effects of a given medical intervention 
with the costs and effects of a relevant alternative (comparator). Health effects are usually valued in 
some common denominator (e.g., QALYs). The ratio of additional monetary costs to QALYs gained (i.e., 
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio [ICER]) can then be calculated. Ideally, the ICER enables the 
investigator to judge whether the incremental health effects of the intervention justify its incremental 
monetary costs. In calculating costs, it is important to distinguish different types of costs. A common 
categorisation of costs is shown in Figure 3.1, which presents the different types that are directly 
required as input in the intervention (direct medical and non-medical costs) or are indirectly induced 
by the intervention (indirect medical and non-medical costs).[7]
Direct medical
costs (e.g. cost
of medication)
Direct non-
medical costs
(e.g. travel,
informal care,
patient time)
Intervention
Indirect non-medical
costs (e.g. productivity
and consumption
changes) 
Outcomes:
improved length
and/or quality of life 
Indirect medical costs,
related and unrelated
FIGURE 3.1 Different costs in economic evaluations as input in and resulting from an intervention
As Figure 3.1 shows, the direct costs relate to resources that directly contribute to the intervention. 
Indirect costs (which can also be savings, e.g., when productivity changes) can best be viewed as 
consequences of the intervention and the related health improvement. Whether or not these different 
costs are deemed relevant in an intervention is partly determined by the given intervention (e.g., small 
health changes may not be associated with changes in productivity) and, importantly, influenced by 
the perspective chosen for the analysis.
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A societal perspective implies the inclusion of all relevant costs and effects of a medical intervention 
regardless of whether they fall within or outside the healthcare sector, and, in principle, all these costs 
are relevant. When a healthcare perspective is used, the non-medical costs are normally deemed 
irrelevant.2 We discuss these different cost categories further in the following sections.
Direct medical costs
Direct medical costs are usually defined as those that directly relate to the intervention or condition 
under study and fall within the formal healthcare sector. They occur in normal years of life (i.e., the 
years that a patient would have lived with or without the treatment).[7] All costs falling within the 
formal healthcare sector that are related to the intervention or condition (e.g., formal caregivers’ time, 
costs of diagnostic tests, drugs and other hospital materials) belong to this category independent 
of who is financing these costs. This cost category is a central part of any cost-effectiveness analysis, 
whether performed from a societal or a healthcare perspective.3
Direct non-medical costs
Direct non-medical costs are costs that are directly related to the intervention or condition under 
study, but that fall outside the formal healthcare sector. For example, such costs can include patients’ 
travel costs, costs related to patient time in receiving treatment, and informal care costs, but may also 
involve costs incurred due to necessary adjustments in a patient’s living environment. From a societal 
perspective, these costs should be included in economic evaluations since they are a direct input into 
the total treatment. These types of costs can be considered irrelevant when a narrower perspective is 
adopted (e.g., the healthcare perspective, which is largely the reference case in the UK).
Indirect non-medical costs
Indirect non-medical costs are societal costs or savings that occur as a result of changes in a patient’s 
productivity level. These so-called productivity costs occur when an illness leads to absenteeism, 
presenteeism (reduced productivity at work), disability or premature death in a productive person, 
whether paid or unpaid. Other costs may include, for example, those that occur outside the healthcare 
sector, such as costs for special education or, in cases of addiction, police or legal costs. There is, at 
least from a societal perspective, general theoretical consensus that all costs belonging to this cost 
category should be included. However, there continues to be much discussion on how to estimate 
these costs.[1,6,23-30]  
2 While we do not wish to fully address here which perspective is most appropriate, it is clear that some costs may 
be more relevant for healthcare decision-makers than others.[22] On the other hand, simply and completely leaving 
certain costs out of an economic evaluation may still be considered a short-sighted strategy.
3 Those costs in normal life-years unrelated to the intervention are normally excluded from the analysis, since these 
costs are independent of changes in length and quality of life (QOL) due to the intervention under study. Therefore, 
these costs are generally the same for all treatment strategies and cancel out.
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Another type of cost that may be considered as indirect non-medical costs is currently receiving 
considerable attention in the literature: costs of non-medical consumption (net of production) in 
life-years gained (e.g., costs of food, housing and clothing). From a full societal perspective, there 
appears no valid reason to exclude these future non-medical costs. However, inclusion is uncommon 
and exclusion has been advocated for feasibility reasons[7] and for consistency between the cost and 
effect sides of the cost-effectiveness ratio.[11] Consensus on how to handle these costs has yet to be 
achieved.[9-11,20] From the healthcare perspective, indirect non-medical costs can be readily ignored 
(although the line between these costs and future medical costs is somewhat vague – i.e., the costs of 
food and housing of people who are institutionalised can be seen as ‘medical costs’).
Indirect medical costs
Indirect medical costs usually describe medical costs that result from care consumption in life-years 
gained. These costs are relevant when an intervention prolongs the life of a patient, and include costs 
that would not have occurred without the life-prolonging intervention. Moreover, these costs are 
relevant from both a societal and a healthcare perspective, as they involve real societal costs that 
fall under the healthcare budget. These costs are often further described as ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’ 
indirect medical costs.
Related indirect medical costs are related to the life-prolonging intervention. In our earlier 
example, these would be the costs of Bob’s heart condition medication. Another example would 
be the continued use of anti-rejection medication after a life-saving liver transplantation. This care 
consumption is directly related to the intervention that was required for the condition in the first 
place. The inclusion of these related indirect medical costs is normally advocated in an economic 
evaluation.[7]
Unrelated indirect medical costs are a result of consumption of medical care in added life-years, but 
are unrelated to the intervention that was required to treat the initial condition (e.g., the costs of Bob’s 
hip replacement). Obviously, these costs would not have occurred if the patient’s life had not been 
extended, but other than that, these medical consumption costs are unrelated to the intervention 
under study. The inclusion of these costs remains a matter of much debate,[13] and in the remainder of 
this chapter we focus on the inclusion of these costs.4
4 It should be noted that the cost categorisation outlined here is common but certainly not perfect or complete. For 
example, during life-years gained, people may also require informal care, which would be something like ‘indirect 
direct non-medical costs’, etc. It appears to becoming more common to use less aggregate cost categories (e.g., 
productivity costs, informal care, travel costs, etc.) with more meaningful labels.
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3.3 UNRELATED INDIRECT MEDICAL COSTS
The debate on the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained in economic evaluations is 
not new. Weinstein et al. [31] argued that this cost category is often unjustly excluded, “… if treatment 
results in prolonged life because a condition has been cured or early disease has been avoided, then 
the cost of treating later disease that would not otherwise have risen must be considered.” In contrast, 
Russell[8] argues that an intervention should be judged on its own ‘merits’ if the aim of the evaluation 
is to establish whether an intervention produces good value for money. She claims that it would 
be incorrect to attribute additional costs in life-years gained to an intervention just because it is 
successful in prolonging a patient’s life. Russell[8] maintains that “When the question is … simply whether 
the proposed programme is a good use of society’s resources, its indirect effects on medical expenditures 
are no more relevant than its indirect effects on expenditures for food, clothes, or housing.” Indeed, the 
latter type of costs (i.e., survivor consumption costs) is not usually included in economic evaluations; 
however, this is another matter that is also being fiercely debated.[18,32-36] In practice, the viewpoint of 
Russell[8] appears to have received quite some support. For instance, Mushlin and Fintor[37] evaluated 
nine cost-effectiveness studies of breast cancer screening and found that none of the studies had 
included unrelated medical care in life-years gained. The authors concluded that the studies“… 
all avoided the nonsensical conclusion that it is almost always more cost-effective to do nothing than 
to screen and attempt to cure.” It must be noted that while statements such as this are sometimes 
tempting, especially in the pursuit of getting effective screening programmes established, it is rather 
nonsensical to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis in which real costs are deliberately ignored, in 
an attempt to attain the desired results. Obviously, excluding certain costs while keeping the effects 
constant will result in more favourable cost-effectiveness ratios, but then the ultimate strategy would 
be to ignore all costs. Rather than such nonsensical strategies, studies should be performed in a way 
that is methodologically sound and that results in relevant and complete information for the decision-
maker. But what should be the role of unrelated medical costs in gained life-years in that context?
Garber and Phelps[9] tried to shed some light on this issue. They showed that, under certain strict 
assumptions, the inclusion or exclusion of survivor medical costs will not affect the ranking of cost-
effectiveness ratios and that, therefore, they can be safely omitted from the analysis. They claimed 
that if the unrelated future healthcare costs are truly conditionally independent of prior expenditures 
(i.e., independent of the expenditures of the intervention under study) and the practice is consistently 
executed, including these costs would only add a constant figure to all cost-effectiveness ratios. Thus, 
although the cost-effectiveness ratio will increase, the ranking of the ratios remains unaltered.
However, some have questioned these results. First, the US Panel[2] argued that this would only hold if 
interventions were compared that were intended to treat people with similar personal characteristics, 
such as age. Interventions aimed at different age groups and thus adding life-years in different life 
phases would most likely entail different costs per additional life-year. In that case, the inclusion or 
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exclusion of these age-specific future costs would indeed matter and, therefore, the ranking of the 
cost-effectiveness ratios could be influenced.[2] Second, the important assumption in the model of 
Garber and Phelps[9], that future unrelated medical costs are costs that are conditionally independent 
of prior expenditures, would probably not hold in practice.[2,18] In this respect, the Panel[2] argued that 
“It is fair to ask whether the pattern of future expenditures is ever truly unaffected by an intervention that has 
a large impact on longevity.” Finally, related to this point, the Panel[2] claimed that if standard practice 
would be to exclude unrelated medical costs in life-years gained, it would seem almost impossible 
to achieve exclusion in a consistent and comprehensive manner since there “… are practical and 
conceptual problems in disentangling the ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’ components of costs for ‘related’ diseases 
…” Likewise, Weinstein and Manning[19] illustrated the difficulty in separating unrelated costs from 
related costs: “In the analysis of a heart disease programme, for example, one would need to include future 
induced costs that are affected (conditionally upon survival) by the intervention, but exclude all heart 
disease costs that are conditionally independent.”
Meltzer[18] directly addressed the questions and doubts raised by the Garber and Phelps[9] model. 
Using a more general model than Garber and Phelps[9], and relaxing some of their assumptions, he 
reached a completely different conclusion: that both the absolute and relative outcomes of cost-
utility ratios of interventions are significantly altered when future unrelated medical costs are included 
and that their inclusion is required in order to reach optimal decisions.5
In areas of so much debate, guidelines can play an important role in advocating uniform studies 
and harmonising the applied methodology. However, guidelines in different jurisdictions differ 
remarkably in important aspects, including how they handle unrelated medical costs in gained life-
years. We briefly describe how these costs are handled in guidelines from the US, the Netherlands, UK 
and Sweden.[2,4,14,38] 
Guidelines for pharmacoeconomic research
The influential US guidelines[2] most comprehensively addressed the issue of unrelated medical costs 
in gained life-years, but ultimately left the decision of whether to include them or not up to the 
discretion of the analyst. On one hand, the US Panel[2] wrote that including these costs seems self-
evident, since medical care consumption in added life-years is only possible because of the treatment 
under study; ignoring these future costs would not be an adequate reflection of an intervention’s true 
cost to society. However, on the other hand, the Panel pointed out the large amount of support for 
excluding these costs, reasoning that it seems politically inappropriate to consider unrelated medical 
consumption in life-years gained. They claimed that living longer entails additional consumption 
costs, including medical consumption. If these costs would be accounted for, then it would make 
sense to consider all consumption costs, which is uncommon. This reflects the argument of Russell[8].
5 Note that Meltzer[18] extends the discussion by also arguing in favour of including all future non-medical costs, such 
as survivor consumption and survivor earnings.
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Alongside these theoretical considerations, the US Panel[2] also highlighted several practical issues 
surrounding the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained. The first is the aforementioned 
difficulty of distinguishing between related and unrelated medical care, which makes complete 
exclusion of unrelated medical costs extremely difficult. Another practical issue that might hamper 
the inclusion of unrelated medical costs is the lack of comprehensive data of future unrelated medical 
care and the uncertainty of how to estimate the associated costs. Finally, the Panel argued that, if 
unrelated medical care costs are to be included, then so should all costs in added life-years, in line 
with Meltzer’s argument.[18]
In short, the US Panel[2] recommended omitting this cost category if it is small and the influence on 
the cost-effectiveness ratio can be considered negligible. However, if inclusion is expected to have a 
significant effect on the cost-effectiveness ratio, the Panel[2] recommended that a sensitivity analysis 
should be conducted. The difficulty of reaching firm recommendations in this controversial area is 
illustrated by this recommendation within the US guidelines, which also prescribe the use of a broad 
societal perspective and argue for a clear reference case – a standard set of methodological practices. 
Leaving the decision of whether or not to include these costs up to individual analysts can interfere 
with this societal perspective and lead to incomparability between studies if analysts make different 
decisions from each other.
Like the US guidelines[2], the Dutch pharmacoeconomic guidelines[14] advocate use of a societal 
perspective. However, while this implies that the Dutch guidelines are inclusive regarding most types 
of costs, the guidelines explicitly state that unrelated indirect medical costs should be excluded from 
the analysis. It appears that the controversy in the literature as well as the aforementioned practical 
difficulties in recommending otherwise have probably resulted in this guidance,[39] which may, 
nonetheless, be considered rather restrictive and disappointing in the advocated societal context.
The guidelines of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) adhere to a narrower 
perspective than that of the US[2] and Dutch[14] guidelines. NICE recommends the use of a healthcare 
budget allocation perspective, where only the costs that fall within the UK NHS and Personal Social 
Services are taken into consideration. In the Guide to Methods of Technology Appraisal[4] that was 
published recently, it is explicitly stated that “Costs related to the condition of interest and incurred in 
additional years of life gained as a result of treatment should be included in the reference case analysis. 
Costs that are considered to be unrelated to the condition or technology of interest should be excluded,” 
while these costs clearly fall under the NHS budget.
In contrast, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Board (LFN) in Sweden has published guidelines[38] in which 
the societal perspective and the inclusion of all relevant costs are advocated. In these guidelines, “All 
relevant costs associated with treatment and illness should be identified, quantified and evaluated. … If 
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treatment affects survival, then the costs for increased survival – total consumption less total production 
during gained life-years – should be included.”
Current guidelines thus largely encourage ignoring unrelated medical costs in gained life-years, either 
by requiring researchers to exclude these costs from the analysis or by leaving it up to the analyst 
to decide whether to include them.6 Both the theoretical controversy and the practical problems 
associated with including these costs seem to have contributed to this current situation. In terms 
of the latter, the practical issues may not be easy to solve. For example, Meltzer and Johannesson[10] 
agree with the US Panel[2] that the lack of adequate data to estimate future unrelated medical costs 
is still troublesome. However, they also claim that “In any case, it seems difficult to argue that including 
an implicit estimate of zero by omitting these costs would be preferable to an imprecise estimate, especially 
with appropriate sensitivity analysis.” Moreover, it is important to note that there is progress in this 
area. The recent literature on healthcare costs of ageing, demonstrating that healthcare costs are not 
merely dependent on age and sex but importantly on time to death, can also be of use here (van Baal 
et al., unpublished data).[40-43] In terms of the more theoretical debate on inclusion of unrelated future 
medical costs, new arguments in favour of including these costs appear to be gaining support, as will 
be highlighted in section 3.4.
3.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS DEBATE
The influential US guidelines[2] have spurred debate in the literature regarding the inclusion of 
unrelated medical costs in gained life-years. For instance, Meltzer and Johannesson[10] address the 
different arguments put forward by the US Panel[2] for not firmly advocating inclusion of these costs. 
Regarding the more political argument (that it would not be acceptable to include these types of 
costs in economic evaluations) they acknowledged that it may seem that including unrelated medical 
costs will aggrieve the elderly, but argue that these costs are still real. Moreover, inclusion of these 
real costs does not automatically result in these interventions no longer being cost-effective (unlike 
the suggestion of Mushlin and Fintor[37]). On the other hand, exclusion of these costs may lead to 
favouring interventions that extend life among the elderly, rather than improve quality. Furthermore, 
Meltzer and Johannesson[10] use a simple example to demonstrate that, even if the assumption of 
conditional independence holds (so that future spending, conditional on survival, is not influenced 
by current medical consumption) and interventions are aimed at patients of one single age (so that 
the stream of future costs is identical across interventions), excluding unrelated future costs still leads 
to biased outcomes in practice, simply because one QALY can be gained by prolonging life for 1 year 
in perfect health or for 2 years in a health state valued at 0.5 QALY, resulting in 1 or rather 2 years of 
unrelated future spending.
6 The latter would normally result in more work and a less favourable ICER, which casts some doubt on whether 
researchers have incentives to include these costs when it is not a requirement.
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In a reaction to Meltzer and Johannesson[10], Garber[44] argued that “… the Panel in effect recommended 
calculating such costs except when they are known to be small or equal among the various alternatives …” 
and therefore the criticism about the recommendation regarding unrelated medical costs seems only 
“… a matter of emphasis.” Finally, important arguments have been presented against the point raised 
by the US Panel[2] that if one includes unrelated medical costs in gained life-years, one should include 
all costs in gained life-years, including costs of other consumption, the inclusion of which would be in 
line with Meltzer’s argument.[18] 7
In a recent influential paper, Nyman[11] proposed a different set of inclusion principles that should 
serve as a practical guide for deciding which costs and effects to include in cost-effectiveness analysis. 
According to Nyman[11], the set of criteria should result in cost-utility ratios that are – what has been 
labelled by van Baal et al.[13] – internally consistent, also sometimes referred to as a symmetry rule.[36] 
One of the crucial criteria put forward by Nyman[11] is “Include in the analysis the costs of those resources 
that directly produce the utility that is being measured in the denominator of the cost-utility ratio.” 8
Application of this criterion has important implications, particularly regarding the issue of how to 
account for unrelated medical costs in life-years gained. In respect of this, Nyman[11] wrote, “The key, 
as Meltzer[18] correctly points out, is recognising that these unrelated medical costs are not simply costs, but 
costs that are incurred to obtain an expected real benefit in the form of an increase in the probability of 
survival or an increase in health-related QOL. In many existing cost-utility analyses, these benefits are already 
accounted for in the QALYs, therefore, including their costs in the numerator would only be consistent.” Thus, 
application of Nyman’s criteria[11] leads to inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained 
whenever the associated health gain is captured as projected health gains.
The internal consistency argument put forward by Nyman[11] was subsequently used by van Baal et 
al.[13] to discuss its practical implications in the example of a cost-effectiveness analysis of a smoking-
cessation programme. They estimated four cost-utility ratios, each differing as to what costs and effects 
were included. These four ratios were assessed not only in terms of internal consistency but also in 
terms of the implicit underlying objectives and budget responsibilities of the decision-maker. Van 
Baal et al.[13] also addressed the difficulty of separating related and unrelated future costs and showed 
that the line between what is considered related and what is not becomes fuzzy and hazy, especially 
for primary prevention aimed at risk factors affecting many chronic diseases. More importantly, they 
pointed out that it is unclear why a distinction between related and unrelated medical costs would be 
relevant at all for a decision-maker trying to make optimal use of scarce healthcare resources. In the 
7 We do not wish to dwell on this point here, but some have argued that since the utility measure (i.e., the QALY) in 
health economic evaluations is defined rather narrowly, one might argue that a more narrow consideration of costs 
would also be appropriate.[11,36]
8 The two other criteria are “Exclude the costs of those resources that produce utility that is not being measured in the 
denominator, even though the costs are causally associated with the intervention” and “Include the costs of those resources 
consumed that are causally related to the intervention, but that have no countervailing utility gains.” [11]
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   54 23-03-16   10:15
355
Unrelated Medical Costs in Life-Years Gained
following section, we outline the four different strategies used to account for costs and effects in the 
analyses used by van Baal et al.[13] to highlight the importance of the current debates.
However, before doing so, a very recent paper deserves mention. Contrary to much of the recent 
literature, Lee[20] argued against inclusion of all unrelated future costs. His article followed directly on 
from the theoretical work of Garber and Phelps[9] and Meltzer[18]. Using Meltzer’s model[18], but with a 
different budget constraint, Lee[20] reached the conclusion that unrelated medical costs should not 
be accounted for in economic evaluations. The debate in this area will surely continue,[45,46] if only 
because the budget constraint used by Lee[20], which is pivotal for reaching his conclusions, has been 
criticised before in the literature[47] and basically assumed that prolonging life is always associated with 
increasing income. Thus it avoids allocation decisions related to (increased) scarcity – the very reason 
to perform economic evaluations.9 While this may be a reasonable assumption from the individual 
perspective, it is highly questionable whether it is also reasonable to assume this from a societal or 
healthcare perspective.
3.5 DIFFERENT COST-UTILITY RATIOS: AN EXAMPLE
Van Baal et al.[13] demonstrated the consequences of different practices of including costs and 
effects using an example of increased implementation of a smoking-cessation intervention.[48] They 
estimated the cost-effectiveness of a smoking-cessation programme in two scenarios, which only 
differed with regard to the age groups to which the intervention was offered: in scenario 1, smokers 
aged between 25 and 44 years were targeted; in scenario 2, smokers aged between 45 and 64 years 
were targeted. In both intervention scenarios, 25% of the smokers received minimal counselling by a 
GP and/or a GP’s assistant in combination with nicotine replacement treatment for 1 year (see Silagy 
et al.[49] for more details). For ease of interpretation, non-medical costs and savings were excluded 
from the cost-utility ratios, adopting a healthcare perspective.10 Related diseases were distinguished 
from unrelated diseases in that the intervention changed only the prognosis and/or the (age- and 
sex-specific) incidence rate of related diseases. This example considered a preventive intervention 
targeted at the risk factor ‘smoking’, thus only those diseases for which smoking was a risk (relative risk 
>1) were considered. 
Table 3.1 presents the four cost-utility ratios related to the smoking-cessation intervention, as well as 
the appraisal by van Baal et al.[13] The appraisal of each cost-utility ratio is based on whether the ratio 
complies with the internal consistency criterion and whether it relates to a meaningful underlying 
decision-maker’s problem. The latter is important since economic evaluations are intended to provide 
9 As was pointed out by one of the anonymous reviewers of our article on which this chapter is based on, scarcity may 
also enter the equation via the use of utility functions including leisure.[18]
10 As mentioned previously (section 3.2), the issue of inclusion of unrelated medical costs is largely independent of the 
perspective adopted.
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the decision-maker with a complete and helpful tool to guide decisions regarding resource allocation, 
in order to achieve objectives (e.g., maximisation of total health) given restraint resources.
TABLE 3.1 Overview of different cost-utility ratios and results of smoking-cessation intervention scenarios 1 and 2[13] 
Cost-utility 
ratio
What does it include?  Formula
Result (€ per QALY)
Appraisal
S1            S2
1 Only intervention costs divided by all 
QALY gains
Ci
QALYr+QALYu €3,500 €3,400
Inconsistent 
and incomplete
2 Intervention costs and related costs 
only divided by all QALY gains
Ci+Cr 
QALYr+QALYu €1,500 €900
Inconsistent 
and incomplete
3 Intervention costs and related costs 
only divided by QALY gains only 
attributable to related costs
Ci+Cr 
QALYr-QALYu €2,900 €1,900
Consistent but   
incomplete
4 Intervention costs, related costs, 
and unrelated costs divided by all 
QALY gains
Ci+Cr+Cu  
QALYr+QALYu €4,400 €6,600
Consistent and 
complete
Note. Intervention scenarios are compared with current practice: a combination of all current initiatives to stop smoking and 
willpower alone.
Ci= intervention costs; Cr= healthcare costs of medical care of related diseases; Cu= healthcare costs of medical care of unrelated 
diseases; QALYr= QALYs gained due to related diseases; QALYu= QALYs gained due to unrelated diseases; S1= intervention 
scenario 1; S2= intervention scenario 2.
The first cost-utility ratio in Table 3.1 is internally inconsistent because the numerator of the ratio 
only accounts for the intervention costs, while the projected effects in the denominator result from 
both related and unrelated medical care. Moreover, this ratio is incomplete and implies that the 
decision-maker aims to maximise health effects given a disease-specific budget constraint that only 
includes the costs of the intervention. This limitation is clearly not very realistic, since the ratio ignores 
both related and unrelated future medical costs associated with the intervention, while these would 
normally be accounted for when such a disease-specific budget is applied.
The second cost-utility ratio is also internally inconsistent. Costs of related medical care are now 
included together with the intervention costs, but possible costs incurred due to unrelated medical 
care in added life-years are ignored. However, the denominator comprises all future effects, due to 
both related and unrelated medical care. This practice is currently implicitly recommended in the 
Dutch guidelines[14] (as distinguishing effects from related care as opposed to unrelated care is 
uncommon and difficult). The fact that lower ratios were found for cost-utility ratio 2 compared with 
cost-utility ratio 1 can be explained by savings in terms of related costs (Cr) due to a lower incidence 
of smoking-related diseases (i.e., Cr in cost-utility ratio 2 is negative). In terms of the underlying budget 
allocation problem, this ratio is still fairly limited since the available budget is only intended for care 
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related to a specific disease, risk factor or preventive programme. Therefore, results from this ratio 
appear to be meaningful only for healthcare  decision-makers with a very narrow focus.
In cost-utility ratio 3, the costs of the intervention and related medical care are included in the 
numerator, while the denominator contains only the QALY gains produced by the costs listed in the 
numerator (i.e., effects caused by unrelated medical spending in gained life-years are subtracted from 
the total gains). In absence of empirical data regarding exactly how unrelated medical care affects 
health, the assumption was made that 50% of the gains were attributable to related costs. This yielded 
cost-utility ratios of €2,900 and €1,900 per QALY gained for scenario 1 and 2, respectively.11 Cost-utility 
ratio 3 is internally consistent, since only those effects that are a direct consequence of the included 
costs are considered. However, this approach requires knowledge on the length and QOL of patient 
groups when not receiving any unrelated medical care during gained life-years. Such knowledge is 
hard to come by and its informative value for the decision-maker has been questioned,[13] although 
in some instances such a breakdown might still be interesting (e.g., in the case of disease-specific 
budgets). More specifically, excluding health gains due to unrelated medical care in gained life-
years from the objective function of a decision-maker seems rather nonsensical and, therefore, the 
underlying budget allocation problem of this ratio cannot be considered very meaningful.
Finally, the fourth cost-utility ratio is similar to the second ratio, except that now, besides the costs of 
the intervention and related medical care, the costs of unrelated medical care (Cu) are also included in 
the numerator. Although costs are saved because of a decrease in smoking-related diseases (so that Cr 
is negative), these savings are offset by Cu because of costs of unrelated medical care consumption in 
the gained life-years. As a consequence, the fourth cost-utility ratio yields the least favourable results. 
This ratio is not only internally consistent but also relates to a meaningful budget allocation problem 
since the denominator and objective function comprise the total health effects and the numerator 
and budget constraint consider all healthcare costs.[13]
The four cost-utility ratios highlight the different options to deal with related and unrelated future 
medical costs. It is not surprising that including all costs and effects in the cost-utility ratios as 
compared with only some costs and all effects results in a higher estimate of the costs per QALY 
gained. The reason for this is simple. Living longer brings about competing diseases that result in 
healthcare expenditures (which in turn yield health). Thus, when unrelated medical costs in life-
years gained are included in the analysis, interventions aimed primarily at improving QOL become 
relatively attractive compared with life-prolonging interventions. Moreover, the smoking-cessation 
example showed that treatment among the younger group of smokers proved more cost-effective 
than treatment among the older group when costs of unrelated medical care were included. Van 
11 Note that the percentage of QALYs gained attributable to unrelated medical care depends on both the intervention 
and population.[13] Varying this percentage from 25% to 75% resulted in ratios ranging from €5,800 to €1,900 per QALY 
gained in scenario 1 and from €3,700 to €1,200 per QALY gained in scenario 2.
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Baal et al.[13] argued that this can be explained because, for the younger smokers, “… the high costs 
of unrelated medical care occur farther away in the future and are, thus, more heavily discounted.” 12 
Besides this example of a smoking-cessation intervention, several other studies have demonstrated 
empirically that the cost-effectiveness ratios significantly change when the costs of unrelated medical 
care are included.[50,51] Gyrd-Hansen et al.[50] concluded that including the costs of unrelated medical 
care – as a function of age – favours intervention among relatively younger groups. These findings 
suggest that different practices of accounting for costs and effects lead to significant differences in 
cost-effectiveness ratios. If we assume that the results of such economic evaluations are considered 
by healthcare policy makers in their decisions, the inclusion or exclusion of these costs may directly 
affect the allocation of healthcare resources.
3.6 TIME TO CHANGE THE GUIDELINES?
In summary of the above, we conclude that the dominant argument in the recent literature appears 
to be that unrelated future (medical) costs need to be included in economic evaluations of healthcare 
programmes.  Therefore, it is immediately clear that most current economic evaluations do not give 
a full picture of the cost-effectiveness of healthcare interventions. While the controversy is not (yet) 
completely resolved,[20,45,46] it seems that a majority of recent papers[10,11,13,46] argue in favour of including 
these costs. From a decision-maker’s viewpoint, would it not make perfect sense to look at all costs 
brought about by an intervention, directly and indirectly, knowing that the projected health effects 
would not be realised without incurring these costs? 
In that context, two types of consistency are important in economic evaluations: (i) internal consistency 
as put forward by Nyman[11]; and (ii) what we will label external consistency. The former is clear: as 
long as the projections of gained QALYs (implicitly) incorporate normal medical care consumption 
during added life-years, it is inconsistent not to include the costs of this care consumption. While it 
is theoretically possible to produce cost-effectiveness estimates that exclude both the costs and the 
effects of this unrelated care, in practice it proves very difficult to accurately estimate health gains in 
absence of this unrelated care consumption. Van Baal et al.[13] had to make rather bold simplifying 
assumptions in order to estimate the health effects of the intervention without any further unrelated 
future care consumption. Equally important, the result of such an exercise is not very meaningful 
to decision-makers.[29] Therefore, the external consistency argument requires that the results of an 
economic evaluation address a meaningful decision-maker’s budget allocation problem (i.e., are 
consistent with the problem addressed). Economic evaluations can only serve their purpose if that 
requirement is met. As van Baal et al.[13] argued, without using the term external consistency, only the 
fourth cost-utility ratio appears to satisfy both types of consistency.
12 In the smoking-cessation example, discounting was applied according to the recommendations in the Dutch 
guidelines for pharmacoeconomic research[14]: costs were discounted at a rate of 4%, while effects – in terms of QALYs 
– were discounted at 1.5%.
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We therefore claim that the preferred ratio is that which includes both the unrelated costs and the 
associated projected health gains. In terms of consequences, ignoring costs of unrelated medical care 
in life-years gained improves the cost-effectiveness ratio of interventions such as smoking-cessation 
programmes that increase length of life relative to interventions that primarily increase QOL. When 
interventions are judged on the basis of their ICER, and a more or less fixed threshold is used as 
benchmark, including more costs may then cause an intervention to become a less likely candidate 
for funding. Moreover, when economic evidence is used to formulate more precise medical practice 
guidelines, including the costs of unrelated medical care can lead to other treatment profiles and 
to including or excluding certain age groups from treatment, as the smoking-cessation example[13] 
highlights. But note that excluding costs also has distributional consequences! Apart from this, 
systematic exclusion of unrelated medical costs does not necessarily enhance the comparability 
of economic evaluation results because “The costs to include in a CUA [cost-utility analysis] … is often 
determined by the type of intervention and the target disease(s) of the intervention, because this determines 
what medical care is related”[13], which can result in strange and arbitrary lines between related and 
unrelated medical care. Therefore, the matter is not trivial and a reconsideration regarding the 
exclusion of these costs seems warranted.
In view of the current debates in the literature, we feel that a strong case can be made for including 
unrelated future medical costs in gained life-years. The major problem in advocating this may perhaps 
be the practical issue of how to find reliable estimates of these costs. But not only do we agree 
with Meltzer and Johannesson[10] that a reasonable although imprecise estimate is better than an 
unreasonable estimate of precisely zero, the progress in this area allows more reasonable estimates to 
be made. Gandjour and Lauterbach[12] highlight the use of estimates of future medical care corrected 
for time to death in economic evaluations, and van Baal et al. (unpublished data) recently proposed 
a further refinement of these estimates. Moreover, a clear directive to start including these costs 
will undoubtedly increase developments in this area. In terms of standardisation and facilitation of 
inclusion, national institutes such as NICE in the UK or the National Healthcare Institute (ZiNL) can play 
an important role. For example, the Swedish LFN offers analysts assistance in this respect. Therefore, it 
seems timely to move forward by including these costs, whenever relevant, in economic evaluations 
of healthcare technologies, and to include recommendations for their inclusion in guidelines for 
economic evaluations.
We acknowledge that this raises the question of where to draw the line. Unsurprisingly, the article 
by Nyman[11] provoked a (new) round of debate regarding whether survivor non-medical costs 
(consumption and production) should also be included in an economic evaluation.[32-35] If a healthcare 
perspective is taken, these consumption and production costs are deemed irrelevant by definition, 
while the inclusion of future medical costs would still very much be relevant. This makes it relatively 
easy to advocate inclusion of these costs (without further debate) from a healthcare perspective. 
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However, from a societal perspective, matters are more complex. It has been convincingly argued 
that, from a welfare economic perspective, such survivor consumption costs should not be ignored. [18] 
Others have argued that the choice for a narrow (i.e., health-related) outcome measure on the 
outcome side, would also limit the costs to be included on the cost side of an analysis.[11,29,36] 13 The 
adoption of a complete societal perspective therefore requires capturing all other relevant costs and 
effects separately, including broader utility gains. It seems crucial to recognise the tension between 
the perspective of the decision-maker that the economic evaluation is designed to assist and the 
broad societal perspective. We would argue that, although the healthcare perspective may be a 
natural one from the viewpoint of a healthcare decision-maker, “… completely losing sight of the societal 
perspective is undesirable as well.”[13] Ignoring certain costs or effects cannot only result in suboptimal 
allocation of resources, but it also seems unlikely that a healthcare decision-maker would want to 
be left completely ignorant of the non-healthcare consequences of his/her spending. Lifting such 
ignorance requires the calculation and reporting of different costs, but does not necessarily require 
the equal treatment of all costs.[13] Regardless, it seems inappropriate to exclude future medical costs 
from economic evaluations just because we have not yet resolved the question of whether non-
medical costs should be included. This particularly holds since this controversy seems to be strongly 
related to the broader controversy regarding the appropriate perspective, which, one could say, is 
even at the heart of how we design our evaluations. For instance, even the choice of the narrow 
health-related utility outcomes appears a deliberate attempt to stay close to the perspective of the 
relevant decision-maker.[52]
Conclusions
The inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained in economic evaluations has long been 
controversial. However, there appears to be growing support for incorporating all future medical 
costs. While some controversy may remain, it must be noted that this also holds for many other 
cost categories (e.g., productivity costs) and methodologies (e.g., discounting). If we only included 
those things for which a complete consensus exists, it is likely that no economic evaluation would be 
performed. Strong theoretical arguments, regarding both optimality,[10,18] and internal and external 
consistency,[11,13] all point towards the inclusion of unrelated future medical costs. The practical 
possibilities for estimating these costs appropriately are also increasing (van Baal et al., unpublished 
data), facilitating their inclusion.
This is not a trivial issue, as the impact of including these costs can be substantial. Furthermore, 
inclusion is consistent with both a healthcare and a societal perspective. Good practice in economic 
evaluations is essential in order to provide policy makers with valuable and meaningful information 
about the relative efficiency of health technologies. It seems timely that the inclusion of unrelated 
13 This issue is part of a broader discussion about the welfare theoretic foundation of QALYs, i.e. whether QALYs can be 
interpreted as utilities.[36]
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medical costs in added life-years in economic evaluations, whenever relevant, should be the new 
standard. Guidelines should recommend including these costs rather than excluding them.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that preventive lifestyle interventions targeted at lifestyle-related risk factors, 
such as smoking and obesity, have the potential of not only increasing public health but at the 
same time lowering healthcare expenditures.[1,2] These suggestions have led some policy makers to 
embrace preventive lifestyle interventions. For instance, in the most recent US election campaign, the 
Obama Administration proposed an ambitious healthcare reform plan, in which prevention plays an 
important role: “Devoting more of our healthcare funds to prevention will save tens of millions of dollars 
and improve millions of lives”.[3] Such expectations regarding prevention may importantly influence 
healthcare reforms, as was recently debated in the US context as well.[4-8] 
An important problem then is, that although prevention may indeed increase the health of populations, 
these interventions, unfortunately, are, in general, unlikely to result in lower expenditures.[5,9] While 
preventive interventions may reduce illnesses and expenditures related to risk factors, especially when 
they successfully prolong life, they will increase illnesses and expenditures unrelated to those risk 
factors primarily in gained life-years. The costs of these unrelated illnesses have been demonstrated 
to outweigh the savings on related illnesses for the important risk factors of smoking and obesity.[10,11] 
In spite of this, the suggestion that prevention is cost saving remains persistent both in the academic 
field as well as in healthcare policy making. For many, it remains counterintuitive that a healthy 
lifestyle results in more rather than in less lifetime healthcare expenditures. This is problematic as it 
may result in inefficient use of healthcare resources based on overly optimistic assumptions regarding 
lower healthcare expenditures due to prevention, and thus may cause disappointment (among policy 
makers) when prevention fails to meet these expectations. 
Unfortunately, current health economic evaluations, which are intended to inform decision-makers 
about the most optimal use of scarce healthcare resources, may strengthen these unfounded 
expectations regarding lifestyle intervention programmes, because they normally ignore the costs of 
unrelated illnesses in life-years gained in many jurisdictions including the UK[12] and the Netherlands[13], 
or leave inclusion up to the analyst’s discretion in case of the US guidelines[14] and the WHO Guide 
to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis[15]. This results in too favourable estimations of cost-effectiveness of 
preventive measures prolonging life and indeed sometimes even in estimated cost savings.[16-18] 
In order to improve this and create realistic expectations, it is important to judge preventive lifestyle 
interventions within the same framework as other healthcare interventions. In this chapter, we 
elaborate on this framework, thus shifting the focus from the question whether prevention should 
save money towards the proper question of whether prevention offers value for money. Indeed, 
preventive interventions do not necessarily have to alleviate the financial burden on healthcare 
systems in order to be eligible for funding, but rather, like other interventions, have to demonstrate 
good value for money.[19] Such a relatively favourable cost-effectiveness of preventive interventions 
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can only be asserted comprehensively when all associated costs are included in the analysis. Such 
assessments of all future healthcare costs and benefits will provide a better understanding of the 
true value for money provided by lifestyle interventions compared with curative interventions, which 
eventually should result in more optimal use of healthcare resources in terms of increasing social 
welfare and thus in better policy making.[20] 
In this chapter, we highlight this topic further, focusing in particular on the issue of the inclusion 
of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained when asserting the cost-effectiveness of preventive 
interventions. (As discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, note that this is only one of the pressing issues 
regarding the methodology of economic evaluations of healthcare interventions. Other controversies 
are discounting, the perspective to adopt for the analysis (usually healthcare perspective versus societal 
perspective) and related to that the incorporation of certain cost categories such as productivity 
costs, etc. Some of these issues may also influence cost-effectiveness ratios, in particular those of 
life-prolonging interventions. We will return to this briefly in the discussion of this chapter.) This topic 
is especially relevant here since excluding this cost category may strengthen the wide-spread yet 
mistaken impression that prevention is cost saving or, worse still, should be cost saving in order to 
be attractive. Since assessing value for money also requires attention for the value of preventive 
interventions, we will also briefly highlight some considerations regarding the value of health gained 
through preventive action.
4.2 COSTS OF PREVENTION AND PRIORITY SETTING
The prevalence of important risk factors, such as obesity and smoking, is still high, and, for the former, 
even increasing. It is generally acknowledged that these risk factors have a substantial impact on the 
general burden of disease, and there are no signs that this impact will attenuate in the near future. 
These risk factors thus cause illnesses, which in turn do not only reduce public health but also cause 
healthcare consumption, which translates into healthcare expenditures. Eliminating the risk factors 
would therefore avoid not only illnesses but also the related care consumption and expenditures. More 
health, less costs, therefore. The line of reasoning behind this suggestion is temptingly straightforward 
indeed. 
Obesity and smoking, however, do not only cause morbidity but may also reduce life expectancy. 
Preventive interventions may thus reduce this risk of premature death caused by such risk factors 
and subsequently extend life. During these life-years gained, as a consequence of other, unrelated 
diseases, people may consume additional healthcare. To put it in the illustrative words of late former 
Dutch minister of health, Dr Els Borst: “Dementia is something we witness in people of ages normally not 
reached by smokers and obese”. These additional expenditures due to unrelated diseases in these life-
years gained may offset savings from avoiding risk factor-related diseases.[10,11,21] In the end, therefore, 
effective preventive interventions may increase rather than decrease healthcare costs.[5,10,11] 
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However, while the rhetoric underlying investments in prevention in some countries may prove to be 
false, the investments themselves may still be worthwhile. Prevention, like other care, does not have 
to be cost saving in order to be attractive.[22] Such a requirement would implicitly hold prevention “to a 
higher standard of cost-effectiveness than other medical care”.[5] Prevention, however, may be a relatively 
cost-effective means of improving public health. In this respect it is important to reiterate the 
obvious: saving money is not the primary aim of healthcare.[23] Rather, the aim is to optimally enhance 
health with the available resources. Exclusively focusing on the input side of the balance between 
costs and benefits may be considered a rather restrictive view, “as it ignores the value of the output of 
prevention and healthcare and may consequently lead to underinvestment in these areas”.[24] Effectively 
increasing healthcare expenditures while achieving something valuable, i.e. increased public health, 
can be completely rational.[19,24] There is no reason why this should not apply in case of preventive 
interventions. Thus, as Goetzel[25] succinctly puts it: “Instead of debating whether prevention or treatment 
saves money, we should determine the most cost-effective ways to achieve improved population health... “.
The most relevant policy implications of this assertion are twofold. First, prevention should not be 
primarily seen as a cost-containment tool and second, costs and benefits of preventive interventions 
need to be traded-off explicitly in common economic evaluations.[26] Economic evaluation, most 
commonly performed as a cost-utility analysis when evaluating healthcare interventions, is a useful 
way to identify the costs and consequences of different policy alternatives and compare them 
accordingly. In other words, economic evaluations demonstrate what value [in cost-utility analysis 
usually expressed as quality adjusted life-years (QALYs)] is produced for the money spent. The role 
of economic evaluation is therefore indispensible in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources. 
It would simply be impossible to set rational priorities when no insight is gained in the incremental 
costs and incremental benefits of a healthcare technology if the aim is to optimally improve health 
with available resources. Moreover, economic evaluation can also be helpful in deciding where in the 
chain of lifestyle and disease an intervention is most efficient. Hence the increased use of economic 
evaluation in the process of deciding on national public funding in many jurisdictions.
4.3 EVALUATING PREVENTIVE INTERVENTIONS
Evidence on cost-effectiveness of preventive measures is increasingly becoming available. More 
involvement of institutes such as NICE in the UK are helpful in this respect as they evaluate prevention 
as well as other types of healthcare in a similar decision framework. However, the fact that prevention 
may increase lifetime expenditures due to an increase of unrelated diseases in life-years gained is 
currently not adequately reflected in such evaluations, hampering good comparisons and decision-
making. Preventive interventions may indeed offer good value for money when, for instance, judged 
against a threshold of some £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY like often mentioned in the UK setting.[27] 
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However, studies demonstrating this normally do not account for the costs of unrelated diseases 
in life-years gained. (Note that this is relevant for any life-prolonging intervention, preventive or 
curative.) For example, NICE recently investigated the cost-effectiveness of several smoking cessation 
interventions and concluded that many interventions result in cost savings.[28] This conclusion was 
reached, however, by ignoring the unrelated medical costs in life-years gained. If these costs would 
be included, the interventions may not be cost saving anymore, although, in spite of this, may still 
be considered worthwhile. (It is also important to realise that preventive interventions may have 
additional consequences from a societal perspective. Then, broader costs and effects should be 
considered as well. We return to this issue in the discussion of this chapter. Note that this point is 
completely independent of whether a societal perspective is adopted for the evaluation or a narrower 
healthcare perspective.)
Guidelines on pharmacoeconomic research play an influential role in how economic evaluations 
are performed, but differ in many aspects across jurisdictions, including regarding how to handle 
unrelated medical costs in life-years gained. Interestingly, both the NICE guidelines and for instance 
the Dutch guidelines for economic evaluations in fact prescribe ignoring these additional costs of 
unrelated diseases in life-years gained (without a clear motivation), while the US guidelines and the 
WHO Guide to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis leave this decision to the discretion of the analyst. These 
differences seem to reflect the different positions in the literature, with some authors strongly arguing 
against inclusion of these costs and others equally strongly advocating the opposite. Regarding the 
former position, for instance Russell[29], argued against the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in 
gained life-years because of the fact that an intervention should not be ‘punished’ simply because it 
is successful in prolonging life. She argued that in order to assert whether an intervention produces 
value for money, medical costs in life-years gained are irrelevant, just as expenditures for food, housing 
and clothing are irrelevant. (Note that the inclusion of these latter type of expenditures, also referred 
to as survivor consumption costs, is currently also an area of much debate.[30-34]) This argument was 
later also mentioned by the US Panel[14], but that Panel also provided arguments in favour of including 
future unrelated medical costs, which is indicative for the general lack of consensus on how to 
handle these costs (at that time). Garber and Phelps[35] showed that these costs can be excluded 
from an economic evaluation since their inclusion, under stringent assumptions, will not affect the 
relative rankings of interventions (and therefore decision-making will not be influenced). However, 
subsequently, it has been convincingly argued that the model and assumptions they used have rather 
serious limitations and will fail to reach optimal decisions.[14,16] Meltzer[16], using a more suitable model, 
convincingly demonstrated that excluding unrelated medical costs in life-years gained is at variance 
with lifetime utility maximisation. Another key argument in favour of including unrelated medical 
costs in life-years gained is that of internal consistency. Since the projections of the effects (gained 
QALYs) of prevention will often implicitly assume normal care use in life-years gained, it is inconsistent 
not to include the associated medical costs.[36] A recent overview of the literature indicates that 
majority of the more recent literature argues in favour of inclusion of the unrelated medical costs.[18]
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It seems, therefore, that including unrelated medical costs in life-years gained is becoming the 
new standard, at least in the theoretical literature. The practical uptake of this dawning consensus 
obviously also requires the availability of sound estimates of additional medical expenditures in 
gained life-years. Fortunately, these practical difficulties in estimating and therefore including these 
future medical costs are increasingly being overcome, facilitating their inclusion.[20,37] Despite this, the 
guidelines of the Swedish Pharmaceutical Benefits Board are currently one of the few examples of 
guidelines advocating the inclusion of these future unrelated medical costs.[38] 
In order to illustrate that prevention can still be an efficient way to produce health, in spite of the 
additional costs in life-years gained, Table 4.1 displays the cost-effectiveness ratios of four preventive 
interventions; two targeted at obesity and two promoting smoking cessation, both including and 
excluding unrelated medical costs in life-years gained.
TABLE 4.1 Cost-effectiveness (CE) ratios (costs per QALY)
Risk factor Preventive intervention True CE ratio
CE ratio (excluding costs 
unrelated medical care)
Obesity Low calorie diet[47] €17,900 or $24,340 €12,100 or $16,460
Intensive lifestyle program[48] €7,400 or $10,060 Cost saving
Smoking Tobacco taxes increase[49] €2,500 or $3,400 Cost saving
Minimal counselling by GP (or 
GP assistant) in combination 
with nicotine replacement[17]
€4,400 or $5,980 €1,500 or $2,040
Note. Costs discounted at 4% and the effects discounted at 1.5%. Dollar price level 2009 (07/01/09: 1 euro = 1.36 dollars).
The – non-representative – examples in Table 4.1 are illustrative for the fact that excluding future 
unrelated medical costs alters the cost-effectiveness ratios, making them more favourable, and even 
cost saving for the tobacco tax increase and the intensive lifestyle programme for obesity. For other 
examples (not included in the table), excluding these costs may make a cost-ineffective programme 
seem cost-effective when judged against some fixed threshold. The cost-effectiveness ratios in Table 
4.1 serve as a demonstration of what happens to the ratios when unrelated medical costs are either 
included or excluded and to indicate that prevention may still be an attractive investment, even when 
these future costs are accounted for.
The main point here is that, within a more common decision-making framework, it is not about 
whether an intervention saves money, but whether a preventive intervention produces value for 
money, i.e. whether it yields health gains at a reasonable price (that is, whether it is cost-effective), just 
like a curative intervention should produce value for money. In order to reach optimal decisions, one 
needs to be complete in assessing costs and effects. This implies that a, also and sometimes especially 
in the context of preventive interventions influential cost-category should not be omitted from an 
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economic evaluation. Moreover, it is worth noting that ignoring these additional future medical 
costs, which may, occasionally, result in prevention appearing to be cost saving as shown above, may 
strengthen the unfounded idea that prevention should save costs in order to be an attractive option. 
Therefore, the additional costs induced by successfully extending life should not be ignored. Only 
then, well-informed choices can be made between (curative and preventive) interventions. In such 
choices, besides the costs and the health gains, also the values of these health gains play a crucial role, 
as highlighted below.
4.4 THE VALUE OF PREVENTION
While cost-effectiveness ratios similar to those shown in Table 4.1 may normally be expected to be 
considered favourable by policy makers, this need not necessarily be the case with regard to preventive 
interventions. It has been noted that prevention appears to be judged more stringently than curative 
care.[5] This may also have to do with the value we attach to health gains created through prevention 
relative to that generated through curative interventions. Especially for health policy, it is important to 
have knowledge of such value judgments and sentiments. Not only may they be used in normative 
decisions regarding the funding of different programmes, but they may also (partly) explain why, in 
general, prevention is low on the priority list in many countries, given that only 3% of total healthcare 
spending on average in the OECD countries is targeted at prevention.[2] Obviously, one may also think 
of other reasons why spending on prevention is low. For example, policy makers may be rather short-
sighted when setting priorities since they generally govern for only relatively short periods of time. 
Then, preventive interventions, which incur costs now while its effects may only become apparent 
in the future, can be an unattractive policy option when alternative (curative) solutions are available 
(even though at higher costs!).
First, prevention may be less appreciated simply because it falls short of the created expectation of 
being a cost saving solution. In that respect the unrealistic expectations, which may have been created 
to stimulate prevention, may now backfire. Second, preventive interventions are often targeted at 
statistical lives – lives of unidentified individuals who benefit from the intervention. As Jenni and 
Loewenstein[39] indicate “society is willing to spend  far more money to save the lives of identifiable victims 
than to save statistical victims”. And Dranove[40] similarly states: “There is no reason to expect that the value 
of a statistical life would equal the value of an identified life”. This may be partly explained by the fact that 
withholding an identifiable person some treatment will have immediate and visible consequences, 
while this is normally not directly the case for statistical victims. Such preferences result in less priority 
for (primary) prevention. Third, preventive actions are targeted at people who are not (yet) sick. The 
urgency of such actions may be perceived as low, while for instance the ‘rule of rescue’[41] emphasises 
the need to help those most urgently at risk of severe health loss. Society may be willing to devote more 
money to improve the health of someone in great and immediate need than of someone in lesser and 
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more distant need.[42] Fourth, the uncertainty surrounding the costs and effects of specific preventive 
interventions may be relatively large, since controlled trials may be difficult to perform, time horizons 
to observe final outcome may be relatively long and new intervention strategies may be developed 
over time. Finally, societal support for collectively funding preventive (lifestyle) interventions may be 
low, since lifestyle may be perceived to be individuals’ own choice and responsibility and, therefore, 
the related health and cost consequences to be self-inflicted. This argument of culpability (whether 
or not considered to be applicable) may decrease the degree of solidarity society will show with 
the involved individuals. For some reason (perhaps related to the above-mentioned urgency and 
identifiability), this culpability question appears less relevant in case of curative care. 
Whether or not the above-mentioned preferences and attitudes, some of which appear somewhat 
inconsistent or irrational, should be used in policy making is obviously open for debate, yet they may 
help to explain why prevention may be judged against a different threshold than curative care. If 
indeed a(n implicitly) lower value is, on average, attached to health gained via preventive interventions 
relative to curative interventions, this may also partly explain the focus on cost savings in this area.
4.5 DISCUSSION
Life-prolonging prevention is less likely to result in cost savings than often hoped, expected or even 
calculated, especially in the long run. It is important to stress this, since politically prevention is still 
sometimes seen as a means to reduce healthcare spending.[3] However, additional costs due to 
unrelated diseases in life-years gained in the long run may offset savings in related diseases in the 
shorter run. These additional costs are often ignored in policy making regarding prevention. While this 
may result in perhaps desirable investments in prevention, this may change when prevention does 
not result in the planned savings. If the expected savings are required to finance other healthcare 
(reforms), the consequences of the over-optimistic view on prevention may be far-reaching.[8] It is 
therefore unfortunate that also in most current economic evaluations of life-prolonging interventions 
the additional medical costs in gained life-years are largely ignored. Changing national guidelines for 
economic evaluations in this respect will result in more realistic estimations of cost-effectiveness of 
lifestyle prevention. Theoretical arguments warrant this amendment, while practical difficulties do 
not appear to inhibit inclusion of these costs.[18] An interesting area of research is the value of health 
gain in different contexts. If this is believed to be context dependent, the relative value of health gain 
through prevention also needs to be considered in order to completely judge whether prevention 
yields value for money.
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It is important to note that the economic impact of preventive interventions is likely to vary across 
different jurisdictions. When only considering the impact on the healthcare sector, differences in 
healthcare financing systems between countries, among which the extent to which entitlements 
include coverage of different types of long-term care and social services, are obviously influential. 
Also, the definition of healthcare costs used for estimating the cost consequences of an intervention 
may differ, leading to difficulties in comparisons between countries. A commonly used definition 
(internationally), is the OECD’s System of Health Accounts (SHA). This definition of healthcare costs 
accounts for direct medical costs (diagnosis, treatment and nursing). However, some types of 
expenditures regarding long-term care or social care are excluded.[43] If prevention will prolong life 
and additional expenditures in these additional life-years are incurred, these are likely to be largely 
related to increased use of long-term care and social care.[44] Using the SHA definition may thus 
underestimate the costs of prevention, but if different definitions are used in different jurisdictions 
to account for differences in healthcare systems and financing, comparability of results is hampered 
and similar life-prolonging interventions may have different impacts across countries in terms of 
healthcare spending. (For example, in the Netherlands two additional definitions are used: the Dutch 
Health and Social Care Accounts used by Statistic Netherlands (CBS) and the Budgetary Scheme of 
Care used by the Dutch ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. While the first definition is the most 
complete definition, also including several types of welfare costs, the latter is more restrictive.)  
Comparisons may be even more difficult when also costs and savings beyond the healthcare sector are 
considered. In this chapter, we have discussed an important controversy regarding the methodology 
of economic evaluation of healthcare interventions, i.e. the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in 
gained life-years. Other major issues in this context, with clear relevance to the current debate, are, 
for instance, the perspective to adopt for the analysis and what discount rate to apply for future costs 
and, especially, effects.
The choice of perspective largely determines which costs and effects to include in an economic 
evaluation. A broad societal perspective normally takes into account all relevant – medical and non-
medical, within and outside the healthcare sector – costs and all relevant effects of an intervention. 
In contrast, a more restrictive healthcare perspective in general focuses purely on those costs falling 
on the healthcare budget. In case of the latter perspective, some cost categories, such as costs of 
informal care, and productivity costs, are excluded from the analysis.[14,26] Although from a healthcare 
decision-maker’s point of view one may argue in favour of adopting the narrower perspective, from 
a welfare economic viewpoint a broad perspective including all relevant societal costs and effects is 
normally advocated. The choice of perspective may influence the analysis of preventive interventions 
in several ways. Prevention may for instance sometimes be initiated and funded in other sectors 
than the healthcare sector, e.g. the education sector. Moreover, some lifestyle interventions may 
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require much time-input from the participants, which represents real societal but not healthcare 
costs. Performing economic evaluations from another (i.e., more restrictive) perspective than the 
societal one, may thus underestimate the societal costs associated to such interventions. Moreover, 
life-prolonging programmes may cause other, societal costs and savings related to the consumption 
and productivity level of an individual. Healthy ageing populations may result in additional societal 
savings in terms of increased productivity, less need for informal care or social services, and the delay 
of pension age and so on.
On the other hand, additional societal costs should also be considered, such as survivor consumption 
costs, such as those related to housing, clothing and food.[16] How these different (societal) cost 
categories will influence the evaluation of life-prolonging interventions should be investigated. If a 
healthcare perspective is adopted (like for example is currently prescribed in the UK[12]), such broader 
consequences are usually ignored, as falling outside the scope of the analysis. Note that the issue of 
how to handle unrelated medical costs in life-years gained is relevant in both perspectives.
The issue of discounting is also of particular interest for the economic evaluation of prevention. 
Although discounting of future costs and effects in economic evaluations of healthcare is widely 
accepted and standard practice, it remains an area of much controversy. Not only does the height 
of the discount rates for costs and effects differ between countries, there is also a continuing debate 
about whether costs and effects should be discounted at the same rate. Setting specific discounting 
rules may have a profound effect on the final cost-effectiveness ratios, especially for interventions 
that incur immediate costs and future health benefits, such as prevention.[45] In general, using higher 
discount rates for health effects (that is, attaching lower weight to future health) will worsen the cost-
effectiveness ratios of interventions, especially those interventions that incur current costs and distant 
effects (like some types of prevention). It is more recently advocated that attaching more weight to 
future health effects (thus using a lower discount rate for health effects), which may substantially 
improve the cost-effectiveness of preventive interventions, may be justified in order to account  for 
the  growing  value  of  health gains over time.[45] 
Clearly, some of the methodological choices we have to make in order to perform economic 
evaluations of healthcare technologies may have important consequences for healthcare decision-
making, especially regarding interventions that extend life more than increase quality of life. However, 
the main objective of this chapter was not to discuss the consequences of methodological choices in 
general, but to focus on the realistic expectations and calculations of the costs and savings related to 
life-prolonging interventions and a fair judgment of these interventions. Prevention, in that respect, 
should be evaluated within the same framework as other curative interventions, implying a focus 
on value for money. Ignoring certain, obviously relevant, cost categories without any justification 
may mislead healthcare policy makers and result in non-optimal allocation of resources, both from a 
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healthcare and a societal perspective. As the examples mentioned in this chapter show, prevention 
still may offer (very) good value for money, even when accounting for unrelated medical costs in 
life-years gained, justifying the claim of the WHO that “governments, in their stewardship role for better 
health, need to invest heavily in risk prevention, in order to contribute substantially to future avoidable 
mortality”.[46] 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing prevalence of obesity has become a public health issue in many countries.[1,2] With 
around 1.5 billion adults worldwide being either overweight or obese and increasing prevalence 
rates among children,[3,4] current and future attention to this problem is unsurprising. Especially since 
obesity has been found to cause coronary heart disease, hypertension, type 2 diabetes mellitus and 
certain types of cancer, therefore affecting the overall burden of disease and disability (and associated 
premature death).[5-9] While the development and implementation of effective strategies to reduce 
the disease burden associated with obesity is clearly desirable from the perspective of public health, 
it has also repeatedly been suggested that this would also improve the financial sustainability of 
national healthcare systems.[10] 
Indeed, considerable economic costs are associated with obesity, and several studies have reported 
costs projections related to obesity concluding that obesity causes high medical expenditures. These 
findings suggest that preventing obesity, e.g. through lifestyle interventions, may not only lower the 
overall burden of disease, but at the same time decrease total healthcare expenditures.[11,12] In an era 
where the ageing of populations and increasing longevity already pose additional challenges to the 
sustainability of healthcare systems, this may sound like good news indeed. Recently, however, van 
Baal et al.[13] demonstrated that effective prevention of obesity may result in higher rather than lower 
lifetime medical costs. The savings due to preventing obesity-related diseases are offset in the long 
run by the additional costs of unrelated illness, especially in gained life-years.1 Many of the studies 
that report the opposite did not apply a lifetime perspective, excluding the unrelated medical costs 
in life-years gained from their cost projections.2 Therefore, as has previously been demonstrated for 
smoking,[17,18] obesity prevention may eventually increase total healthcare expenditures (although this 
may clearly still be worthwhile given the health benefits).3 
As related and unrelated illnesses may be different in nature and in possible treatments, prevention 
strategies may not only affect the magnitude of future healthcare costs, but also the distribution of 
costs over different healthcare segments. Understanding this interaction is important, especially for 
the planning and financing of healthcare systems. Preventing obesity will most likely result in short-
term savings in the curative sector due to a lower prevalence of obesity-related morbidity. Successful 
preventive strategies may reduce obesity-related morbidity but also increase longevity and the 
prevalence of unrelated diseases. This may influence the total amount of medical expenditures as well 
1 This implies that obesity affects both morbidity and mortality. While there is some debate about whether this is also 
true for the latter, much evidence suggests that obesity may indeed affect life expectancy negatively, especially 
among younger adults.[6,8,14-16] 
2 One study that does use a lifetime approach similar to the one followed by van Baal et al.[13] is the previously mentioned 
study by Allison et al.[11] These authors concluded that obesity prevention may lead to cost savings. Van Baal et al.[13] 
offer several possible explanations for their different findings.
3 It is important to note that prevention may sometimes increase total healthcare expenditure due to an increase of 
related medical costs that are induced in life-years gained alone.[19] 
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as the type of healthcare services needed. Indeed, “elderly persons use healthcare services at a greater 
rate than younger persons” and “the effects of longevity on expenditures for acute care differ from its effect 
on expenditures for long-term care”.[20] Thus, changes in lifestyle may change future healthcare costs 
projections, not only at a total cost level, but also for the different segments of the healthcare sector. 
As in other countries, obesity (prevention) may have important consequences for the Dutch healthcare 
financing system.[21] The Dutch healthcare system consists of three compartments covering different 
types of healthcare services. The entitlements in the first two compartments, which together “offer 
all members of the public adequate cover against medical expenses”,[22] are laid down in two mandatory 
insurance schemes which are regulated differently. Long-term nursing care, home care and psychiatric 
care are covered in the first compartment which is regulated by the government at a regional level 
under the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) “under a regime of price and supply regulation”.
[23] 4 GP care, pharmaceuticals and hospital care are all covered in the second compartment, which 
basically comprises all insurable, curative care regulated under the Health Insurance Act (ZVW). This 
latter scheme for curative care is based on regulated competition among private health insurers.[22,24] 
5 Therefore, a substitution from one compartment to another compartment may have important 
distributional consequences among insurance schemes. Moreover, such a shift may prove to be even 
relatively more problematic if it is directed towards the first compartment, since possibilities of labour-
saving technologies or increases in labour productivity are especially restricted in the area of long-
term nursing and care, while a shortage of personnel is foreseen.[25] 
In this chapter, using a cohort approach based on Dutch empirical data, we use a similar but extended 
version of the model used by van Baal et al.[13] to calculate annual and lifetime medical cost differences 
between obese and ‘healthy-living’ people (as well as smokers as an additional reference case). We 
focus on how prevention of obesity influences the breakdown of the medical costs into different 
segments and cost categories, especially highlighting the consequences of preventing obesity 
for lifetime spending on pharmaceuticals. Prior studies have mainly focused on the consequences 
of weight loss (interventions) on pharmaceutical expenses.[26-29] However, less is known about the 
(lifetime) sector-specific cost consequences of obesity prevention. Since obese people use more 
obesity-related pharmaceuticals than people with normal weight, one may expect initial savings 
on drugs. In contrast, people with normal weight probably live longer and may therefore induce 
additional drug costs for diseases such as Alzheimer’s in additional life-years (with respect to obese 
people). Whether preventing obesity will result in cost savings in the drug segment may therefore 
importantly depend on how the savings on drugs for obesity-related diseases on the one hand relate 
to the additional drug costs in life-years gained on the other. 
4 Note that the Long-Term Care Act (Wlz) replaced the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) as of January 1, 2015.
5 Consumers may buy supplementary healthcare insurance from private health insurers for care that is not covered by 
either of the two Acts, i.e. care that is covered in the third compartment (e.g., cosmetic surgery and physiotherapy).
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5.2 METHODS
In order to estimate the effects of obesity prevention on the annual and lifetime healthcare costs 
in different segments, in particular the pharmaceutical sector, the Chronic Disease Model (CDM) 
developed by the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) was used 
in combination with Dutch empirical data from a Cost of Illness (COI) study from 2003.[21] We briefly 
discuss the methods and input data used. For a more in-depth explanation of the RIVM CDM, we refer 
to Hoogenveen et al.[30] and van Baal et al.[31] 
The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment Chronic Disease Model 
The CDM is a Markov-type, multistate, transition model that describes the life course of different, 
hypothetical cohorts in terms of disease prevalence numbers, as well as mortality rates.6 In this 
chapter we used two risk factors, obesity and smoking, to simulate incidence and prevalence rates 
of 22 risk factor-related chronic diseases, such as acute myocardial infarction, chronic heart failure, 
diabetes and different types of cancer. The risk factors and chronic diseases are linked by relative 
risks that are based on a wide range of international epidemiological studies. The prevalence of any 
chronic disease then determines the mortality risk (having a disease increases the risk of death) and 
thus the life expectancy.7 Moreover, mortality may also be a direct consequence of risk factor-related 
diseases that are not explicitly included in the model.[13] 
We used a cohort analysis to estimate the disease prevalence and mortality rates of obese people and 
compare these numbers with healthy people and smokers. Three different cohorts are distinguished: 
an ‘obese’ cohort, a ‘smoking’ cohort and a ‘healthy-living’ cohort. All cohorts consist of 500 men and 
500 women who initially are all aged 20 years. The obese cohort consists of men and women who 
have a body mass index (BMI) ≥30 kg/m2 and who have never smoked (and will never smoke).8 BMI 
is an internationally commonly used indicator of body weight (i.e., weight-for-height index expressed 
in kg/m²). The WHO broadly recognises four categories for adults according to predefined cut-off 
points: a BMI <18.5 kg/m² is used to classify ‘underweight’; a person has ‘normal weight’ when his or 
her BMI ranges between 18.5 and 25 kg/m²; a BMI ≥25 kg/m² indicates ‘overweight’ and a BMI ≥30 kg/
m² is used to categorise ‘obesity’.[34] The two reference cohorts that allow for disease prevalence and 
mortality rate comparisons are, first, a cohort consisting of people who are non-smokers and have 
a normal BMI (i.e., between 18.5 and 25 kg/m²) [the ‘healthy-living’ cohort] and, second, a ‘smoking’ 
cohort of individuals with normal weight but who smoke throughout their entire lives. Furthermore, 
6 Among other things, the CDM has previously been used for projections of risk factors and disease prevalence rates, 
and cost-effectiveness analyses.[32,33]
7 For example, smoking increases the chance of getting lung cancer, which subsequently increases the risk of dying. As 
a consequence, the life expectancy of smokers in the model is lower than the life expectancy of non-smokers.
8 The obese cohort is modelled as non-smokers to facilitate a clear interpretation of the substitution of diseases and 
its associated costs. Moreover, due to interactions between both risk factors with regard to mortality, it would pose 
additional data demands.
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all cohorts are closed, meaning that there are no transitions among different cohorts (an obese person 
will never enter the ‘healthy-living’ cohort). Simulation of the cohorts proceeded for 100 simulations of 
one year until no survivors were left in any of the cohorts (i.e., nobody reached the age of 120 years). 
The CDM thus provides survival and prevalence numbers for diseases related to obesity and smoking. 
The prevalence of diseases unrelated to both risk factors (e.g., dementia) is considered equal for all 
cohorts. Therefore, prevalence numbers of such diseases will only depend on the number of survivors 
in each of the cohorts. 
Cost of Illness Study
Linking the disease prevalence rates and cohort sizes to the healthcare costs per disease per patient 
divided per healthcare sector will result in estimations of annual and lifetime healthcare costs for 
different sectors of the three different cohorts. COI data from the Netherlands for 2003 were used to 
estimate these healthcare expenditures for the different cohorts.[21,35] This COI study is a product of 
a collaboration of the center for Public Health Forecasting of the RIVM and the Erasmus University 
Medical Centre and Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and builds on previous editions of COI studies in 
the Netherlands. Specific methodologies for and previous results from these COI studies have been 
discussed elsewhere.[35,36] 
These data can provide an overview of the total healthcare costs and related welfare expenditures in 
a specific year. Costs can be broken down according to disease, age and sex. Using such a top-down 
approach avoids any double counting and, therefore, cost estimates are both comprehensive and 
mutually exclusive. Furthermore, costs can be ordered according to the main categories (i.e., diagnosis 
groups) of the ninth version of the WHO’s International Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes 
of Death (ICD)[37] and further allocated to specific diseases. Beside this, costs can also be allocated to a 
wide range of more general categories, such as ‘sector’ (based on groups of healthcare providers), ‘all 
other infectious diseases’ and ‘not disease-related expenditure’.
Which costs are to be included in the cost estimations depends on the definition of care used. In 
this study, we used the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) System 
of Health Accounts (SHA), which focuses exclusively on healthcare costs as a consequence of direct 
medical care (diagnosis, treatment and nursing) and enables international comparisons.[38] 9 It is 
important to note that the SHA does not include some specific types of care allocated to the long-term 
care function, such as costs of home care.[21] As such, the costs related to long-term care and, therefore, 
ageing, are underestimated. The segments used are those identifiable in the Dutch healthcare system. 
One feature especially relevant for the current study is that drugs used within the hospital are labelled 
9 Other definitions of healthcare costs available in the Netherlands are the Dutch Health and Social Care Accounts used 
by Statistic Netherlands (CBS) and the Budgetary Scheme of Care used by the Dutch ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport. The first definition takes the broadest, societal perspective including some welfare costs and for example costs 
of housing and day nursery, while the latter includes costs that fall under the ministerial responsibility.
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as ‘hospital costs’, as they largely fall under the hospital budget in the Netherlands. We address this 
issue further in the discussion of this chapter. 
Analysis
In this chapter, we particularly focus on the costs of the four largest sectors: ‘medicines and medical 
appliances’, ‘hospitals’, ‘long-term care’ and ‘primary healthcare’. The CDM thus describes the prevalence 
numbers for 22 chronic diseases (specified by age and sex) related to obesity and/or smoking. Costs for 
the different cohorts are estimated by multiplying these prevalence numbers by the costs per patient 
per sector (also specified by age and sex). Diseases that are unrelated to obesity or smoking, such as 
dementia, are all included in a rest category. To calculate the costs of this rest category, the total costs 
per person per sector are deducted by the sum of the related costs of the 22 chronic related diseases 
per person per sector. This cost of the unrelated diseases is multiplied by the number of survivors for 
each cohort. The total costs per sector for the cohorts are calculated by adding the separate costs for 
all diseases (related) and the rest category (unrelated diseases). This allows comparisons of the annual 
and lifetime healthcare costs – the latter is obtained by summing the annual costs up over time – 
of the three different cohorts and estimating the consequences, in terms of costs for the different 
healthcare sectors, of eradicating obesity from the population.10 
Discounting
In order to assert whether preventing obesity results in cost savings in the pharmaceutical segment or 
any of the other major healthcare segments, we have to convert all the costs and benefits over time to 
the net present value. For this purpose, we discounted all costs and savings at a discount rate of 4%, 
which is in accordance with the Dutch national guidelines.[39] To allow for international comparisons11 
we also calculated cumulative differences in healthcare costs between the obese cohort and ‘healthy-
living’ individuals employing different discount rates, including discount rates of 0%, 3% and 5%. 
Sensitivity analyses
As the application of the RIVM CDM and the COI data require making various assumptions regarding 
key model input values and choosing between different definitions of healthcare costs (which may 
importantly influence the results), van Baal et al.[13] conducted several additional analyses. In this 
chapter, we also performed sensitivity analyses using similar starting points to van Baal et al.[13] which 
we deemed especially relevant for our study. 
10 Note that we focus here on the consequences of prevention for healthcare costs, not on the costs of prevention itself. 
Therefore, we assume that the preventive intervention that would lead to this eradication (i.e., completely preventing 
obesity), is costless. Obviously, such interventions are hard to come by.
11 Discount rates for costs differ for different jurisdictions and national guidelines for pharmacoeconomic research. 
Discount rates usually range from 3% to 5%, although sensitivity analyses including discount rates from 0% to 6% are 
largely prescribed.[40-42] 
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First, we estimated the healthcare costs using the Dutch Health and Social Care Accounts healthcare 
costs definition (from Statistic Netherlands). This definition is broader than the SHA used in our base-
case analyses and also comprises many types of social care, including care for the disabled, home 
care and day nursery. In the study by van Baal et al.[13] the adoption of this broader definition had the 
biggest impact on their results – it increased the healthcare costs for all cohorts and also the relative 
differences between the three cohorts substantially. In our study, therefore, we expect this analysis to 
be especially relevant for the effects on the long-term care sector. 
Second, no consensus has been reached regarding the exact association between BMI levels and 
risk of death. Variation in mortality risks for higher levels of obesity has been observed among several 
studies.[43,44] As we do not distinguish between levels of obesity (above a BMI of 30 kg/m2, relative 
mortality risks remain equal for all levels of obesity) and thus do not account for this variation in 
mortality rates, our lifetime medical costs estimates may be biased. Therefore, we examined the impact 
of varying the relative mortality risk associated to different levels of obesity. For this purpose and in 
line with van Baal et al.[13] we used the relative mortality risks from Flegal et al.[44] who used follow-up 
data from the series of National (US) Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (NHANES). Flegal et 
al.[44] reported lower relative mortality risks for higher levels of BMI than cited in the international 
literature[45-47] (and used here). The input of these relative mortality risks into our model may influence 
the results for the obese cohort with regard to lifetime healthcare costs (as a consequence of lower 
mortality rates), which was also the case in van Baal et al.[13] In two separate scenarios, we applied the 
relative risk of mortality as reported in Flegal et al.[44], first, the relative risk of mortality for BMI levels 
between 30 and 35 kg/m2 and second, for BMI levels ≥35 kg/m2.
5.3 RESULTS
Life expectancy
Life expectancies differ for the three different cohorts. Starting with 1,000 people within each cohort, 
differences in mortality are negligible in the first 20 years. The main reason for this is that harmful 
effects of risk factors such as obesity and smoking predominantly effect mortality rates in the long 
run (in contrast to quality of life effects, which may also occur immediately). After 60 years (at the age 
of 80 years), 736 persons are still alive in the ‘healthy-living’ cohort as apposed to 483 persons in the 
smoking cohort. The smoking cohort is the first cohort to become extinct while the ‘healthy-living’ 
cohort is the last to lose all its members. Remaining life expectancies at the starting age of 20 years 
are thus longest for the ‘healthy-living’ cohort (64.4 years), followed by the obese cohort (59.9 years) 
and the smoking cohort (57.4 years). 
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Annual healthcare costs
Figure 5.1a shows the average additional annual costs of an obese person compared with a ‘healthy-
living’ person, conditionally upon survival. An obese person incurs higher medical costs for each of 
the healthcare segments than a person in the ‘healthy-living’ cohort, at all ages. However, the size of 
the differences in annual medical costs incurred by an obese and a ‘healthy-living’ individual differs 
significantly between healthcare sectors, the most notable difference being the annual hospital 
costs. To account for the differences in spending between healthcare sectors, Figure 5.1b displays the 
annual cost ratio between the obese and ‘healthy-living’ cohorts. This lower panel shows that obesity 
has, relatively, the largest impact on medication spending. Between the ages of 30 and 40 years, an 
obese person spends, on average, 25% more on drugs than a ‘healthy-living’ individual. 
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FIGURE 5.1 Average additional annual costs (a) and cost ratio (b), according to healthcare sector, for an obese person compared 
with a ‘healthy-living’ person (€, year 2003 values)
Expected lifetime medical costs
Table 5.1 describes the results of the average expected lifetime costs, specified for each of the four 
healthcare sectors, per obese person, ‘healthy-living’ person and smoker. Furthermore, costs are 
divided into two parts: those costs attributable to obesity and smoking-related diseases, and costs 
attributable to other, unrelated diseases that occur in life-years gained. Summing up the costs for all 
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risk factor-related diseases suggests that obese individuals are most expensive and ‘healthy-living’ 
people most inexpensive. The obese cohort incurs the highest related healthcare costs within all 
sectors, except for long-term care. Drug spending for obesity-related diseases for an obese individual 
is on average €9,200, compared with €7,200 and €5,200 for a smoker and a ‘healthy-living’ individual, 
respectively. For diseases other than those related to obesity and smoking, costs – which are much 
higher than costs attributable to obesity and smoking-related diseases – are highest for the ‘healthy-
living’ cohort, especially due to large differences in costs for long-term care. Average pharmaceutical 
expenditures per capita differ among cohorts: €26,300 for the obese cohort, compared with €24,300 
and €29,800 for the smoking and ‘healthy-living’ cohorts, respectively. As shown in Table 5.1, total 
expenditure on medication and medical appliances are thus highest for the obese cohort. Total 
lifetime medical costs (summing all the segments up) are, on average, highest for a person in the 
‘healthy-living’ cohort (€281,000) followed by a person in the obese cohort (€250,000) and smoking 
cohort (€220,000). The main reason for this is the difference in life expectancies among the different 
cohorts. The costs incurred in these additional life-years, in particular the costs for long-term care 
caused by diseases unrelated to obesity and smoking, are the foremost contributors to the cost 
differences between the three cohorts.
TABLE 5.1 Expected lifetime medical costs per person (€ x 1,000, year 2003 values) at 20 years of age for the three cohorts, 
categorised by sector
Total healthcare costs (all diseases)
Sector ‘Healthy-living’ cohort Obese cohort Smoking cohort
Related 
diseases
Unrelated 
diseases
Total Related 
diseases
Unrelated 
diseases
Total Related 
diseases
Unrelated 
diseases
Total
Long-term care 16 85 101 14 58 72 12 42 54
Hospital 19 49 68 24 44 68 23 40 64
GP 3 20 23 4 19 23 3 18 21
Medication 5 30 35 9 26 36 7 24 32
Othera 3 51 54 4 48 51 3 46 49
Total 46 235 281 55 195 250 48 172 220
Note. Minor discrepancies with some of the totals may exist due to rounding off the cost estimates of the specific sectors.
a Includes the costs from all other sectors than the four explicitly listed in the table.
Obesity prevention and healthcare costs
To analyse how prevention of obesity might influence the breakdown of the medical costs into 
different segments and cost categories, we used the differences in lifetime healthcare costs between 
the obese and ‘healthy-living’ cohorts. We assumed that the preventive strategy that would lead to 
this conversion (the obese cohort becomes the ‘healthy-living’ cohort) is costless. Figure 5.2 shows 
the cost differences for each of the four cost categories for the entire period (100 years) between the 
‘healthy-living’ and obese cohorts. Future costs were discounted at 4%. 
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Figure 5.2 shows that during approximately the first 50 years, converting obese people into ‘healthy-
living’ people will save costs in all segments (i.e., the four main segments) of the healthcare sector. The 
reason for this is that healthy people have lower disease incidence rates related to obesity and thus 
lower related medical costs. The largest savings occur in the pharmaceutical and hospital segments. 
Savings in the medication segment are mainly a consequence of reduced medication and medical 
appliances expenditures for diabetes, osteoarthritis and low-back pain. After this period, a different 
picture emerges. Preventing obesity results in the incurrence of additional costs in life-years gained in 
all healthcare segments, in particular in the long-term care sector. It also becomes immediately clear 
that the costs of long-term care explain that preventing obesity may increase rather than decrease 
healthcare costs. 
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FIGURE 5.2 Difference in lifetime costs between the ‘healthy-living’ and obese cohorts, categorised by healthcare sector (year 
2003 values)
From the age of 74 years, drug spending is higher for the ‘healthy-living’ cohort than the obese cohort 
because of increased costs related to diseases such as Alzheimer’s and other diseases incurred in 
life-years gained. Despite this, lifetime expenditures on pharmaceuticals are lower when obesity is 
prevented – the cumulative difference in costs of pharmaceuticals between the obese cohort and 
the ‘healthy-living’ cohort is almost €1 million. Apparently, the savings on drugs for obesity-related 
diseases outweigh the additional costs for other diseases in life-years gained. Thus, successfully 
preventing obesity may result in cost savings in the short-term, which would apply for all healthcare 
segments, but in additional expenditures in the long-term, which sometimes outweigh the short-
term savings. However, the medication segment (and the hospital segment, to a very small extent), 
will incur lower lifetime costs when obesity is successfully prevented, at the expense of higher costs 
elsewhere. 
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Discounting
The costs in Figure 5.2 are discounted at a rate of 4%. The discount rate may importantly determine 
whether or not the short-term savings, which are the result of converting the obese cohort into the 
‘healthy-living’ cohort, are outweighed by the additional costs incurred in the long run, i.e. whether 
or not preventing obesity will save costs in any of the healthcare segments. Table 5.2 presents the 
estimates for cumulative differences in healthcare costs if obesity is successfully prevented, using 
different discount rates. Not discounting will especially affect the cumulative long-term care 
expenditures, resulting in a €29 million difference in costs in that segment between the obese and 
‘healthy-living’ cohorts. Applying a discount rate of 6% would reduce these additional expenditures to 
zero! The reason for this is that although preventing obesity will primarily increase the costs within the 
long-term care segment compared with the costs in the other segments, these costs are most likely 
to be incurred predominantly during the life-years gained, i.e. in the far future (after 50 years). Thus, if 
intervention costs are fixed, applying a higher discount rate for additional future costs due to obesity 
prevention will result in a reduction of total costs. This would make obesity prevention a more attractive 
strategy in terms of net present value (i.e., net present costs), even for the long-term care segment. For 
the medication and medical appliances segment and the two other healthcare segments, the choice 
of the discount rate seems to be of rather limited importance. In case of pharmaceuticals, obesity 
prevention will – regardless of the discount rate – always result in a reduction of lifetime costs. 
TABLE 5.2 Net present value differences of lifetime costs between the obese and ‘healthy-living’ cohorts, specified by discount rate 
for costs (€ x 1 million, year 2003 values)
Sector 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
Long-term care 29 14 7 4 2 2 0
Hospital 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
GP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Medication -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Other 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sensitivity analyses
The results of the sensitivity analyses are shown in Table 5.3. In scenario 1 (using the broader definition 
of healthcare costs from Statistic Netherlands: the Dutch Health and Social Care Accounts healthcare 
costs definition), absolute estimates of expected lifetime long-term care costs per person increase 
(almost by a factor of 2) for all cohorts, while costs in the other segments remain unaltered. Absolute 
cost differences for long-term care also increase between cohorts. Applying this broader definition 
of healthcare costs would make obesity prevention even less favourable (in terms of lifetime medical 
costs). 
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TABLE 5.3 Expected lifetime healthcare costs per person: results of sensitivity analyses (€ x 1,000, year 2003 values)
Scenario Sector
‘Healthy-living’ 
cohort
Obese cohort Smoking cohort
Base-case scenario Long-term care 101 72 54
Hospital 68 68 64
GP 23 23 21
Medication 35 36 32
Other 54 51 49
Total 281 250 220
Scenario 1 (broader definition of healthcare 
costs)
Long-term care 198 141 105
Hospital 68 68 64
GP 23 23 21
Medication 35 36 32
Other 54 51 49
Total 378 318 271
Scenario 2 (relative mortality risks for the 
obese cohort based on NHANES 30≤ BMI<35 
kg/m2)
Long-term care 98 82 51
Hospital 67 72 62
GP 23 24 21
Medication 34 37 31
Other 53 53 48
Total 275 267 212
Scenario 3 (relative mortality risks for the 
obese cohort based on NHANES BMI  ≥ 35 
kg/m2)
Long-term care 99 78 52
Hospital 67 69 63
GP 23 23 21
Medication 35 36 31
Other 53 52 49
Total 277 258 216
Note. Minor discrepancies with some of the totals may exist due to rounding off the cost estimates of the specific sectors.
BMI = body mass index; NHANES = National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey.
For the second additional analysis, we used the relative mortality risks for BMI levels between 30 
and 35 kg/m2 as reported by Flegal et al.[44] who used data from NHANES – which are lower then 
used in our base-case scenario – as input values. Clearly, lower relative mortality rates for higher 
BMI levels will extend the life expectancy of the obese. This increases the difference regarding drug 
expenditures between obese and ‘healthy-living’ individuals. Moreover, it attenuates the differences in 
long-term care expenditures between the obese and ‘healthy-living’ cohorts (reducing the long-term 
care estimates for the latter, while increasing the long-term care costs for the former), but it slightly 
widens the gap for the hospital and GP segments (with higher expenditures for the obese cohort). In 
terms of total expenditures, applying lower relative mortality risks allows the obese people to incur 
more healthcare costs (as they live longer), which attenuates the differences in lifetime expenditures 
between the obese and ‘healthy-living’ cohorts. Preventing obesity will then be a relatively more 
attractive option – in terms of costs – with respect to the base-case scenario.
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An almost similar pattern (but less pronounced) is shown in scenario 3 (relative mortality risks for the 
obese cohort based on NHANES BMI ≥35 kg/m2). However, in this case, pharmaceutical expenditures 
are similar to our base-case analyses.
5.4 DISCUSSION
In this study, we used a Markov-type modelling approach to examine the consequences of obesity 
prevention for spending on pharmaceuticals and three other main Dutch healthcare segments, i.e. 
hospitals, long-term care and primary healthcare. We linked the RIVM CDM to cost figures from the 
2003 edition of the Dutch COI study.[21] We have shown that average annual drug expenditures are 
– conditionally on survival – higher for an obese individual than for a ‘healthy-living’ individual. More 
importantly, although obese people have a lower life expectancy than ‘healthy-living’ people (and thus 
have fewer years to induce drug costs), lifetime spending on drugs is higher for the obese. This can be 
explained by the fact that obesity increases the incurrence of diseases such as coronary heart disease, 
hypertension and type 2 diabetes, which require (extensive) drug treatment. Preventing obesity may 
first induce savings (i.e., savings in the first 50 years from the starting age of 20 years) on drugs for 
such obesity-related diseases. However, prevention also increases life expectancy. Still, the additional 
drug costs for diseases unrelated to obesity in the life-years gained through preventing obesity are 
outweighed by these early savings. In the end, therefore, obesity prevention (at zero costs) will result 
in cost savings for the medication segment. This holds in all sensitivity analyses and regardless of the 
discount rate used in the analysis. 
For the other healthcare segments, consequences are most pronounced (and different from those for 
the drug segment) for expenditures on long-term care. Obesity prevention will increase long-term 
care lifetime expenditures substantially in the long run. The magnitude of the cost increase depends 
to a large extent on the definition of healthcare costs used, the relative mortality risk associated with 
obesity and the discount rate. Nevertheless, the additional expenditures will easily offset short-term 
savings, which are negligible since treatment of obesity-related diseases in normal life-years usually 
does not involve long-term care. On the other hand, in life-years gained, many unrelated diseases 
may be incurred that do require long-term care (such as Alzheimer’s disease). Thus, for the first 
compartment (which is the financing scheme that accounts for long-term care), obesity prevention 
will result in (much) higher costs. This implies that the future sustainability of the long-term care 
sector will increasingly be challenged if policy makers are able to prevent obesity. Moreover, several 
projection studies show that population ageing will further increase the demand for long-term care 
considerably, posing additional challenges regarding the financing as well as planning of (future) 
long-term care.[48,49] 
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   92 23-03-16   10:15
593
Healthcare Costs and Obesity Prevention
For the two other healthcare segments, i.e. hospital care and primary healthcare, overall consequences 
of obesity prevention are almost negligible. Although short-term savings are achieved in the hospital 
segment, additional costs in the long-term almost completely offset these savings. Expenditures on 
GP care are hardly influenced by obesity prevention. Thus, although obesity prevention seems to 
have similar cost consequences for all healthcare segments – i.e. (relatively) short-term savings and 
additional expenditures in the long run – lifetime healthcare costs are affected in different ways for 
the different segments. 
Previous studies show that changing lifestyles (into healthier ones) may be an efficient way to improve 
public health, even when medical costs in life-years gained are accounted for.[17,50-53] Although 
prevention may not lead to cost savings in every healthcare segment (and in terms of total healthcare 
expenditures), it may still be a rational thing to do if we can achieve better public health in a cost-
effective way.[54,55] Therefore, it is important to realise that the substantial cost increase in the long-
term care sector (and therefore rising total healthcare costs) as a consequence of obesity prevention 
does not imply that prevention of obesity is undesirable, but instead that much (policy) attention 
should be devoted to the future financing and planning of long-term care. 
An important point in this context is where to draw the line regarding which costs to include in 
economic analyses (which may influence whether we perceive prevention as an attractive investment, 
in terms of costs, that is). From this chapter it is clear that applying a broader definition of healthcare 
costs increases the absolute difference of estimates for long-term care expenditures between cohorts 
substantially, making obesity prevention less attractive with respect to the base-case scenario in 
terms of costs. This can be explained by the fact that the additional costs that are incurred in the 
long-term care segment as a consequence of obesity prevention are not purely medical expenditures, 
but consist mainly of costs for more public welfare services. However, such costs may not be directly 
relevant from a healthcare perspective, but more so from a societal perspective. If we extend our 
perspective into a complete societal one, more societal costs and benefits need to be considered. 
Less obesity means less obesity-related morbidity and higher life expectancies. This may increase, 
for example, the productivity of the working population, since obesity has been found to induce 
productivity losses[56-59] as well as provide the possibility to delay pension age. Furthermore, as the 
proportion of elderly grows in developed countries, healthy ageing may lead to a reduced strain on 
informal care (both financially and emotionally) as well as a stronger network of childcare. On the 
other hand, more costs will also be incurred that deserve consideration. Such costs, often referred 
to as survivor consumption costs, may be related to housing, food and clothes.[60] It need not come 
as a surprise that such considerations may importantly affect the consequences of (preventive) 
interventions, in terms of costs and effects.
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Limitations
There are several limitations to our study that deserve mention. Some of these were already discussed 
by van Baal et al.[13] and will therefore not be extensively repeated here. First, we used the standard 
classification used by the WHO for overweight and obesity, i.e. according to BMI. It has been argued 
that this measure may have its limitations and that a combination of BMI and an indicator of how fat 
is distributed over the body – usually this is the waist circumference or waist-to-hip ratio – or even the 
latter indicator alone, would be more appropriate to assess the real heath risk attributable to obesity.
[8,61] 
Second, in the simulation approach we used, we have not incorporated any subdivision in BMI levels 
for people who are obese. Previous research has shown that this may be important for the relative 
risks and mortality rates related to obesity. We therefore performed two additional analyses using 
lower mortality risks for the obese, which show that the negative cost effects of obesity prevention 
on long-term care expenditures are attenuated compared with our base-case scenario, but still large 
enough to offset (slightly increased) savings in the three other main healthcare segments. 
Another possible limitation of our model is that it does not account for the influence of variation in 
obesity on the cost per patient for every disease related to obesity. This implies that the costs of, for 
instance, treating low-back pain are independent of BMI level, which may not always be realistic. 
Furthermore, an important limitation is that expenditures that result from pharmaceutical utilisation 
within hospitals or intramural long-term care services were not included in the medication and medical 
appliances segment but were an inseparable part of the hospital costs and long-term care segment. 
This has to do with the current financing system of hospitals applied in the Netherlands, which implies 
that costs of intramural care, including medication, are largely part of the relevant institution’s budget. 
This implies that our estimates of medication expenses will likely be an underestimation and may also 
affect estimates of costs and savings in the different segments. Future work could therefore be aimed 
at further disentangling these costs. 
A final noteworthy limitation of using the Dutch COI study is that assigning healthcare costs to 
diagnosis groups, age and sex is sometimes difficult. Detailed information regarding how cases were 
dealt with in which specific diagnosis data were lacking, information on the age distribution was 
missing or data had been miscoded is provided elsewhere.[62] 
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Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to show the consequences of preventing obesity for drug costs and 
other large segments of the healthcare sector. Obesity prevention will likely increase long-term 
care expenditures but induce savings in the pharmaceutical sector. This latter result is expected to 
be even more prominent as more and more obese people are being subjected to drug treatment. 
Despite possible cost increases as a consequence of obesity prevention, it may still be a worthwhile 
investment. This will to a great extent depend on how much health will be gained.[63] These are 
important considerations for healthcare policy makers who are concerned with the future financing 
and planning of the healthcare system.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
The consideration of future consequences in current behaviour is increasingly acknowledged as 
being important, as the effects that current behaviours and attitudes may have on future wellbeing 
and health can be profound. The trade-off between satisfying immediate desires and future benefits is 
therefore a matter of concern in areas like healthcare (smoking, unsafe sex), environment (exhausting 
resources), and finance (savings and pension building). Whether individuals take these possible 
distant outcomes into consideration when deciding to engage in certain behaviours, or just focus on 
maximising their immediate benefits without regarding future consequences, is often considered to 
be a more or less stable and measurable personal characteristic.
Following initial studies on time perspective by Frank[1] and Lewin[2], several researchers[e.g., 3-8] have 
examined the concept of what has been labelled future time perspective in the second half of the 
last century. Although slightly different definitions of this concept have been used, it is generally 
defined as “a rather generalised concern for future events and experiences”[5]. Despite attempts to develop 
instruments that measure this general concern with the future adequately, researchers have not yet 
achieved satisfying results in terms of consistency, reliability, and validity (for a review, see Strathman 
et al.[9]).
Strathman et al.[9] developed the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale, a measure 
for assessing individual differences in this construct of future thought. Given the complexity of the 
concept this instrument attempts to capture, this warrants a careful consideration of its construct 
validity. However, after the first study by Strathman et al.[9], only Petrocelli[10] has examined the factor 
structure of the CFC Scale. Contrary to Strathman et al.[9], Petrocelli[10] found evidence of two underlying 
factors, and hence suggested that an adjusted version of the CFC Scale would be a better measure of 
the CFC construct. So far, however, supporting evidence for this claim is lacking.
Meanwhile, as highlighted further below, the CFC Scale appears to be increasingly used in applied 
research in different contexts as a measure of consideration of future consequences. This makes it 
more important to address the questions regarding the underlying factor structure of the CFC Scale. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we present the results of a study that elaborated on the two previous studies 
regarding the properties of the CFC Scale, and that aimed at providing additional evidence in the 
factor validation process of the CFC Scale. Moreover, we examine the feasibility of the scale in young 
adolescents; the convergent validity of the scale – and possible underlying factors – with alternative 
measures assessing adolescents’ appreciation and expectations of their future; and the relation of the 
scale with several personal characteristics.
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Consideration of future consequences
Strathman et al.[9] tried to assess a unique aspect of the future time perspective and not merely a 
general preoccupation with the future. Strathman et al.[9] described the CFC as follows:
“The CFC refers to the extent to which individuals consider the potential distant outcomes of their current 
behaviours and the extent to which they are influenced by these potential outcomes. It involves the 
intrapersonal struggle between present behaviour with one set of immediate outcomes and one set of 
future outcomes.” 
The CFC Scale consists of 12 items measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (extremely 
uncharacteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic), of which seven items should be reverse-scored to obtain 
a total score ranging from 12 to 60 (or mean scores ranging from 1 to 5). A higher score indicates a 
higher level of consideration of future consequences (for original instrument and instructions see 
www.missouri.edu/~psyas/cfc.pdf ). Individuals high in CFC are expected to focus more on the future 
implications of their behaviour and to use these as a guide for their current behaviours. In extreme 
cases, these individuals may completely disregard immediate outcomes in their decision-making 
process. On the other hand, individuals low in CFC are expected to focus more on immediate needs 
and concerns, and their actions are expected to be focused on meeting these immediate needs. At 
the extreme end, these individuals do not take future consequences into account at all.[9]
To provide evidence of the influence of CFC on behaviours and attitudes, Strathman et al.[9] showed 
in Experiment 1 the effect of the CFC construct on information processing by demonstrating that 
individuals high in CFC, because of their greater interest in the environment, were less in favour of 
increased offshore oil drilling. More important, high CFC individuals were more in favour of oil drilling 
when its advantages were framed in the future and its disadvantages in the present. Conversely, low 
CFC individuals were more in favour of oil drilling when the advantages were outlined as immediate 
and disadvantages as distant. These results suggest that the time frame in which the consequences 
are portrayed has a greater influence on the decision-making process of individuals as opposed to 
whether the outcomes are either positive or negative.
In Experiment 2, Strathman et al.[9] demonstrated that the CFC Scale accounts for unique variance in 
behaviour over and above other measures assessing individual differences, including the Stanford 
Time Perspective Inventory[11,12], for example in cigarette use and general health concern.
The CFC Scale has been used in several studies in various research areas. For example, researchers 
have demonstrated that individuals high in CFC, as compared to individuals low in CFC, are more likely 
to engage in pro-environmental consumer behaviour, [13,14] pro-environmental political behaviour,[15] 
safe sexual behaviour, and HIV testing[16]. Orbell et al.[17] reported that individuals high in CFC were 
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more in favour of participating in colorectal cancer screening, and Orbell and Hagger[18] found similar 
results with regard to Type 2 diabetes screening. In addition, researchers have demonstrated that high 
CFC individuals have higher academic achievement[19] and tend to have greater fiscal responsibility[20]. 
Joireman et al.[21], moreover, found evidence of a link between CFC and aggression, while Insko et 
al.[22] demonstrated that a higher CFC among members of different groups diminishes intergroup 
competitiveness. However, this latter finding is not supported by Insko et al.[23]
Factor validation of the CFC Scale
Strathman et al.[9] started with a set of 24 statements when developing the CFC Scale and conducted 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to assess its factor structure. The results of both exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis provided evidence for a one-factor solution consisting of 12 items 
that measured the CFC construct best. Strathman et al.[9] demonstrated that these 12 items, together 
named the CFC Scale, were reliable in terms of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α’s between .80 and 
.86) and stability over time (e.g., test-retest correlation of .72). In addition, relationships between the 
CFC Scale and other measures evidenced a good convergent validity, for example, between the CFC 
Scale and future orientation,[e.g., 9,24] delay of gratification, and conscientiousness.[9]
Its extensive use in a wide variety of studies, the inconsistent results regarding the association 
between CFC and intergroup competitiveness, and the modest amount of empirical validation, 
induced Petrocelli[10] to examine the factor structure of the CFC Scale in more detail. First, Petrocelli[10] 
explored the factor structure of the CFC Scale by means of principal component analysis resulting 
in two underlying factors. Subsequently, Petrocelli[10] used confirmatory factor analysis to examine 
four maximum likelihood solutions. Petrocelli[10] attained a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of only .48 for 
Factor 2 (as opposed to .82 for Factor 1), and a relatively low correlation between the two factors (r = 
.54) despite the fact that it concerns items from the same scale. Hence, Petrocelli[10] suggested that the 
two underlying factors might be assessing different constructs: Factor 1 focused almost exclusively on 
immediate behaviour and immediate consequences, and Factor 2 concerned distant consequences 
of immediate behaviour. Petrocelli[10] also evaluated a model composed of one factor containing all 
the reverse-scored items and Item 2. Petrocelli[10] found that this model, omitting items of Factor 2, 
produced the best fit and therefore proposed that an 8-item version of the CFC Scale, consisting of 
almost exclusively reverse-scored items, might be a more appropriate measure of the CFC construct. 
Petrocelli[10] concluded that the CFC Scale may not so much be a measure of the extent to which 
individuals consider future consequences of their behaviour, but more of the extent to which they are 
not influenced by immediate consequences of their actions – that is, if the reverse-scored items are 
in fact reverse-scored. Otherwise, these items could serve as a measure of the extent to which people 
are influenced by the immediate consequences of their actions.
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Study hypotheses
Since the participants who completed the questionnaire for the study in this chapter are exclusively 
young adolescents, we assessed the feasibility of the CFC Scale in this study sample first. Although some 
authors have reported evidence of equal competency in decision-making between adolescents and 
adults,[e.g., 25] several authors have found that young adolescents are less able to foresee consequences 
of new alternatives and less able to conceptualise risks and benefits of their actions.[e.g., 26-28] Others 
have supported this notion of immaturity of judgment among young adolescents as opposed to 
older adolescents,[29,30] while van Exel et al.[31] theorised that adolescents would only consider their 
future to a very limited extent. Therefore, a lower mean CFC score is expected in the present study 
sample, as compared to results from other studies, and potentially a poor feasibility.
The general study hypothesis concerned the factor structure of the CFC Scale. Petrocelli[10] reported 
multiple underlying factors, therefore we hypothesised that the CFC Scale decomposes in two or 
more underlying factors. In order to clarify this further, we explored the convergent validity of the 
CFC Scale. We expected that the CFC Scale would correlate (positively) with other measures that 
assess young adolescents’ appreciation and expectations of their future, as well as with health belief 
statements. However, the correlations between these measures and any underlying factors of the CFC 
Scale could be different. We also investigated this.
Finally, we investigated associations of the CFC Scale and any underlying factors with several personal 
characteristics. In past research, variables including sex, educational level, and personality have 
discriminated between individuals high and low in CFC. Contradictory results have been reported 
concerning sex. Petrocelli[10] found that men scored significantly lower on the 12-item CFC Scale than 
women. Similar sex differences were found in the first factor of the two-factor solution, but not in Factor 
2. Other researchers found no significant differences in scores in CFC between men and women.[e.g., 18] 
No hypothesis is made here. Based on a study by Joireman[19] concerning academic achievement, a 
higher score in CFC is expected to correlate with a higher education. Other researchers have reported 
a correlation between CFC and Goldberg’s conscientiousness dimension.[e.g., 9,18,22] Associations with 
all Big Five personality dimensions are investigated. Finally, we tested the discriminative power for 
religious upbringing, Body Mass Index (BMI), health status, happiness, and attitudes about health lifestyle.
6.2 METHODS
Participants
We conducted secondary analysis on existing data of 2,006 young adolescents (1,064 girls and 942 
boys) recruited in May 2005 from 10 secondary education schools throughout the Netherlands. Van 
Exel et al.[32] obtained the sample in a study investigating adolescents’ health behaviour in relation to 
their attitudes about their health lifestyle and their consideration of the future consequences of their 
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behaviour. Participants between the ages of 11 to 15 (mean age = 13.2 years, SD = 0.70) attended 
either 1st or 2nd grade of pre-vocational or general secondary education. The vast majority of the 
study sample was autochthonous Dutch (90.1%).
Materials
Participants completed the “Health and Future” questionnaire during class, under supervision of their 
teacher. The questionnaire covered eight topic areas: about you, about your health, about your future, 
about home, about school, about your leisure time, about what you eat, and about money. The about your 
future section included the CFC Scale and some alternative measures assessing future appreciation 
and expectations. We translated the CFC Scale into Dutch and slightly simplified the wording to 
increase its comprehensiveness for young adolescents (see Appendix 6.1).
We assessed personality using a short version of Goldberg’s Big Five Personality Inventory[33,34]. We 
asserted health status using a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 (worst conceivable health state) 
to 10 (best conceivable health state) and happiness using a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 
(completely unhappy) to 10 (perfectly happy). We further assessed attitude about health lifestyle by 
means of self-categorisation to one of five attitudes identified within the same population before 
using Q-methodology: carefree sporty, worrying dependent, contended independent, looks over content, 
and indifferent solitary.[31] For a more detailed discussion of the sample method, questionnaire 
development and contents, and measures used, see van Exel et al.[32]
Procedure
First of all, we made a straightforward comparison of the descriptive statistics (scores on the CFC 
Scale) of the present study sample with the results from several other studies.
Feasibility
We asserted the feasibility of the CFC Scale in this sample by means of response analysis, i.e. in terms of 
the percentage of completed scales with no missing items, the percentage of completed scales with 
no more than 10% missing items, the percentage of missing values per item, and the standardised 
index of missing values. The standardised index is computed by dividing the mean number of missing 
values per respondent by total number of items, multiplied by 100.[35] We excluded completed CFC 
Scales with more than 10% missing items (that is, more than one missing item) from further analyses. 
In case of a single missing item, the average score of the respondent on the other 11 items replaced 
the missing item, after recoding the reverse-scored items.
Reliability
We analysed the reliability of the CFC Scale by assessing its internal consistency using two indicators: 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and item-total correlation.
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Factor analysis
We used factor analysis to assess the interrelationship among the scale items and to identify the 
number of underlying dimensions. First, we tested the factorability of the CFC data. We computed the 
determinant value of the correlation matrix to test for multicollinearity or singularity. This value should 
be greater than .00001.[36,37] Next, we performed Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity[38] and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s 
(KMO) test of sampling adequacy[39,40]. To allow factor analysis, the first test should be significant (p < 
.05), while the size of the KMO value should exceed .60.[41] If all these tests are shown to be satisfactory, 
the data is suitable for factor analysis.
The actual factor analysis consisted of two phases. First, we subjected the CFC Scale to confirmatory 
factor analysis via the maximum likelihood method of estimation, using the factor solutions reported 
by Strathman et al.[9] and Petrocelli[10]. We evaluated two models: first, the solution of Strathman et al.[9], 
which consisted of one factor including all 12 items; second, the two-factor solution of Petrocelli[10], 
consisting of Factor 1 (Item 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12) and Factor 2 (Item 1, 6, 7, and 8). To determine 
whether the number of extracted factors in both models was adequate, we computed two common 
goodness-of-fit tests: the chi-square (Χ2) test and the ratio of the chi-square to its degrees of freedom 
(Χ2/df). The advantage of the Χ2/df ratio over the Χ2 index is its insensitivity to large sample sizes, but 
there is some indistinctness in the literature about what cut-off point for the Χ2/df ratio we should use 
to achieve an “adequate fit”. We used the 5:1 ratio suggested by Wheaton et al.[42]
In the second phase, we conducted exploratory analysis on the present dataset, namely principal 
component analysis with Varimax rotation. To assert the number of factors to retain, we used three 
techniques, of which the Kaiser’s criterion[e.g., 43] is the most commonly used, also known as the 
eigenvalue rule. Only factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 are retained. This technique has 
been criticised in the past, as it tends to overestimate the number of factors to select.[e.g., 44] Next, we 
performed Catell’s scree test[45], which implies inspection of the scree plot in which the extracted 
factors are plotted against their eigenvalues. The final approach, Horn’s Parallel Analysis[46], involves 
the comparison of the eigenvalues with eigenvalues obtained from a randomly generated dataset 
of the same size. This technique is considered to be the most accurate[44] and we used Watkins[47] to 
conduct this test.
Convergent validity
We assessed the convergent validity through Spearman’s rank-order correlation of the CFC Scale and 
any underlying factors with alternative measures assessing adolescents’ appreciation and expectations 
of their future and some health belief statements. We asked respondents (A) how important it was to 
them what their life would be like 2, 5, and 25 years from now (Likert-type scale, four levels ranging 
from very important to not at all important); (B) to make a series of trade-offs between money values 
now and in the future (2, 5, and 25 years from now), which were used to calculate discount rates; (C) 
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to consider 3 x 2 investments in health (improve their dietary behaviour, exercise 30 minutes more 
per day, and take an injection that would make them sick for the next week) that would yield (i) a 
better health at age 70 or (ii) extend life with 3 years; (D) for their subjective life expectancy; (E) for 
their expectations regarding their health status at the age of 40 and 70; and (F) to evaluate seven 
health belief statements. To ensure that higher scores indicated higher appreciation of the future, 
we reversed the scores for Measure A, B, C, and F. We interpreted the strength of the relationship 
according to the guidelines suggested by Cohen[48]: rs = .10 to .29 indicates a small, rs = .30 to .49 a 
medium, and rs = .50 to 1.0 a large correlation effect size.
Relation with personal characteristics and health variables
Finally, we used t tests, one-way between-groups ANOVA with Tukey’s post hoc test, and Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation to explore associations of the CFC and any underlying factors with personal 
characteristics and several health variables. We assessed the strength of the relationships found using 
the t tests using Cohen’s d (i.e., d = 0.20 indicates a small, d = 0.50 a medium, and d = 0.80 a large 
effect).
6.3 RESULTS
We received completed questionnaires from 2,006 young adolescents residing in the Netherlands. 
Averaged individual mean scores on the 12-item CFC Scale ranged from 1.33 to 4.75. The average 
score in the present study sample was 3.27 (SD = 0.50), and the median was 3.33. This is similar to the 
mean score of 3.28 in a recent Dutch academic sample collected by Rappange[49] and to mean scores 
reported among samples of 50- to 69-year-olds[17,32]. In contrast, Strathman et al.[9] and Petrocelli[10] 
reported mean scores around 3.50 in academic settings. Our findings are inconsistent with our 
expectation that young adolescents would score lower on the CFC Scale.
We further anticipated that the feasibility of the CFC Scale in this study sample might be poor. 
However, we found excellent results on all measures of feasibility. In total, we received 1,946 (97%) 
scales without missing values. Only 9 out of 2,006 completed questionnaires had more than 10% 
missing values on the CFC Scale, which we therefore excluded from further analyses. Missing values 
per item ranged from 0.1% to 0.6%, and the standardised index of missing values was 0.4.
We assessed the internal consistency to investigate the reliability of the CFC Scale. Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient for the scale was .76, and item-total correlations ranged from .26 to .58. Both values are 
similar to results from previous studies.
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Factor analysis
Preceding the evaluation of the different factor solutions found by Strathman et al.[9] and Petrocelli[10], 
we assessed the suitability of the dataset for factor analysis. The determinant value was .130, the 
Barlett’s Test of Sphericity reached significance, Χ2 = 4068.430, p < .01, df = 66, N = 1,997, and the KMO 
value was .830, which meets Kaiser’s “meritorious” criteria[40]. All tests support the factorability of the 
data. 
Confirmatory factor analysis
Evaluation of the one-factor structure reported by Strathman et al.[9] and the two-factor structure 
by Petrocelli[10], using confirmatory factor analysis, resulted in unsatisfactory results. Factor loadings 
on the one-factor solution ranged from .224 to .710. The model did not produce an adequate fit, Χ2 
(54, N = 1,997) = 804.95, p < .01 and Χ2/df = 14.91. This exceeds the 5:1 ratio proposed by Wheaton 
et al.[42] The two-factor model also produced a poor fit, Χ2 (43, N = 1,997) = 435.37, p < .01 and Χ2/df 
= 10.12. The factor pattern matrix and the factor structure matrix of this model, together with the 
item descriptives, are shown in Table 6.1. In absence of satisfactory results, we conducted additional 
exploratory factor analysis to explore more appropriate factor structure solutions.
TABLE 6.1 Item descriptives and factor pattern/structure matrix of the CFC Scale: maximum likelihood with Direct Oblimin rotation 
(δ = –0.50)
Item Item descriptives Factor pattern matrix Factor structure matrix
M  SD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
1 3.36          0.97                     .169              .603                   .365              .658
2 2.56          0.99                   –.023              .562                   .159              .555
3a 2.91          1.08                     .587              .138                   .632              .328   
4a 2.76          0.96                     .522            –.005                   .520              .164
5a 3.55          0.95                     .329            –.016                   .324              .090
6 3.64          0.89                     .306              .172                   .362              .271
7 3.80          0.93                     .317              .169                   .372              .272
8 3.43          0.92                     .241              .248                    .321              .326
9a 2.27          0.99                     .626            –.084                   .599              .119
10a 2.53          0.97                     .543              .013                   .547              .189
11a 2.36          0.96                     .762            –.064                   .742              .183
12a 3.12          0.90                     .388            –.086                   .360              .039
Note. Item means and standard deviations are before reverse-scoring. Loadings in bold are values greater than .30 and are retained 
for that factor. Underlined values indicate a multiple loading on two factors. Eigenvalues for Factor 1 and Factor 2 are 2.743 and 
0.650, respectively (before rotation). The two-factor solution explains a total amount of 28.3% of the variance, with Factor 1 
contributing 22.9% and Factor 2 contributing 5.4% (before rotation). Factor 1 and Factor 2 are correlated (r = .32).
aReverse-scored items.
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Exploratory factor analysis
Principal components analysis with Varimax rotation resulted in three factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0, explaining a total of 49.0% of the variance with the three factors accounting for 
20.8%, 16.4%, and 11.9%, respectively. The factor loadings of all items on the three factors are shown 
in Table 6.2. Inspection of the scree plot revealed a break after the third factor, and this was further 
supported by the results Parallel Analysis provided, which showed three eigenvalues exceeding the 
corresponding eigenvalues from the generated data (12 variables x 1,997 subjects). Next, principal 
components analysis with Direct Quartimin rotation (δ = 0) showed that the correlation between the 
three factors ranged from .09 to .27. The absence of strong relations among any combination of two 
factors justifies the use of Varimax rotation.[36,37] In addition, we performed reliability analysis for all 
factors. Factor A1 (Item 3-5 and 9-12) scored well in terms of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .74). 
TABLE 6.2 The factor loading matrix of the CFC Scale: principal components analysis with Varimax rotation
Item Factor Communality
A1 A2 A3
4a .713 –.019 .174 .539
3a .662 .189 .299 .563
11a .647 . 418 –.005 .594
5a .575 –.175 .153 .385
9a .523 .461 –.136 .505
10a .488 .402 –.004 .400
12a .478 .124 –.100 .254
8 –.027 .692 .186 .515
7 .118 .636 .059 .422
6 .102 .601 .149 .393
2 .023     .059 .839 .707
1 .163   .295 .701 .605
Eigenvalue 2.490 1.966 1.427 5.877
% of variance 20.8 16.4 11.9 49.0
Note. Loadings in bold are values greater than .40 and are retained for that factor. Underlined values indicate a multiple loading on 
two factors. Eigenvalues and percentage of variance are after rotation.
aReverse-scored items.
We found lower Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (.52 and .54) for Factor A2 (Item 6-8) and Factor A3 (Item 
1-2), respectively. The respondents scored higher on Factor A2 (M = 3.62, SD = 0.66), as compared to 
Factor A1 (M = 3.21, SD = 0.61) and Factor A3 (M = 2.96, SD = 0.81). Factor A1 turned out to consist of 
the seven reverse-scored items, and Factors A2 and A3 of the positively worded items. Although the 
three-factor solution indicates a clear - statistical - distinction between Factors A2 and A3, a closer 
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examination of the content of these items and an attempt to interpret both factors did not result in 
a comparable clear-cut distinction between the two factors. Moreover, both factors independently 
did not prove to be very stable. Therefore, we also included a two-factor solution consisting of Factor 
B1 (identical to A1) and Factor B2 (A2 and A3 combined; Cronbach’s α = .59; M = 3.36, SD = 0.58) in 
further analyses. 
Convergent validity
Table 6.3 presents the correlations between the CFC Scale, underlying factors, and six other measures 
assessing appreciation of the future. We found small positive correlations for the CFC Scale and 
underlying factors with importance of future life (Measure A) and health expectancy at age 40 and 70 
(Measure E). Correlations with adolescents’ discount rates (Measure B) were also small and decreased 
substantially when the trade-offs between money now and later involved longer delays. This may 
indicate that adolescents´ time horizon when thinking about future outcomes is fairly limited, or that 
the CFC predominantly captures mid-term (2-5 years) outcomes in adolescents. Regarding the health 
investments (Measure C), we found higher correlations for improving dietary behaviour than for the 
other two investments, and – not shown in the table – for investments that would yield a better 
health at age 70 rather than extending life by three years. This applied to the CFC Scale as well as to 
the underlying factors. We found no correlation with life expectancy (Measure D), while correlations 
with the health belief statements (Measure F) varied considerably.
Relation with personal characteristics and health variables
Table 6.4 presents relations of the CFC Scale and underlying factors with several personal characteristics 
and health variables. Some are discussed in more detail here. We found no significant association 
between the CFC score and sex t(1,991) = 1.84, p =.07, when we measured CFC using the 12-item CFC 
Scale. However, girls scored significantly higher on Factor A1 (and B1), t(1,991) = 4.22, p < .01, d = 0.19, 
while boys scored significantly higher on Factor A3, t(1,991) = -6.50, p < .01, d = 0.29 and Factor B2, 
t(1,991) = -2.34, p = .02, d = 0.10. Pupils attending general secondary education scored significantly 
higher on the 12-item CFC Scale, t(1,971) = 5.02, p < .01, d = 0.23. We found similar results for Factors 
A1, A2, and B2: t(1,971) = 4.95, p < .01, d = 0.22; t(1,971) = 4.60, p < .01, d = 0.21, and t(1,971) = 3.19, p 
< .01, d = 0.14, respectively.
Adolescents with a religious upbringing scored higher on the 12-item CFC Scale, t(1,981) = 5.36, p 
< .01, d = 0.24; Factor A1, t(1,981) = 5.68, p < .01, d = 0.26; Factor A2, t(1,981) = 2.64, p < .01, d = 
0.12, and Factor B2, t(1,981) = 2.82, p < .01, d = 0.13. The strength of these relationships is, however, 
predominantly limited.
Respondents with a worrying dependent attitude about their health lifestyle scored significantly 
higher on the 12-item CFC Scale and on all underlying factors except for Factor A3.
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TABLE 6.3 Convergent validity: correlation of the CFC Scale with other measures of appreciation and expectations of the future 
and health belief statements
Variable Category CFC Scale Three-factor structure
Two-factor 
structure
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2
(A) Meaning of future life In 2 years .20†† .15†† .18†† .12†† .15†† .19††
In 5 years .23†† .17†† .20†† .16†† .17†† .23††
In 25 years .21†† .16†† .19†† .17†† .16†† .21††
(B) Discount rate 2 years .20†† .18†† .12†† .09†† .18†† .13††
5 years .14†† .12†† .08†† .06†† .12†† .09††
25 years .06†† .07†† .04† .01 .07†† .02
(C) Health investments
Improve dietary behaviour  .27†† .22†† .24†† .17†† .22†† .26††
Exercise 30 minutes per day more .21†† .15†† .17†† .17†† .15†† .21††
Take an injection that makes you sick for a week .16†† .11†† .14†† .16†† .11†† .19††
(D) Life expectancy .00 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00
(E) Health expectancy at age 40 .18
†† .15†† .15†† .12†† .15†† .16††
70 .12†† .10†† .10†† .10†† .10†† .12††
(F) Health belief statements
“I eat healthy” .14** .11** .13** .10** .11** .13**
“I exercise enough to stay fit” .10** .06** .11** .09** .06** .12**
“Living healthy makes me feel better” .24†† .17†† .26†† .14†† .17†† .25††
“If I live unhealthy I may incur all sorts of diseases in the future” .21†† .14†† .22†† .15†† .14†† .24††
“If I live unhealthy I may die sooner” .19†† .11†† .22†† .15†† .11†† .23††
“If I want, I can easily live healthier than I do now” .00 .03 .04* .04* .03 .06*
“If I were regularly ill, I would start living healthier” .12†† .12†† .14†† .08†† .09†† .13††
Note. N ranges from 1,761 to 1,990. The strength of the relationship can be interpreted according to the following guidelines 
suggested by Cohen[48]: rs = .10 to .29 indicates a small, rs = .30 to .49 a medium, and rs = .50 to 1.0 a large correlation.  *p < .05, 
two–tailed. **p < .01, two–tailed. †p < .05, one–tailed. ††p < .01, one-tailed.
Investigation of the relation between CFC and all Big Five personality dimensions revealed that a 
positive loading on any of the five personality dimensions was associated with a significantly higher 
score on the 12-item CFC Scale: neuroticism, t(1,735) = 2.04, p = .04, d = 0.10; extraversion, t(1,735) = 
2.43, p = .02, d = 0.12; openness to experience, t(1,735)= 4.56, p < .01, d = 0.22; conscientiousness, t(1,735) 
= 5.90, p < .01, d = 0.28; agreeableness, t(1,735) = 3.78, p < .01, d = 0.18. We found different results for 
the underlying factors. We found significant associations between positive personality-factor loaders 
and all underlying factors for only two dimensions, openness to experience and conscientiousness.
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TABLE 6.4 Relation of the CFC Scale with personal characteristics and health variables
Variable Category CFC Scale Three-factor structure Two-factor structure
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2
Sex Girls 3.29 3.27** 3.65 2.85** 3.27** 3.33*
Boys 3.25 3.15 3.59 3.08 3.15 3.39
Education Pre-vocational 3.21** 3.13** 3.54** 2.95 3.13** 3.30**
General secondary 3.32 3.27 3.68 2.96 3.27 3.39
Body Mass Index Mean or lower 3.27 3.21 3.64 2.93 3.21 3.35
Above mean 3.28 3.23 3.61 3.00 3.23 3.36
Attitude about 
health lifestyle
Carefree sporty 3.26 3.18 3.64** 2.96 3.18 3.37
Worrying dependent 3.39** 3.34** 3.73** 3.03 3.34** 3.45**
Contended independent 3.20 3.15 3.52 2.86 3.15 3.26
Looks over matter 3.27 3.21 3.60 2.99 3.21 3.36
Indifferent solitary 3.03 2.96 3.30** 2.88 2.96 3.13
Happiness Mean or lower 3.22** 3.18 3.53** 2.93 3.18 3.29*
Above mean 3.30 3.23 3.66 2.98 3.23 3.39
Personalitya Neuroticism + 3.31* 3.23 3.66 3.03** 3.23 3.41**
Neuroticism - 3.26 3.21 3.60 2.89 3.21 3.31
Extraversion + 3.31* 3.25 3.65 3.02* 3.25 3.40*
Extraversion - 3.25 3.20 3.61 2.90 3.20 3.33
Openness to experience + 3.33** 3.26** 3.70** 3.05** 3.26** 3.44**
Openness to experience - 3.22 3.18 3.56 2.86 3.18 3.28
Conscientiousness + 3.35** 3.30** 3.69** 3.01** 3.30** 3.42**
Conscientiousness - 3.21 3.14 3.57 2.90 3.14 3.30
Agreeableness + 3.32** 3.24 3.73** 3.00* 3.24 3.44**
Agreeableness - 3.23 3.20 3.51 2.91 3.20 3.27
Health status Mean or lower 3.20** 3.14** 3.54** 2.91* 3.14** 3.29**
Above mean 3.32 3.26 3.67 2.99 3.26 3.40
Religious 
upbringing
Yes 3.31** 3.26* 3.64** 2.98 3.26* 3.38**
No 3.17 3.08 3.55 2.90 3.08 3.29
Note.  N ranges from 1,821 to 1,994. 
aPositive versus negative personality-factor loaders. *p < .05. **p < .01.
6.4 DISCUSSION
The main goal of this chapter was to provide additional evidence in the factor validation process of 
the CFC Scale, which measures “the intrapersonal struggle between present behaviour with one set of 
immediate outcomes and one set of future outcomes” [9]. Even though this scale has not been extensively 
validated so far, it has already been used in a large variety of studies. To provide further insight into 
the validity of the CFC Scale, we examined the factor structure of the CFC Scale. Like Petrocelli[10], 
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the results from this chapter suggest a multiple factor solution. In addition, the results presented 
above give an indication of the convergent validity of the CFC Scale and the extent to which several 
personal characteristics, including sex, have discriminative power. The examination of the relationships 
between CFC and several health variables produced mixed results.
Factor analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that both the Strathman et al.[9] and Petrocelli[10] solutions 
do not provide an adequate fit of the data. Subsequent exploratory factor analysis provided evidence 
for a three-factor solution: a Factor A1 consisting of all seven reverse-scored items; and a clustering 
of positively worded items into two factors, Factor A2 (Item 6, 7, and 8) and Factor A3 (Item 1 and 2).
The first factor from the present study is almost identical to Factor 1 reported by Petrocelli[10]. However, 
Petrocelli[10] added Item 2, a non-reverse-scored item, to this first factor. Although Petrocelli[10] attained 
good internal consistency for his Factor 1, a closer look at the content of these items does not provide 
much support for the choice to retain this single non-reverse-scored Item 2 together with seven 
reverse-scored items in Factor 1, especially considering that the difference between the two factor 
loadings of Item 2 in the Petrocelli[10] study was negligible. The results presented here also contradict 
the choice of Petrocelli[10] of including Item 2 in Factor 1. The correlations shown in this chapter 
between Factor A1 and other measures of appreciation and expectations of the future, though 
modest in size, seem to confirm that Factor A1 is related to a more general future time concept.
The exploratory factor analysis also distinguished two mainly future-oriented factors, Factor A2 
and Factor A3. The absence of multiple loadings on these factors and the presence of high factor 
loadings suggest that the positively worded items may represent two different aspects of future 
time perspective. Despite this clear statistical difference between the two factors, examination of the 
content of the items, however, suggests that it seems rather precarious to pursue this distinction. 
What is more, the stability in terms of internal consistency of both factors was modest, which seems 
to indicate that the factors do not represent two independently relevant aspects of the CFC construct. 
The convergent validity tests and the relation with personal characteristics and health variables 
showed that the combined Factor B2 accounts for most of the relations found for Factors A2 and/
or A3. Future research must clarify whether a two-factor structure, distinguishing the reverse-scored 
items from the non-reverse-scored items, is indeed a more appropriate solution. The correlation 
among the three factors was low despite the fact that they all consist of items included in the 12-item 
CFC Scale. This suggests that the Factors A1, A2, and A3 may be measuring more than one construct.
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Relation between sex and CFC
Several researchers have demonstrated that time perspective and sex are associated.[24,50] Men tend 
to score higher on measures of present time perspective, while women tend to report higher future 
time perspective scores. In accordance with these findings, Petrocelli[10] reported that women scored 
significantly higher on the 12-item CFC Scale and Factor 1, while there were no sex differences in 
Factor 2. In the present study, no sex differences were observed in the 12-item CFC Scale, which is 
similar to previous studies using the CFC Scale. However, girls scored higher on Factor A1/B1, and 
boys higher on Factor B2 and Factor A3. In other words, girls show a higher CFC when the construct 
is framed in present-oriented statements, and boys when it is framed in future-oriented statements. 
This provides further indication that the factors underlying the CFC Scale may be measuring different 
CFC constructs. More positively, given the fairly similar convergent validity of the CFC Scale and the 
underlying factors, one might conclude that the CFC Scale measures different aspects of one broader 
construct. However, regardless of where the line between constructs and aspects of constructs is 
drawn – a question that might be answered in future research – the important conclusion from these 
findings is that the underlying factors explain different aspects of (health) behaviour and, therefore, 
their distinction is important.
Construct validity of the CFC Scale 
Petrocelli[10] argued that a short version of the 12-item CFC Scale, consisting of the eight items loading 
on Factor 1, might be a more appropriate measure of the CFC construct. The evidence presented 
in this chapter suggests that if this short version of the CFC Scale were indeed a better measure 
of the CFC construct, it would be most appropriate to use the reverse-scored items exclusively. 
Statistically, the 12-item CFC Scale and Factor A1/B1 from this study perform similarly as a measure 
of the CFC construct. In addition, in terms of internal consistency, the reliability of the 12-item CFC 
Scale and Factor A1/B1 are highly comparable. Inclusion of the five non-reverse-scored items does 
not substantially improve the reliability of the CFC Scale, while omission of these items makes it more 
efficient. The results provide additional supporting evidence with regard to the convergent validity of 
both the 12-item CFC Scale and Factor A1/B1. 
Although intuitively appealing, others have already suggested that it is incorrect to assume that scoring 
low on a present-oriented scale automatically indicates being future-oriented.[10,24] Indeed, Petrocelli[10] 
claimed that if an individual states that they are not influenced by the immediate outcomes, it does 
not mean that they are influenced by the distant consequences of current behaviour. If this is true, 
summing up the reverse-scored items and the positively worded items would be nonsensical. Then, 
the short version of the CFC Scale would assess a more present-oriented aspect of the CFC construct, 
which differs from what was originally proposed by Strathman et al.[9] In this context, Petrocelli[10] 
argued that “it might be more appropriate to consider the CFC Scale as indicating the extent to which an 
individual is not influenced primarily by the immediate consequences of behaviour.” The repeated result 
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that the more present-oriented statements are the most dominant and consistent part of the 12-item 
CFC Scale in any case appears to implicate the construct validity of the 12-item CFC Scale.
Furthermore, the findings from this chapter suggest that it could be inappropriate to completely 
exclude Factors A2 and A3 (or B2), despite their modest internal consistency. Convergent validity 
was more or less equally provided for all factors, and the relations of Factors A2 and A3 (or B2) with 
personal characteristics and health variables suggest they pick up part of the CFC construct. In part, 
the Factors A2 and A3 (or B2) seem complementary to Factor A1/B1, as they account for something 
the 12-item CFC Scale picks up, but Factor A1/B1 does not (or, as in the case of sex, pick up opposite 
effects that cancel out in the 12-item CFC Scale). This is, for instance, the case with happiness and the 
personality dimensions neuroticism, extraversion, and agreeableness. But most of the time, Factors A2 
and A3 (or B2) show similar relations as Factor A1/B1. It would be instructive to examine the content 
of Factors A2 and A3 (or B2) in more detail in future research.
Temporal discounting
In this chapter we used, among other approaches, temporal discounting as a measure of time 
preference. It is important to note that there are several mathematical methods to measure discount 
rates.[e.g., 51-54] We used a hyperbolic-like model that uses an empirically derived parameter value of 
time preference often denoted as k. Using a continuous form of k, rather than the ordinal form of k we 
used, yields very similar correlations with the CFC Scale and underlying factors. Recently, a potentially 
valuable alternative labelled “area-under-the-curve” (AUC)[52] has come to the forth. This theoretically 
neutral approach measures time preference as the area under the empirical discounting curve and so 
avoids making any assumptions about the mathematical form of the discounting curve.[55] AUC has 
been used, for example, in studies concerned with discounting in relation to individual competitive 
ability[56] and discounting by pathological gamblers[57]. We investigated whether using the AUC 
approach altered our findings, regarding correlations between temporal discounting and the CFC 
Scale and/or underlying factors. The mean AUC value was .48 and Spearman’s rank-order correlations 
between AUC and the CFC Scale, Factor A1/B1, Factor A2, Factor A3, and Factor B2, were .16, .15, .09, 
.06, and .10, respectively. All correlations were significant at p < .01, except for AUC and Factor A3 
(significant at p < .05). These correlations were very similar to the correlations found between the 
CFC Scale and underlying factors and the computed discount rate when trade-offs were pictured at 
5 years from now. Moreover, the structure of the magnitude of the associations across the CFC Scale 
and underlying factors was almost identical for all discount rate measures. This supports the validity 
of our findings.
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Limitations 
A shortcoming of previous research concerned with the factor validation of the CFC Scale was the 
academic setting in which the CFC Scale was administered. The present study provides evidence of 
the factor structure in a non-academic setting. The respondents in this and the study of Strathman et 
al.[9] differ in many aspects. The Strathman et al.[9] study sample consisted of American college students 
in the early 1990s, while we report on a recent sample of Dutch secondary school pupils between the 
ages of 11 and 15. When we compare the mean CFC scores found in these studies – as well as those 
reported in recent studies by Petrocelli[10], who used a sample of American undergraduate students, 
and Rappange[49], who used a sample of Dutch college students – it seems that the differences 
between respondents in terms of age, educational level, and time period of study have little effect 
on CFC scores. The same seems to apply to the possible effect of cultural differences between 
the samples. As supporting evidence, previous research has shown that differences in long-term 
orientation between the Americans and the Dutch are marginal.[58, see www.geert-hofstede.com] It is, however, 
not possible to say how these differences in age, educational level, time period of study, and culture 
may affect the factor structure of the CFC Scale.
However, it would be inappropriate to pass by to the widely spread notion of immaturity of judgment 
of young adolescents and their ignorance in foreseeing future consequences. Given our sample, the 
participants may be presumed a priori to be more present-oriented, which might have blurred the 
scores on the more future-oriented statements. The results with regard to the feasibility of the CFC 
Scale in the present study and the mean CFC score provide encouraging evidence that the alleged 
immaturity of the participants did not influence the findings too much. In future research, the CFC 
Scale should preferably be administered in a general population. 
Another limitation of this study is that participants were asked to complete a translated and somewhat 
simplified version of the CFC Scale in order to make it more suitable for young adolescents. Although 
this was done with utmost care, the influence on the measurement of CFC is unknown. 
Finally, in the “Health and Future” questionnaire, the 12 items of the CFC Scale were administered in 
the same order for the whole population. As far as we know, this is common in research using the CFC 
Scale. However, the split we found in the factor structure of the CFC regarding the future-oriented 
statements – i.e. Items 1 and 2 in Factor A3 versus Items 6, 7, and 8 in Factor A2 – raises the question 
of whether the order and clustering of items may influence participants’ response and therewith the 
factor structure. Future studies might consider presenting the statements in a different order.
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CFC in healthcare research
Though the CFC Scale consists of general statements about the CFC, this has not restrained researchers 
from using the scale in healthcare research. The current analysis was conducted on a dataset from 
a previous study concerned with adolescents’ behaviour in relation to attitudes about their health 
lifestyle and their consideration of future consequences in their health behaviour. Although not every 
result is completely independent of how we used the CFC Scale, we found that CFC was significantly 
related to adolescents’ attitudes about health lifestyle, happiness, and health status, but not to Body 
Mass Index. Moreover, the significant relationships between CFC and the health investments and 
some of the health belief statements used to provide convergent validity, suggest that CFC is also 
useful when the consequences of behaviour are related to health issues. Nevertheless, in most cases, 
the strength of the relationships was small. The lack of consistent results and the modest strength of 
the significant relationships should be reckoned when using the CFC Scale in healthcare research.
In summary, the findings from this chapter confirm the evidence for a multiple factor structure 
underlying the 12-item CFC Scale. The current study helped make the content and shape of the first 
factor more evident and showed once more that this present-oriented factor is producing results 
similar to the 12-item CFC Scale. However, it remains unclear how many factors the remaining future-
oriented items represent and what these items actually reflect. These are important considerations 
for future research.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 6.1 Consideration of Future Consequences Scale: Dutch Version for Young Adolescents [in English]
Do the following statements fit you?
1 2 3 4 5
not at all not a little well extremely well
1. I think about what my life might be like in the future, and try to improve my future with the things I do now.
2. I often do things that might only give me pleasure in the long run.
3. I only do things that I enjoy, and do not worry about what may happen later on. 
4. I only do things that give me pleasure right away.
5. I prefer choosing the line of least resistance.
6. I am willing to do something I find not much fun, if it pays off later on.
7. I think it is important to know whether things could have negative consequences, even though you may not 
find out these consequences for a long time.
8. I think it is better to do something that is very important for the future, than something that has a little bit 
importance for now. 
9. Some things could have negative consequences in the long run, but I do not worry too much about that. I will 
resolve things before they get too bad.
10. I think sacrificing now because of possible future consequences is unnecessary. I can deal with future 
consequences later on.
11. I only do things that I enjoy at this moment. I will resolve any future problems when they occur.
12. Because the outcomes of my behaviour now are clear, they are more important to me than possible distant 
outcomes.
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
Individuals’ own perception of remaining lifetime is increasingly considered relevant in relation to 
lifestyle behaviours such as smoking. Individuals generally face uncertainty regarding their own 
mortality risk or may have inaccurate expectations regarding longevity and the impact of health 
behaviours thereon. If people underestimate or even ignore the health consequences (i.e., longevity 
reductions) of unhealthy behaviour, they may more easily adopt and maintain an unhealthy lifestyle. 
Therefore, more insight into how individuals assess their own mortality risks in relation to unhealthy 
behaviours may help understand health behavioural decision-making. This is even more important 
as modifiable unhealthy behaviours are an increasing threat to global mortality and morbidity and 
even small lifestyle improvements may importantly improve health and lower mortality risk.[1] In this 
chapter, we therefore investigate the relations between individuals’ subjective survival probabilities 
(SSPs) and socio-demographic characteristics, health and especially health behaviour. This chapter 
adds to the literature by investigating these issues in a population of elderly (i.e., 60 years and older) 
from 15 European countries, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE).
The importance of lifespan uncertainty in the decision-making process of individuals was already 
emphasised by Yaari[2].When maximising lifetime utility, people trade-off subjectively expected gains 
and costs. To predict and explain individual behaviour, economists traditionally used assumptions 
about individual subjective expectations rather than actual data.[3] More recently, data on subjective 
expectations and probabilities of survival have been collected in large household surveys.
Several studies have investigated the congruity between SSPs and actuarial survival probabilities 
to assess whether individuals’ beliefs about their remaining lifetime are accurate.[4–11] Less congruity 
may imply inaccurate subjective expectations, but may also signal individuals’ private information 
beyond what is accounted for in life tables.[9] Such information may be used by individuals when 
making economic decisions.[12,13] Studies have also highlighted the relation between SSPs and 
economic decisions regarding retirement, social security claiming,[8,14,15] saving, consumption and 
bequests[12,13,16,17]. These studies suggest that SSPs are indeed important in economic decision-making 
processes of individuals. Another stream of research has focused on whether SSPs predict individuals’ 
actual mortality[7,18–21] and the relation between SSPs and socio-demographic characteristics and socio-
economic status,[5,22,23] but also, for example, parental longevity[19]. Note that research on subjective life 
expectancy has been conducted using point estimates or verbal answers rather than probabilities. In 
this chapter our focus is on studies that used SSPs as elicitation method.
In line with these research applications in the field of economic decision-making, SSPs have been 
found relevant for lifestyle decisions as well. Regarding tobacco use, there is large consensus that 
smoking decreases longevity, possibly up to 10 years.[24] Hurd and McGarry[5] found that SSPs indeed 
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vary systematically with smoking. Lower SSPs for smokers compared to non-smokers are reported, 
although among smokers little variation in SSPs was found according to intensity of smoking[25] 
Schoenbaum[26] found that heavy smokers (≥25 cigarettes per day) fail to adjust their survival 
expectations downwards in line with life tables, while expectations of never, former and light smokers 
(<25 cigarettes per day) resembled actuarial predictions. Khwaja et al.[27] also concluded that smokers 
expect to live longer than objective longevity figures predict. Balia[28] used the first wave of the SHARE 
data to study the formation of SSPs in relation to smoking and individual perception of health risks, 
with a particular focus on the short- and long-term effects of smoking and the reversibility of these 
effects.
Besides smoking, obesity is an important public health issue. While the consequences of obesity on 
morbidity are commonly acknowledged, the relation between obesity and life expectancy is less 
straightforward. It seems that obesity is more harmful in terms of reduced longevity among younger 
adults than among older people.[29,30] Walter et al.[31] did not find evidence that increased body 
weight decreases life expectancy among older people. In terms of impact of obesity on SSPs, Falba 
and Busch[32] reported lower SSPs among respondents who were overweight or obese compared to 
normal weight respondents. These authors concluded, however, that obese individuals do not fully 
update (i.e., lower) their subjective survival chances in line with the excess mortality risk associated 
with obesity as estimated in life tables used in their study. Hurd and McGarry[5] even found no 
association between SSPs and (over)weight.
Other lifestyle-related risk factors in part related to obesity, such as alcohol consumption and physical 
activity, also seem to be systematically related to SSPs. In line with epidemiological data, moderate 
alcohol consumers report higher SSPs than heavy drinkers (five or more glasses per day) and people 
who abstain from drinking.[5,10] In addition, people who are physically active report, on average, higher 
longevity expectations.[5]
In general, previous research findings regarding the association between SSPs and lifestyle-related 
health risk factors suggest that SSPs in general vary with risk factors in a fairly systematic way, 
commonly in expected directions. The relation between obesity and SSPs is more diverse. The study 
presented in this chapter adds to this empirical and theoretical literature in a number of ways. First, 
we provide descriptive statistics of SSPs using cross-national European data and perform a country 
comparison among thirteen countries. Second, we investigate whether the SSPs vary with socio-
demographic characteristics and socio-economic status, objective health status and, in particular, 
lifestyle, which is the main objective of our study. Finally, we address the validity of the probabilistic 
elicitation format for collecting data on individuals’ longevity expectation, as it is unclear whether 
respondents are capable of expressing their survival expectations using probabilities. The remainder 
of this chapter is structured as follows: first, in the next section, we describe our data, measures and 
analyses. After that, we present our results. We end with a discussion of our main findings.
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7.2 METHODS
Data source and description
For our study, we used data from the second wave (2006/2007) of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a cross-national and multidisciplinary panel database with 
micro-level information on health, socio-economic status, and social and family networks. Its format 
is analogous to the US Health Retirement Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA). The SHARE database contains data from more than 22,000 households in 15 countries across 
Europe. Based on probability samples and using a computer-assisted personal interviewing technique 
(for details, see Börsch-Supan et al.[33], Börsch-Supan and Jürges[34]), information is collected of non-
institutionalised individuals aged 50 and older and their spouses (who may also be younger than 50 
years). More documentation and information on SHARE can be found at http://www.share-project.
org. We excluded respondents aged under 60 and over 90 years, as explained in the next section, and 
respondents from Ireland or Israel because complete data were not available at the time of our study. 
We also left out respondents that had item non-response on any covariate under study, except for 
household income. We used logistic regression to test whether responding to the survival probability 
question was attributable to particular characteristics.
Measurement
Exploratory variable
SHARE provides an indicator of individuals’ SSP. In the ‘Expectations’ module of the SHARE questionnaire, 
after a warm-up question and several other questions about expectations, respondents were asked to 
state their SSP on a scale from 0 to 100 as follows:
What are the chances that you will live to be age [T] or more?
The target age T (75, 80, 85, etc.) presented to the respondent depends on the age of the respondent. 
Respondents aged between 50 and 65 at the time of the interview were presented a target age of 
75 years implying time horizons, that is the target age minus current age, ranging from 9 to 25 years. 
Respondents aged 66 through 90 years were presented with target ages using time horizons varying 
systematically between 9 and 15 years. For example, respondents aged 65 through 70 received a 
target age of 80, while those aged 80 through 85 received a target age of 95. Respondents older than 
90 years got increasingly shorter time horizons with a minimum of 6 years. For congruity reasons, we 
decided to limit the variety of time horizons and therefore to retain only those respondents aged 
between 60 and 90 years old, who were all presented with a target age T which was in the range of 
9–15 years from their current age. As time horizons differ between respondents, conditioning of the 
distribution of SSPs on age and target age is necessary.
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Covariates
The covariates used in our analyses (and their reference categories) are displayed in Appendix 7.1. 
Below we highlight some variables that need further explanation.
Education was operationalised using a re-categorisation into four levels of the 1997 International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97). Respondents who indicated that they were still in 
school or have had an ‘other type of education’ were assigned to one of the four levels according to 
the number of years of education. Household income concerned the overall income received in Euros, 
net of tax, by all household members together in an average month in the last year. Missing values 
for income were imputed based on age, gender, country, household size, years of education and 
work status. Income value was adjusted (i) for household size, by dividing household income by the 
square root of the number of persons in the household, and (ii) for the purchasing power of different 
currencies using the PPP exchange rate of the year in which the interview was administered (i.e., 2006 
or 2007). Because the distribution of income was skewed, income was dichotomised using the overall 
sample median (net) average income per month (€ 991).
We used the following health behaviour variables: smoking, alcohol consumption and physical (in)
activity. We differentiated between non-smokers, past smokers (i.e., smoked at least for a year in 
the past) and current smokers. Data on alcohol consumption were used to construct a binary 
variable identifying respondents that consumed more alcohol than the recommended levels in the 
Netherlands (two glasses per day for men, one glass per day for women) in the last three months prior 
to the interview. Respondents were considered to be physically inactive when they hardly ever or 
never engaged in moderate (e.g., gardening, walking) or vigorous physical activity (e.g., sports).
Analyses
We provide descriptive statistics of the SSP variable with particular attention to the variation in SSP 
according to age and country. Intuitively, one may expect that the age of a respondent will have 
a considerable influence on his SSP to some future age. We used analysis of variance to this end. 
Furthermore, as we used data from 13 countries across Europe, we look for any particular response 
patterns of SSP across countries.
Multivariate analysis
We used multivariate ordinary least squares regression to examine the association between SSP and 
the covariates. We defined four models, each consecutive model nested in the previous one. The 
first model investigated the association of SSP with socio-demographic characteristics and socio-
economic status, including a squared term of age to adjust for a nonlinear effect. In the second model, 
we added health indicators, and in the third model, we added lifestyle factors. Finally, in the fourth 
model, we tested for several interactions between socio-demographic variables and lifestyle variables 
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and subsequently added two statistically significant interaction terms: excessive alcohol consumption 
x gender, and physical inactivity x age. In addition, to explore possible country-specific associations, 
we estimated the fourth model for each country separately.
Reliability
It is important to understand whether respondents are willing and/or able to answer probabilistic 
questions.[3] We investigated the reliability of SSP responses using two criteria from the SHARE 
database. First, we took the sum of two related questions about the chance that the standard of 
living will be better or worse 5 years from now. To be internally consistent, answers to these questions 
should not add up to more than 100%. Considering some margin of error, a tolerance level of 10% 
was applied.[28] Second, we used a numeracy test. Respondents were asked: ‘If the chance of getting a 
disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of the 1,000 would be expected to get the disease?’ The 
possible answers were categorised as follows: 100, 10, 90, 900 and ‘other’. To check the sensitivity of 
our findings to the reliability of SSP responses, we repeated our multivariate regression analysis using 
a subsample consisting of the respondents that provided valid answers to both criteria. Analyses were 
conducted using STATA 11 IC (StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA).
7.3 RESULTS
Sample characteristics
From the SHARE Wave 2 database (n=33,281), 20,421 respondents were selected based on their 
age and country of residence. Furthermore, 345 respondents (1.7%) with target ages outside the 
range of 9–15 years were excluded. SSP response rate in this subsample was about 89%; hence, 
2,225 more respondents were dropped. Logistic regression analysis showed that, besides significant 
country differences, a higher age, a lower educational level and being physically inactive decreased 
SSP response rate significantly, Χ2(36)=808.44, p < .001. Finally, from the 17,851 respondents left, we 
excluded observations with item non-response on any of the included covariates except household 
income (n=1,556), leaving 16,295 (81% of the relevant sample) respondents as our final sample for 
further analyses.
Overall subsample sizes varied by country, from approximately 1,600 in Italy and Belgium to around 
800 in Austria and Switzerland. The overall composition of the sample by country was as follows: 
Austria 5.1%, Belgium 9.8%, Czech Republic 7.2%, Denmark 7.9%, France 7.4%, Germany 8.6%, Greece 
8.8%, Italy 10.5%, the Netherlands 8.0%, Spain 5.7%, Sweden 9.0% and Switzerland 4.9%. Males were 
slightly underrepresented (47%). Table 7.1 provides the characteristics of our final sample.
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TABLE 7.1 Sample characteristics (n=16,295)
Variable Category %
Age (mean [SD]) 70.3 (7.2)
Male (%) 47.2
Living alone (%) 27.6
Parent(s) alive (%)    9.6
Child(ren) (%) 90.8
Educational level (%) ISCED 0 or 1 37.0
ISCED 2 17.6
ISCED 3 or 4 29.6
ISCED 5 or 6 15.8
Working (%)    8.2
Income high (%) 50.0
Living in rural area or small town (%) 51.8
Chronic disease (%) 81.3
Depressed (%) 24.3
Obese (%) 19.1
Doctor visits high (%) 45.7
Drug use (%) 78.9
Hospital stay (night) (%) 16.4
ADL limitations (%) 11.4
iADL limitations (%) 18.8
Smoking status (%) Never 55.0
No, stopped 30.2
Yes 14.8
Excessive alcohol consumption (%) 34.1
Physically inactive (%) 12.4
Subjective survival probabilities 
The mean time horizon in eliciting SSP was 12.4 years (SD=1.5), and the mean SSP was 56.5% (SD=30.4). 
Figure 7.1 presents the distribution of SSP, which took 58 different values in the range of 0 to 100. 7% 
of the respondents thought that they had no chance of surviving until their target age, and 12.7% 
thought this chance was 100%. Almost one quarter of the sample stated a SSP of 50%. A large majority 
of the respondents rounded their SSP: 93.6% of the answers were rounded to tens (50, 60, 70, etc.) and 
98.7% to fives or tens (50, 55, 60, etc.). 
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FIGURE 7.1 Distribution of subjective survival probability (n=16,295)
Age groups
We constructed six age categories with 5-year age bands. Table 7.2 presents these categories, the 
number of respondents, the time horizon and the mean SSP for each age group. Mean SSP varied 
significantly across all age groups, F(5, 16,294)=595.68,  p < .001. As expected, the youngest age group 
reported the highest SSP (68.7%) and the oldest group reported the lowest (28.3%). Time horizons 
differed across age groups, for example the mean time horizon of the age group 65-70 years was 
significantly lower compared to all other age groups.
TABLE 7.2 Time horizon and subjective survival probability by age group (n=16,295)
Age categories n
Time horizon
Mean (SD)
Survival probability
Mean (SD)
Age 60-65 yrs   4,807 12.6 (1.5) 68.7 (25.2)
Age 65-70 yrs   3,939 11.6 (1.5) 62.9 (27.6)
Age 70-75 yrs   3,183 12.6 (1.4) 54.0 (29.1)
Age 75-80 yrs   2,403 12.7 (1.5) 44.1 (30.6)
Age 80-85 yrs   1,427 12.8 (1.4) 35.4 (29.5)
Age 85-90 yrs      536 13.0 (1.3) 28.3 (30.4)
Total 16,295 12.4 (1.5) 56.5 (30.4)
Mean SSP varied significantly across countries, F(12, 16,282)=61.72, p < .001. The means in the Czech 
Republic and Poland were clearly the lowest, that is 42.1% and 44.3%, respectively. The average SSP in 
Belgium (lowest), Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, Spain and Greece (highest) ranged from 53.6% 
to 59.5%. 
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In four countries (Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and Switzerland), mean survival probabilities were 
higher than 60%, with highest mean SSP reported in Denmark (64.1%). Mean time horizons were all 
within the range of 12.25 years (Germany) to 12.47 years (Greece), while mean ages across countries 
varied from 69.6 years to 71.9 years for the Netherlands and Spain, respectively.
Figure 7.2 presents the mean SSP by age group and country. All countries showed a similar pattern to 
that in Table 7.2, with some deviation in the patterns of Poland and the Czech Republic. Note that the 
mean SSP in these two countries were significantly lower than in all other countries. In Sweden, the 
range of mean survival probabilities, from the lowest age group (i.e., 60–65 years) to the highest age 
group (i.e., 85–90 years), was greatest, while this range was smallest in Poland.
shown in Table 1. Results indicated that the
ﬁnal model explains 26% of the variance in
SSP. The R2 signiﬁcantly i creased with e ch
consecutive model, although the actual incre-
ments in R2 were relatively small. In general,
the (signs of the) coeﬃcients of the covariates
were fairly stabl across th four models,
except for the ﬁrst, most restrictive model.
A longer time horizon was negatively associ-
ated with respondents’ SSP. Men had lower
SSPs than women (not conﬁrmed in Model 1),
while age showed an accelerating declining
eﬀect on SSP (given the signiﬁcant quadratic
term). Country coeﬃcients varied to a great
extent in line with the results from Fig. 2.
Other important predictors of SSPs are mental
health and the variables related to the social
environment of the respondent. In particular,
individuals who indicated that one or both par-
ents were still alive reported signiﬁcantly higher
probabilities (Model 4: coeﬃcient 2.95), having
children had a similar, albeit smaller eﬀect.
The eﬀect of living alone was also similar, but
negative. Living in a rural area or small town
was associated with lower SSPs.
In Model 4, all health indicators, except for
obesity and hospital stay overnight, were nega-
tively associated with SSP. Regarding the life-
style covariates, respondents who smoked or
were physically inactive reported lower SSPs,
while having quit smoking was not r lated to
SSP. Interestingly, excessive alcohol consump-
tion was associated with higher SSP in the
third model, but when adding the interaction
term with gender, the main eﬀect was no
longer signiﬁcant. The interaction term, how-
ever, was signiﬁcant indicating that the ‘posi-
tive’ eﬀect from the third model related only to
women. In other words, only women who
drink excessive y (i.e. more than one glass p r
day) had signiﬁcantly higher SSP. Age signiﬁ-
cantly attenuated the negative eﬀect of being
physically inactive on SSP.
Table 2 Time horizon and subjective survival probabilities
by age group (n = 16 295)
Age categories n
Time
horizon
M (SD)
Survival
probability
M (SD)
Age 60–65 years 4807 12.6 (1.5) 68.7 (25.2)
Age 65–70 years 3939 11.6 (1.5) 62.9 (27.6)
Age 70–75 years 3183 12.6 (1.4) 54.0 (29.1)
Age 75–80 years 2403 12.7 (1.5) 44.1 (30.6)
Age 80–85 years 1427 12.8 (1.4) 35.4 (29.5)
Age 85–90 years 536 13.0 (1.3) 28.3 (30.4)
Total 16 295 12.4 (1.5) 56.5 (30.4)
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FIGURE 7.2 Subjective survival probability by age category and country   
Multivariate analysis
Table 7.3 presents the results of the multivariate analysis of SSP including all the covariates shown in 
Table 7.1. Results indicated that the final model explains 26% of the variance in SSP. The R2 significantly 
increased with each consecutive model, although the actual increments in R2 were relatively small. 
In general, the (signs of the) coefficients of the covariates were fairly stable across the four models, 
except for the first, most restrictive model.
A longer time horizon was negatively associated with respondents’ SSP. Men had lower SSPs than 
women (not confirmed in Model 1), while age showed an accelerating declining effect on SSP (given 
the significant squared term). Country coefficients varied to a great extent in line with the results from 
Figure 7.2. 
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TABLE 7.3 Regression analysis of subjective survival probability
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Time horizon    -1.62***    -1.65***    -1.66***    -1.65***
   (0.144)    (0.140)    (0.140)    (0.140)
Male    -0.51    -2.31***    -2.65***    -1.55***
   (0.416)    (0.410)    (0.451)    (0.552)
Age    -1.24***    -1.14***    -1.14***   -1.15***
   (0.075)    (0.073)    (0.073)    (0.073)
(Age)²    -0.02***    -0.01**    -0.01*    -0.01***
   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)
Germany    -4.55***    -4.72***    -4.92***    -4.87***
   (1.315)    (1.253)    (1.252)    (1.252)
Sweden     0.46    -1.51    -2.00    -2.05
   (1.374)    (1.330)    (1.334)    (1.332)
Netherlands     2.93**     1.33     1.00     1.05
   (1.290)    (1.235)    (1.242)    (1.241)
Spain     2.63*     2.84**     2.90**     2.97**
   (1.530)    (1.448)    (1.449)    (1.447)
Italy     6.66***     7.59***     7.77***     7.90***
   (1.301)    (1.239)    (1.240)    (1.239)
France     1.67     2.01     1.64     1.68
   (1.320)    (1.262)    (1.263)    (1.264)
Denmark     6.77***     5.11***     4.70***     4.63***
   (1.366)    (1.309)    (1.317)    (1.317)
Greece     3.41***     2.48**     2.33*     2.39**
   (1.257)    (1.207)    (1.207)    (1.207)
Switzerland     5.13***     2.91**     2.54*     2.65*
   (1.441)    (1.394)    (1.397)    (1.396)
Belgium    -2.20*    -1.79    -2.19*    -2.18*
   (1.237)    (1.183)    (1.184)    (1.184)
Czech Republic -14.33*** -14.41*** -14.32*** -14.32***
    (1.397)    (1.330)    (1.328)    (1.328)
Poland -10.81***    -6.96***    -6.64***    -6.51***
   (1.434)    (1.380)    (1.382)    (1.382)
Living alone    -2.82***    -1.98***    -1.78***    -1.75***
   (0.559)    (0.541)    (0.541)    (0.541)
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TABLE 7.3 Continued
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parent(s) alive 3.13***   3.04*** 2.99*** 2.93***
(0.680) (0.662) (0.660) (0.659)
Child(ren 1.50*    1.75** 1.59** 1.56**
(0.799) (0.775) (0.775) (0.774)
ISCED 2 0.82 -0.30 -0.35 -0.32
(0.677) (0.657) (0.656) (0.656)
ISCED 3 or 4 2.69*** 1.00 0.80 0.78
(0.623) (0.606) (0.607) (0.607)
ISCED 5 or 6 4.01*** 1.92*** 1.61** 1.56**
(0.722) (0.706) (0.704) (0.704)
Working 4.44*** 3.09*** 3.12*** 2.97***
(0.764) (0.758) (0.757) (0.755)
Income high 1.18* 0.75 0.63 0.54
(0.606) (0.589) (0.588) (0.588)
Rural area -1.15** -1.24*** -1.31*** -1.34***
(0.482) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467)
Chronic disease -2.18*** -2.20*** -2.19***
(0.623) (0.623) (0.623)
Depressed -9.66*** -9.32*** -9.31***
(0.567) (0.569) (0.569)
Obese -0.66 -0.74 -0.66
(0.552) (0.552) (0.552)
Doctor visits high -3.63*** -3.64*** -3.62***
(0.473) (0.472) (0.471)
Drug use -2.89*** -2.90*** -2.83***
(0.622) (0.621) (0.621)
Hospital stay (night) -1.06* -0.84 -0.84
(0.618) (0.619) (0.618)
ADL limitations -2.64*** -1.92** -2.10**
(0.808) (0.821) (0.822)
iADL limitations -5.73*** -5.09*** -5.16***
(0.676) (0.686) (0.684)
Stopped smoking 0.43 0.36
(0.513) (0.513)
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TABLE 7.3 Continued
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Currently smoking -2.85*** -2.87***
(0.639) (0.639)
Excessive alcohol 
consumption 
1.82*** 0.46
(0.472) (0.611)
Physically inactive -3.62*** -6.54***
(0.816) (1.185)
Excessive alcohol 
consumption x female
3.07***
(0.867)
Physically inactive x age 0.33***
(0.096)
Constant 82.24*** 93.27*** 93.69*** 93.53***
(2.309)  (2.279) (2.284) (2.285)
F stat 164.67 167.14 151.75 145.48
R2 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.26
Note. N= 16,295.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Austria is country reference group. For education, ISCED 0 or 1 is reference 
group. For smoking status, non-smokers are reference group. 
 *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
Other important predictors of SSPs are mental health and the variables related to the social 
environment of the respondent. In particular, individuals who indicated that one or both parents 
were still alive reported significantly higher probabilities (Model 4: coefficient 2.93), having children 
had a similar, albeit smaller effect. The effect of living alone was also similar, but negative. Living in a 
rural area or small town was associated with lower SSPs.
In Model 4, all health indicators, except for obesity and hospital stay overnight, were negatively 
associated with SSP. Regarding the lifestyle covariates, respondents who smoked or were physically 
inactive reported lower SSPs, while having quit smoking was not related to SSP. Interestingly, excessive 
alcohol consumption was associated with higher SSP in the third model, but when adding the 
interaction term with gender, the main effect was no longer significant. The interaction term, however, 
was significant indicating that the ‘positive’ effect from the third model related only to women. In 
other words, only women who drink excessively (i.e., more than one glass per day) had significantly 
higher SSP. Age significantly attenuated the negative effect of being physically inactive on SSP.
The estimation of the fourth regression model for each country separately revealed a similar pattern for 
many variables in terms of sign and magnitude of the coefficient, for example, for ‘time horizon’, ‘age’, 
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‘depression’ and ‘doctor visits’. Table 7.4 shows estimation results for six countries (the other countries are 
shown in Appendix 7.2). Coefficients of some other variables, however, differed substantially. Among 
others, the effects of gender and having children from the previous analysis were not present in any of 
the six countries, while smoking only had a significant negative association with SSP in the Netherlands. 
Former smokers from Spain and the Czech Republic reported significantly higher SSP than non-smokers, 
while quitters from the Netherlands reported lower probabilities. The results for alcohol consumption 
also differed from the original analysis, while the outcomes for the variable ‘physically inactive’ were 
similar to those in Table 7.3. Note that the standard errors are much larger due to smaller sample sizes.
TABLE 7.4 Subjective survival probability regression analysis (Model 4) by country 
Variable Sweden Netherlands Spain Italy Greece Czech Rep
Time horizon -1.35*** -1.86*** -1.98*** -1.29*** -0.65 -1.86***
(0.509) (0.442) (0.601) (0.451) (0.411) (0.512)
Male 1.05 1.31 -2.73 -1.77 2.49 1.18
(1.839) (1.824) (2.095) (1.649) (1.588) (2.074)
Age -1.02*** -1.44*** -1.16*** -0.84*** -0.27 -2.15***
(0.285) (0.236) (0.345) (0.228) (0.209) (0.251)
(Age)² -0.06*** 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.06***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
Living alone -2.07 1.06 -2.45 -3.22* -4.13*** 2.71
(1.927) (1.860) (2.934) (1.927) (1.409) (1.746)
Parent(s) alive 1.35 -1.10 8.32*** 4.55** 1.77 1.16
(2.030) (2.210) (3.045) (2.188) (1.736) (2.707)
Child(ren) 4.65 2.68 4.06 -2.27 -0.82 4.60
(2.942) (2.775) (4.097) (2.456) (1.821) (2.970)
ISCED 2 3.70* -2.22 -2.68 -1.31 -1.25 -1.04
(2.088) (2.083) (2.576) (1.916) (1.920) (2.144)
ISCED 3 or 4 6.71*** 0.73 2.51 -3.88* 2.83* -2.78
(1.988) (2.393) (3.405) (2.132) (1.713) (2.257)
ISCED 5 or 6 0.20 -1.83 0.34 -6.31** 1.68 -1.77
(2.059) (2.484) (3.549) (2.678) (2.170) (3.077)
Working 5.02** 1.83 4.88 2.56 -1.06 1.06
(2.126) (2.527) (3.711) (3.272) (1.968) (3.319)
Income high -2.18 2.63 -6.36*** 2.30 1.58 -25.67***
(3.955) (2.138) (2.183) (1.593) (1.340) (3.592)
Rural area -2.87* 0.83 -1.14 -2.14 1.80 -3.53**
(1.577) (1.501) (2.082) (1.648) (1.506) (1.631)
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TABLE 7.4 Continued 
Variable Sweden Netherlands Spain Italy Greece Czech Rep
Chronic disease -1.54 -3.37* -3.68  -2.40  -1.12  -4.86*
(1.963) (1.900) (2.769)  (2.334)  (1.857)  (2.553)
Depressed -3.75 -7.35*** -12.86*** -13.23***  -7.88***  -9.24***
(2.306) (2.042) (2.337)  (1.666)  (1.749)  (1.910)
Obese 1.23 2.95 -5.21**  -0.44 0.21  -1.29
(2.068) (1.968) (2.151)  (1.748) (1.427)  (1.714)
Doctor visits high -1.50 -5.42*** -7.44***  -0.10  -3.96***  -6.43***
(1.607) (1.644) (2.045) (1.456)  (1.248)  (1.777)
Drug use -5.53*** -3.79** 2.52 -1.34  -1.20  -2.82
(1.979) (1.747) (2.907) (2.239)  (1.861)  (2.782)
Hospital stay (night) 3.48 -1.62 -6.11** 1.88  -4.13*  -0.28
(2.383) (2.319) (2.676) (2.010)  (2.275)  (2.061)
ADL limitations -0.23 -0.50 2.71 -7.19***  -8.33***  -2.31
(3.069) (3.315) (3.656) (2.722)  (3.033)  (2.637)
iADL limitations -2.35 -6.34*** -12.51*** -5.08** 2.71  -4.00*
(2.768) (2.232) (3.072) (2.109)  (1.667)  (2.311)
Stopped smoking -1.23 -3.04* 4.05* 0.96 2.77 3.44*
(1.598) (1.571) (2.436) (1.684) (1.706)  (2.011)
Currently smoking -3.71 -7.66*** -1.84 0.24 -1.41  -0.96
(2.380) (2.232) (3.186) (2.105)  (1.557)  (2.439)
Excessive alcohol 
consumption 
-2.61 -3.75* -1.43 0.33 3.91**  -4.70**
(2.100) (2.026) (2.817)  (1.929) (1.659)  (2.299)
Physically inactive -18.83*** -3.33 -8.85*  -6.89** -14.79***  -9.46***
(6.009) (4.569) (4.680)  (2.786)  (4.727)  (3.013)
Excessive alcohol 
consumption x 
female
6.48** 6.94** 10.11* 3.46 2.43 4.33
(2.992) (2.776) (5.654) (3.484)  (2.553)  (3.373)
Physically 
inactive x age
  1.33*** 0.35 0.41 0.48* 1.07*** 0.16
(0.469) (0.408) (0.395)  (0.260)  (0.361)  (0.274)
Constant 85.76***  98.03*** 102.38*** 97.65*** 75.21*** 83.63***
(7.326) (6.674) (8.754) (6.717) (5.861) (7.414)
Observations 1,471 1,302 923 1,715 1,428 1,179
R2 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.22 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.25
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
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Reliability 
The final analyses concerned the reliability of the answers to the SSP question. 435 respondents (2.7%) 
did not answer either one or both of the two questions about the standard of living in 5 years. Of the 
remaining 15,860 respondents, 96.9% provided a reliable answer. In addition, 77% (n=12,550) of the 
respondents answered the numeracy question correctly. In total, a subsample of 11,918 respondents 
(75.2%) answered both questions validly.
Re-estimation of the fourth regression model (from Table 7.3) with this subsample showed that this 
model performed similarly to the initial model (using our original sample) in terms adjusted R2 (0.24 
vs. 0.26) (results not shown here). Although the coefficients varied somewhat in size between both 
analyses, almost all variables retained their sign and statistical significance. 
7.4 DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we have presented the SSP from respondents aged 60 through 90 years from several 
European countries, using data from the second wave of SHARE and related them to general 
characteristics, (mental) health and, our main focus, lifestyle factors. The average SSP of surviving the 
next 9–15 years was around 57%. In general, the findings from this chapter show associations between 
SSP and socio-demographic, socio-economic, social context and (objective) health indicators in line 
with previous research.
Regarding socio-economic status, one would expect a positive significant relation between measures 
like education and income and SSP, considering the fact that richer and higher educated people 
may have better living conditions as well as better access to (better) healthcare services. Indeed, our 
results suggest that higher educated respondents report higher SSP, but this effect diminishes once 
we introduce health and lifestyle variables into our model. The same pattern holds for income, where 
we only find a significant association between a higher income and SSP in our first model, although 
the sign remains consistent in all models.
Obesity is not significantly associated with SSP. Although several previous studies did report such 
an association, it is coherent with the recent literature that indicates that being obese at older ages 
does not necessarily shorten remaining life expectancy but instead increases morbidity and disability. 
It would therefore be interesting to investigate whether obese individuals adjust their expectations 
regarding future quality of life accordingly.
As expected, smokers reported significantly lower survival chances compared to non-smokers. 
Interestingly, however, no SSP difference was found between non-smokers and former smokers. This 
is interesting, since risk of disease and early death from most smoking-related causes only declines 
to the level of never-smokers after many years. A number of possible explanations for this somewhat 
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surprising finding may be given. First, quitters may have already stopped smoking for many years and 
therefore take all the benefits of quitting into consideration. Alternatively, more recent quitters may 
be overoptimistic regarding the benefits of stopping and incorporate this into their survival chances. 
Finally, our findings may also indicate that non-smokers underestimate their SSP.
The association between SSP and alcohol consumption is rather striking. Our third regression model 
showed that individuals who drink excessively report significantly higher SSP than moderate drinkers 
and abstainers. However, after introducing the interaction term ‘excessive alcohol consumption 
x gender’, this result only held for female excessive drinkers. A possible explanation for this has to 
do with the (believed) protective effect of (light–)moderate alcohol consumption. Female excessive 
drinkers might not consider themselves to be heavy drinkers and therefore belief to have benefits 
from their alcohol use. This relates to the fact that excessive drinking among women, according to 
the Dutch alcohol norm, starts from one glass of alcohol per day. Another possible explanation comes 
from the increasing risk of harmful health effects as the amount of drinking increases. From our data, 
it turned out that men, next to being more likely than women to drink excessively, consume more 
alcohol also excessively.
Finally, physical inactivity was negatively associated with SSP. It is important to emphasise that such 
an association need not signal causality. Indeed, being physically inactive may result from poor 
health rather than being a lifestyle decision. The fourth regression model indicated that a higher age 
attenuates the negative relation between physical inactivity and SSP. This may be partly explained by 
the acceptance of less mobility or a poorer health state at more advanced stages of life. If a declining 
physical functionality is considered a normal part of ageing, then its relation with SSP may become 
weaker. Instead, physical inactivity at younger ages can be an outcome of a serious health issue that 
individuals may believe to influence their longevity.
Cross-country differences
Our results showed important cross-country differences in terms of average SSP, the range between 
the lowest and highest age group, and some associations between SSP and the covariates, such 
as alcohol consumption and having stopped smoking. Regarding the latter, current smokers in 
the Netherlands reported by far the lowest SSP relatively to non-smokers and quitters. This may 
signal that Dutch smokers are informed about and aware of the negative effects of smoking on life 
expectancy. Therefore, despite the success of tobacco control policies in declining smoking rates 
and raising awareness about the harmful effects of smoking, the Dutch government may reconsider 
its prioritisation in tobacco control, aiming, for example, at higher prices of cigarettes and better 
treatment (coverage) to help smokers stop, instead of increasing consumer information. These results 
show the value of examining the differences in the public uptake of preventive strategies between 
countries.
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Furthermore, a striking finding in this chapter was the fact that, overall, respondents living in a rural 
area or small town reported significantly lower expected survival chances than respondents living in 
an urban environment. In our country analyses, we found this negative significant relationship only 
for Sweden and the Czech Republic, although for most countries the signs were consistent with our 
main model. This clear impact of living in a rural area deserves more attention in future studies. While 
it may reflect differences in lifestyles, access to healthcare facilities or working conditions, the current 
study cannot answer these questions.
Overall, results from Poland and the Czech Republic seemed to be somewhat deviant compared to 
other countries. A possible explanation is that both Eastern European countries were not included 
in the first wave of SHARE. This means that both the Czech and Polish respondents were probably 
unfamiliar with the probabilistic format as well as with subjective longevity questions, which may 
have had some influence on their responses. Alternatively, respondents from other countries were 
observed for the second time and may have gained knowledge about their longevity expectations 
prior to the second wave (so-called learning effect). It would therefore be interesting to see whether 
the result patterns between Eastern and Western European samples are more similar in the fourth 
wave of SHARE. These considerations also raise the question whether it is more informative to 
analyse all country samples separately instead of aggregating these subsamples to one sample. In 
that context, a recent cross-sectional study by Péntek et al.[36] showed that subjective life expectancy 
patterns (using a point estimate) in Hungary and the Netherlands were similar, despite differences 
in actuarial life expectancy and cultural diversity. This supports the idea that results across European 
samples may be comparable.
Probabilistic format
The use of the probabilistic format when investigating subjective longevity expectations is increasingly 
embraced in the literature for reasons of interpretation, interpersonal comparability and comparisons 
with known event frequencies, and the possibility to investigate the consistency of responses.[37] 
However, it is still important to understand the willingness and capability of individuals to answer 
probabilistic questions. A promising result from our study in this chapter that supports the use of SSPs 
is the relatively high SSP response rate (89%), especially considering the average age of our sample 
(around 70 years). It is unclear how much of the non-response can be ascribed to misunderstanding, 
cognition or observation error. Our analysis showed that, among other things, non-response was 
higher in certain countries and among older and lower educated people. This indicates that the 
use of probabilities as an elicitation method may be less valid under some circumstances. Recently, 
initiatives using visual aids have been employed that could be useful in respondents who are less 
capable or willing to answer probability questions verbally. See Delavande et al.[38] for instance, for a 
review on methods for eliciting SSPs in developing countries.
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We have addressed this issue also by identifying ‘reliable’ respondents according to two validity 
criteria. Outcomes using only reliable responses (around 75% of our sample) were very similar to our 
original analysis. This is indicative of good validity of the SSP question, but still it is worth investigating 
further whether respondents should be systematically excluded based on such criteria. In a similar 
context, however, Hurd and McGarry[5] argue that even lower quality responses contain information 
that is worthwhile. Furthermore, they argue that a certain amount of inconsistency (i.e., as found in 
our study) is acceptable and most likely similar to inconsistencies and errors found in many of the 
predictor variables.
Related issues are that of rounding numerical responses and ‘focal-point responses’, which are 
common in SSP data.[8,12] From the distribution shown in Figure 7.1, it becomes evident that this is 
also the case in our study. For example, the (often highest) spike at 50% is problematic in terms of 
interpretation. Bruine de Bruin et al.[39] suggest that this response may reflect more fundamental 
uncertainty (similar to ‘don’t know’) or the cognitive inability to answer probabilistic questions rather 
than real probabilistic thinking. However, while focal values probably represent measurement error, 
it is still believed that focal-point responses do contain valuable information. Therefore, the general 
practice is to take numerical answers at face value instead of correcting for biases, including those at 
0%, 50% and 100%.[8,40] This line was also taken here.
Limitations
Several issues deserve attention when interpreting the results from this chapter. First, a drawback of 
our study is a consequence of the fact that SHARE only includes one SSP question with one individual 
target age instead of a sequence of questions using different target ages. Therefore, SHARE does not 
provide the opportunity to estimate a whole distribution of probabilities of the expected ‘time of 
death’.
Another limitation concerns the measures used for assessing objective health. The input for our 
health indicators, like the amount of doctor visits, were given by the respondents and not objectively 
measured. This arguably introduces measurement errors. More objective health measures, such as 
the measurement of how fast a respondent can expel air from his/her longs and walking speed, 
were present in the dataset of SHARE but available only for certain age groups. Moreover, response 
rates were relatively low, possibly because respondents did not feel safe performing the tests. We 
deliberately opted for the most objective measure of health status available instead of a subjective 
measure, such as self-assessed health. Previous research has shown that self-assessed health is indeed 
a good predictor of SSP and predicts mortality rather well,[28] but more objective health indicators 
reduce problems of endogeneity.
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Third, as SSP was measured on a continuous scale that took on a value within a defined range from 
0 to 100, ordinary least squares regression may prove inadequate as it does not necessarily constrain 
inference about the outcome values to the predefined range.[41] To test the influence on our results, we 
also performed a generalised ordered logit model for ordinal dependent variables. SSP was restructured 
into three ordinal categories: 0–33% (n=3,860), 34–66%  (n=5,530) and 67–100% (n=6,905). The results 
(not shown here) showed largely the same outcomes as the ordinary least squares regression (in 
terms of both signs of the coefficients and significance levels). The most salient results were the lack 
of significance for the variables ‘age squared’ and ‘having children’. Other differences from the original 
analysis were merely related to the degree of significance. Some covariates, like ‘age’, ‘depression’, 
‘physical inactivity’ and two country dummies, violated the parallel lines assumption, which means 
that their effect is not the same across the three SSP categories (but these differences are related more 
to the strength of the observed relationships than more fundamental differences). Overall, this lends 
support to our choice for interpreting the independent variable as continuous and for presenting the 
results from the ordinary least squares regression.
A final, important issue is related to the use of cross-sectional data. It is clear that using panel data 
allows us to better understand the formation of SSPs. The use of panel data would provide the 
opportunity to see whether people update their SSP according to new information and events (e.g., 
quit smoking). However, the objective in our study was mainly of descriptive nature and, moreover, 
at the time of this study, only two ‘prospective’ waves were available. Only few people that would fit 
our criteria of sample inclusion and that participated in the first wave had experienced relevant new 
events or passed away before the start of the second wave. Moreover, it needs to be stressed that 
even when using panel data, statements about causality regarding the relation between SSP and 
behaviour remain tentative and contentious since this relation is to a large extent circular. In other 
words, it is unclear whether SSPs are affected by lifestyle decisions and/or vice versa. Other, advanced 
econometric methods may be used to tackle this issue of endogeneity.
Conclusions
The findings from our study suggest that SSPs are useful, informative and important in relation to 
lifestyle decisions and can be validly obtained in elder people. Although negative health effects 
of certain lifestyle decisions are widely publicised, individuals may not adequately personalise the 
possible consequences of such decisions. Unawareness or underestimation of health risks related 
to unhealthy behaviour (e.g., excessive alcohol consumption) or the possible benefits from lifestyle 
improvements impede the effectiveness of health policy aimed at improving lifestyle and with that 
reducing avoidable premature mortality. Our results show that the relation between SSP and lifestyle 
differs among subgroups. This was most markedly for excessive alcohol consumption among men 
and women and, to a lesser extent, for physical inactivity at higher ages. Obese respondents did not 
report lower SSP than respondents with normal weight, despite the fact that research shows that 
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obese adults recognise the adverse health effects of obesity.[42] Moreover, significant cross-country 
differences regarding SSP and its relation to lifestyle were observed. These findings provide interesting 
implications for health policy and, for instance, targeting health communication strategies. Moreover, 
they warrant the further exploration of not only SSPs, but also of expectations of future quality of life 
in relation to lifestyle decisions.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 7.1 Glossary of variables
Variable Variable definition / categories
SSP Subjective survival probability (range 0-100)
Time horizon Target age - current age (range 9-15 years)
Male 1 if male, 0 if female
Age Age in years
(Age)2 Age in years squared
Country 
(dummy variables)a 
Austria (reference group), Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, 
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland
Living alone 1 if living alone, 0 if living with spouse or partner
Parent(s) alive 1 if one or both parents alive, 0 if no parents alive
Child(ren) 1 if respondent has child(ren), 0 if respondent has no child(ren)
ISCED 2b 1 if lower secondary education or second stage of basic education, 0 otherwise 
ISCED 3 or 4b 1 if (upper) secondary education or post-secondary non tertiary education, 0 otherwise
ISCED 5 or 6b 1 if first or second stage of tertiary education, 0 otherwise
Working 1 if worker (both employed and self-employed), 0 otherwise
Income highc 1 if above median income, 0 if below median income
Rural area 1 if living in a small town, rural area, or village, 0 if living in a city, suburb, or large town. 
Chronic diseased 1 if chronically ill, 0 if not chronically ill
Depressede 1 if depressed, 0 if not depressed
Obese 1 if obese (BMI ≥ 30 kg/m²), 0 otherwise
Doctor visits highf 1 if above country median number of contacts with medical doctor in the last 12 
months, 0 otherwise
Drug user 1 if used physician prescribed drugs in the last week, 0 otherwise
Hospital stay (night) 1 if a respondent stayed in a hospital overnight during the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
ADL limitation 1 if at least one limitation with daily activities of daily living (e.g., dressing), 0 otherwise
iADL limitation 1 if at least one limitation with instrumental activities of daily living (e.g., preparing hot 
meal), 0 otherwise
Stopped smokingg 1 if quit smoking, 0 otherwise
Currently smokingg 1 if currently smoking, 0 otherwise
Excessive alcohol consumption 1 if drinking more than recommended levels or excessively, 0 otherwise
Physically inactive 1 if physically inactive, 0 otherwise
Excessive alcohol consumption 
x female
1 if female and drinking more than recommended levels or excessively, 0 otherwise
Physically inactive x age Physically inactive multiplied by age
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a Reference category (indicated by 0) is Austria, because the mean SSP was closest to the overall sample mean SSP. 
b Reference group is ISCED 0 or 1, i.e. no education, pre-primary education, primary education and first stage of basic education. 
c Overall sample median (net) average income per month is € 991, adjusted for household size and PPP.
d A respondent was considered to be chronically ill in case s/he reported to be diagnosed with a chronic disease by a doctor.
e Depression was assessed using the 12-item EURO-D scale with scores above three indicating a clinically significant level of 
depression. 
f Dentist visits were disregarded.
g Reference group is non-smokers.
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APPENDIX 7.2 Subjective survival probability regression analysis (Model 4) by country 
Variable Austria Germany France Denmark Switzerland Belgium Poland
Time horizon -2.86*** -2.94*** -1.20** -1.27** -1.88*** -1.79*** -1.22**
 (0.600) (0.473) (0.531) (0.497) (0.649)  (0.437) (0.532)
Male -2.56 -3.40* -5.98** -3.60 -3.33 -1.32 -3.14
 (2.230) (1.972) (2.319) (2.481) (2.568)  (1.887) (2.193)
Age -1.50*** -1.94*** -1.20*** -1.53*** -0.94*** -1.13*** -0.98***
 (0.325) (0.295) (0.268) (0.254) (0.338) (0.212) (0.283)
(Age)²  0.00   0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02   0.03
 (0.019)  (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020)  (0.014) (0.019)
Living alone   3.32 -0.49 -2.62 -4.87** -0.12   0.23 -3.53*
 (2.243)  (2.140) (1.925) (1.942) (2.373)  (1.659) (2.092)
Parent(s) alive    1.35   8.31***   2.49  0.88   3.48   3.41*   1.98
 (3.246)  (2.213)  (2.203) (2.333) (2.828)  (2.027) (3.250)
Child(ren)    6.33** -0.19 -1.42 -0.42 -1.04   0.20 11.33***
 (2.809)  (3.025)  (2.648) (3.177) (2.888)  (2.234) (3.652)
ISCED 2   5.66* -2.14    4.77*  0.23 -5.53   0.89 13.59**
 (3.166) (10.088) (2.770) (3.917) (3.435)  (1.764) (6.669)
ISCED 3 or 4   4.99** -0.21   1.43  3.26 -1.62 -1.24  2.16
 (2.494)  (9.939)  (1.943) (2.221) (3.021)  (1.861) (2.105)
ISCED 5 or 6    8.30**   3.11   3.48 2.54   0.77   2.56  2.07
 (3.285) (10.091)  (2.284) (2.269) (3.944)  (1.935) (3.694)
Working   6.22   3.22   4.99 1.99 -0.45 -2.24   1.11
 (3.905)  (2.672)  (3.158) (2.188) (2.722)  (3.031) (6.311)
Income high   3.48   4.42*   0.85 -3.91   0.32   2.18 -1.91
 (2.305)  (2.281)  (2.067) (2.984) (2.227)  (1.605) (2.916)
Rural area -0.40 -2.55   0.27 -2.09 -0.85 -1.59 -2.31
 (2.122)  (1.566)  (1.695) (1.533) (2.183)  (1.395) (1.997)
Chronic disease -4.79*   1.09 -4.16* -2.71 -2.33   1.24 -6.55**
 (2.477)  (2.054)  (2.213) (1.935)  (2.412)  (1.982) (3.333)
Depressed -11.40*** -10.76***   -11.15*** -7.77*** -3.98 -7.90*** -9.59***
 (2.692)  (2.195)  (1.735) (2.559)  (3.244)  (1.660) (1.879)
Obese -3.03 -2.41   2.87 -1.40 -2.54 -0.54   1.34
 (2.201)  (2.161)  (2.146) (2.178) (3.165)  (1.675) (2.051)
Doctor visits high -1.55 -3.90** -4.58*** -4.99*** -5.34** -3.96*** -2.53
 (1.981)  (1.635)  (1.766) (1.681) (2.182)  (1.514) (1.896)
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APPENDIX 7.2 Continued
Variable Austria Germany France Denmark Switzerland Belgium Poland
Drug use  -1.32  -4.82** -0.72 -3.52*   1.01 -3.00 -1.15
 (2.500)  (2.021) (2.379)  (1.887) (2.568) (1.993) (2.956)
Hospital stay (night)  -1.05     0.46 -2.12   0.81   1.42 -0.78 -5.51**
 (2.223)  (1.978) (2.287)  (2.224) (2.909) (1.845) (2.150)
ADL limitations  -7.36**  -1.12 -0.32   2.05 -2.26 -3.24 -0.69
 (3.245)  (2.836) (2.832) (3.757) (5.408) (2.282) (2.205)
iADL limitations  -9.21***
 (2.917)
 -7.61***
 (2.852)
-1.51
(2.418)
-8.51***
 (3.066)
-9.01***
(4.348)
-3.49
(2.171)
-8.38***
(2.288)
Stopped smoking  -0.44    1.10   2.87   0.96 -2.06 -2.89* -0.97
 (2.355)  (1.801) (1.968)  (1.651) (2.354) (1.547) (2.219)
Currently smoking  -3.81  -3.46   0.34 -2.26 -1.37 -7.03*** -4.65*
 (2.814)   (2.269) (2.771)  (2.029) (2.843) (2.251) (2.548)
Excessive alcohol 
cosumption
  1.45  -0.14   3.16 -0.68 -1.04   3.57*   4.80*
 (2.766)   (2.077) (2.456)  (2.288) (2.796) (1.909) (2.518)
Physically inactive  -4.28  -4.42 -2.27 -8.12 -7.51 -3.65   4.75
 (4.255)   (5.810) (4.135)  (6.566) (10.093) (3.862) (3.064)
Excessive alcohol 
consumption x 
female
 -1.37    3.84 -4.42   3.93 -0.33   1.53 -1.21
 (3.702)  (2.988) (3.187)  (3.047) (3.717) (2.647) (3.867)
Physically inactive 
x age
  0.45  -0.12 -0.40 -0.24    0.09   0.11 -0.15
 (0.327)   (0.420) (0.323)  (0.423) (0.703) (0.296) (0.296)
Constant 99.09***  106.05*** 90.73*** 100.14*** 104.31*** 90.40*** 71.15***
 (9.191)  (11.928) (7.886)  (7.312) (9.575) (6.450) (8.155)
Observations 829 1,403 1,206 1,280 794 1,597 1,168
R2  0.33 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.22 0.24 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.15
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
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Measuring Subjective Life Expectancy
Survival Probabilities versus Point Estimates
Based on:
Rappange DR, van Exel J, Brouwer WBF. A short note on measuring subjective 
life expectancy: Survival probabilities versus point estimates. 
The European Journal of Health Economics. 2016; doi 10.1007/s10198-015-0754-1
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Measuring Subjective Life Expectancy
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The study of subjective life expectancy (SLE) is important in the context of economic choice behaviour,[1] 
predicting mortality[2] and investment in future health[3]. Such individual subjective expectations may 
contain information not captured by their objective, actuarial counterparts.[4] Therefore, subjective 
longevity beliefs are increasingly elicited in order to better understand peoples’ decisions in various 
life domains, including health. 
However, the measurement of SLE is not straightforward. In general, two elicitation approaches can 
be distinguished: the non-probabilistic and the probabilistic approach.1 The first approach concerns 
the direct measurement of individuals’ subjective estimates of expected lifetime, typically asking for 
a point estimate. While this method is simple and straightforward to administer, it does not provide 
information regarding the uncertainty of reaching the specified age.[5] The second elicitation approach 
asks people for their subjective survival probability (SSP), i.e. their assessment of the probability of 
surviving to a certain target age. SSPs are used in various large-scale household surveys such as, for 
example, the Health Retirement Study (HRS) and the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE). Research using such data has focused on their accuracy compared to actuarial data, 
their predictive power for actual mortality, and their relevance in the context of economic decisions.
[6-8] SSPs capture uncertainty and allow for computing survival probability distributions, but do not 
inform directly about SLE, and their elicitation is cognitively demanding,[9] leading to inconsistencies.
[10] Rounding and focal point answers are common phenomena in both approaches, but remain 
underexplored.[11,12]
The comparison of results from studies using these different approaches requires the comparison 
of both elicitation techniques. This helps to understand possible differences between elicitation 
methods. Moreover, considering the unresolved issues with both approaches, studying different 
elicitation techniques remains important. Only a few studies have directly related both approaches. 
Hamermesh[13] first employed both approaches in a single survey, using two unrepresentative 
samples, and found slightly higher estimates (i.e., 0.5-1 year) when probability estimates were used. 
Recently, Wu et al.[14] evaluated the consistency of both approaches among Australian respondents 
aged between 50 and 74 years and indicated that ‘even for those individuals who consistently evaluated 
their survival probabilities, very few choose life expectancies matching their personal beliefs of survival 
probabilities’.
In this chapter, we report on one of the few studies providing a head-to-head comparison of both 
elicitation formats administered in one study sample. We show the distribution of responses from 
both approaches and focus on focal point answers, rounding and the consistency of answers. We 
1 Verbal expectations questions (e.g., “How likely do you think it is that you will live up to 80 years old?” – very likely, fairly 
likely, not too likely, or not at all likely) are not within the scope of the study presented in this chapter.
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compare both formats and relate them to relevant background characteristics of respondents such as 
health, lifestyle, and age of death of next of kin. Furthermore, we highlight possible consequences of 
sequential questioning (when eliciting SSPs). 
8.2 METHODS
Survey and question formats
A web-based questionnaire was administered to 1,223 people, representative for the Dutch population 
aged between 18 and 65 years in terms of age, gender and education level. The data presented here 
were collected in the context of a larger study investigating expectations about longevity and quality 
of life at older age,[15] acceptability of less than perfect health states,[16] and health state valuations[17]. 
To get a point estimate of SLE, respondents were asked: “What age do you expect to reach yourself?” 
Answers could comprise any integer between 0 and 120. This question format has been used before.
[18,19] Then, after introducing the concept of probabilities using two warm-up questions,2 respondents 
were asked: “What are the chances that you will live to be age [T] or more?” This question was presented 
to each respondent for the five target ages (T) of 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 years. Answers could comprise 
any integer between 0 and 100. The wording is in line with aforementioned household surveys, but 
we used a range of target ages so that individual subjective survival curves could be estimated.[14] 
Other relevant components of our survey included questions on demographics (i.e., age, gender, 
marital status, age of death of next of kin), socioeconomic status (i.e., education, income), health (i.e., 
having a chronic disease or a severe disorder), and lifestyle (i.e., smoking). 
To compare the SLE point estimate to the SSPs directly, we derived a best point estimate from the 
SSPs by computing the age at which the probability distribution of a respondent intersected 50%.3 
We assume that a 50/50 chance of reaching a certain age is a reasonable proxy for what a respondent 
would report as their SLE and, as such, the most logical comparison with a point estimate.
2 First warm-up question: “Later on we will ask you what you think your chances are of reaching a certain age. Let us 
start with an example question about the weather. What are the chances that it will be a sunny day tomorrow? If 
you answer 90, this means that the chance that tomorrow will be a sunny day is 90%. You can answer the following 
questions using a number between 0 and 100” (mean = 43.4; SD = 26.0; range = 0-100). Second warm-up question: 
“Now an example about health. What are the chances that you will have a severe illness in the next 10 years?” (mean 
= 34.2; SD = 22.9; range = 0-100). 
3 If a respondent reported a probability of 50% at one of the target ages, then that target age equalled the computed 
life expectancy based on SSPs (hereafter SSP point estimate). If a respondent answered 50% at subsequent target 
ages, then the mean of those target ages was the SSP point estimate. If the probability of 50% fell between the SSPs 
at two subsequent target ages, we employed linear interpolation to obtain the SSP point estimate.
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To further investigate the coherence between the answers to SLE and SSPs questions, we computed 
a ‘certainty score’ for each individual SLE point estimate in order to ascertain the chance that a 
respondent would reach his SLE point estimate. For this purpose, we used the probabilities at the 
surrounding target ages and linear interpolation if the SLE point estimate fell between two target ages 
(or the probability at a specific target age if the SLE point estimate equalled that target age).4 
We analysed the correlation between the SLE and SSP point estimates. We used ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression to investigate variables associated with both point estimates, to explain the 
computed difference between those estimates, and to assess for which subgroups of respondents the 
certainty score for the SLE point estimate was closest to 50%. 
8.3 RESULTS
From our initial sample of 1,223 respondents we excluded 156 (12.8%) who completed the online 
questionnaire in less than 15 minutes. This minimal completion time for the questionnaire was 
determined on the basis of a pilot-test of the questionnaire. Next, we selected the respondents who 
answered all SSP questions for age 60 and above, i.e. those aged between 20 and 59 years (n=878).5 
For reasons of consistency and to enable the envisaged comparisons between approaches, we 
consecutively excluded respondents who had: a SLE point estimate lower than the current age (n=3); 
a SLE lower than 60 or higher than 100 (because we did not have SSPs for those ages) (n=37); provided 
the same answers to all five SSP questions (n=25), including 19 respondents reporting a 50% chance 
to all five target ages; an increasing SSP for higher ages (n=24); or a distribution of SSP answers that 
did not intersect 50% within the 60-100 years age range (n=52). Finally, 737 respondents (60.3%) 
remained for further analyses. Compared to the initial sample of 1,223, this led to slightly more centred 
distributions for age and education and an underrepresentation of men. The sample characteristics 
are shown in Table 8.1. 
4 If a respondent gave 90 years as point estimate of SLE, then the SSP the respondent gave for target age 90 (e.g., 
70%) was used as certainty score for the point estimate. If a respondent gave 85 years as point estimate for SLE, 
we employed linear interpolation of the SSPs for target ages 80 and 90 to obtain the certainty score for this point 
estimate. 
5 A small group of respondents aged 18 and 19 years (n=43) were excluded to form four equal age groups (20-29 years, 
30-39 years, etc).
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TABLE 8.1 Sample characteristics (n= 737)
Variable Category Value
Age (Mean (SD)) 41.3 (11.3)
Age (%) 20-35 years 31.8
36-59 years 68.2
Male (%) 47.6
Marital status (%) Living alone/divorced 32.2
Married/living together 67.8
Educational level (%) Low 24.6
Middle 44.9
High 30.5
Income (%) Low 28.1
Middle 50.5
High 21.4
(Self-)Employed (%) 61.9
Having severe disorder (currently/ever) (%) 26.5
Having chronic disease (%) 35.8
Smoking (%) Never 58.9
Yes, occasionally 10.3
Yes, daily 30.8
Kin’s age of death (%) < 75 21.0
75 to 85 54.4
≥ 85 24.6
Note. Respondents were categorised into two age groups for further analyses because inspection of descriptive statistics of SSPs in 
different age groups showed a clear difference in SSPs between respondents aged below and above 35 years. 
Education: ‘Low’= primary or secondary education; ‘Middle’= upper secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education; 
‘High’= bachelor, master, doctoral or equivalent. Income (net household monthly income): ‘Low’< €1,500; ‘Middle’= €1,500-2,999; 
‘High’= > €3,000.
Using point estimates, mean SLE was 80.2 years (SD=8.3). Figure 8.1 shows the frequency distribution 
of SLE point estimates. In line with earlier studies, approximately 40% of answers were rounded to 
tens, and 70% to fives. Peaks were observed at ages 75, 80 and 85.
Mean SSP declined from 87.6% (SD=13.6) at target age 60 to 13.4% (SD=15.5) at target age 100 (Figure 
8.2). More than 75% of responses to the five probability questions were multiples of ten, while almost 
95% were multiples of five. A “50%” answer was most often observed for the SSP questions at target 
ages 80 and 90 (around 18% of responses for both ages). 
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FIGURE 8.1 Distribution of the SLE point estimate (n=737)
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FIGURE 8.2 Subjective survival probabilities at target ages (n=737)
The mean point estimate obtained from the SSPs was 83.6 (SD=9.3), which is on average 3.4 years 
(SD= 8.7) higher than the SLE point estimate. The SLE point estimate and the point estimate obtained 
from SSPs were correlated (r= .52, p<.001).
Individual differences between SLE and SSP point estimates ranged from -32 to +40 (Figure 8.3), and 
the distribution showed a slight positive skew. Finally, the certainty score for the SLE point estimate 
derived from SSPs was 58.8%.
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FIGURE 8.3 Distribution of differences between SLE and SSP point estimate (n=737)
Variables associated with SLE and SSP
Table 8.2 shows the results of OLS regression models investigating variables associated with SLE and 
SSP point estimates, the difference between the two estimates, and the uncertainty surrounding the 
SLE point estimate. 
The regression models for SLE (model 1) and SSP (model 2) showed similar outcomes. We found 
statistically significant associations with expected signs for severe disorder, smoking and age of death 
of next of kin. Having a chronic disease was only significant in the SLE model, (high) education only 
in the SSP model. Overall, the SLE model performed slightly better in terms of adjusted R-squared. 
The difference between the SLE and SSP point estimates was associated with age and income (model 
3). The SSP point estimate was closer to the SLE point estimate for younger respondents and those 
with higher incomes. The fourth model showed that the certainty score for the SLE point estimate 
was closer to the 50% mark for respondents with higher education, higher income, and younger 
respondents.
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TABLE 8.2 OLS regression analysis (n= 737)
Variables SLE point estimate SSP point estimate 
Difference between 
SLE and SSP point 
estimates
Certainty score for 
SLE point estimate 
from SSPs
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3) (model 4)
Male -0.54   0.25 -0.80   1.95
(0.587) (0.673) (0.663) (1.372)
Age group >35 years -0.73   0.60 -1.33*   3.97***
(0.659) (0.743) (0.747) (1.492)
Low education -0.42 -0.45   0.03   2.55
(0.741) (0.896) (0.896) (1.820)
High education -0.42 -1.24*   0.83 -2.59*
(0.647) (0.741) (0.686) (1.531)
Low income -0.32 -0.78   0.45 -0.40
(0.683) (0.781) (0.785) (1.628)
High income  0.75 -1.30   2.06*** -3.55**
(0.689) (0.841) (0.779) (1.664)
Kin’s age of death low -4.64*** -4.79***   0.15   1.73
(0.729) (0.909) (0.811) (1.703)
Kin’s age of death high  4.18***   3.43***   0.76 -0.32
(0.715) (0.765) (0.805) (1.703)
Chronic disease -1.88*** -1.05 -0.83   1.80
(0.694) (0.785) (0.802) (1.661)
Severe disorder -1.53* -1.63*   0.09 -0.56
(0.794) (0.845) (0.883) (1.844)
Smoking -1.88*** -1.44** -0.44 -0.16
(0.628) (0.717) (0.700) (1.431)
Constant 82.74*** 85.49*** -2.75*** 55.44***
(0.753) (0.904) (0.913) (1.762)
R2  0.19   0.11   0.03   0.04
Adjusted R2  0.17   0.10   0.01   0.03
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   161 23-03-16   10:15
162
Chapter 8
8.4 DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we presented estimations of subjective life expectancy based on two elicitation 
techniques, using a representative sample of the Dutch population aged 18 to 65 years in terms of age, 
gender and education level. On average, respondents were more optimistic (about 3.5 years) about 
their longevity when expressed in survival probabilities, using the 50% chance point to calculate a 
SSP point estimate. Despite this difference, variables associated with SLE and SSP point estimates 
were very similar and their coefficient signs were plausible. Gender, age and socioeconomic variables 
like education and income were not strongly associated with the SLE and SSP point estimates. We 
found that age turned insignificant after introducing health indicators in the SLE model (results not 
shown here), which is not uncommon.[7] SLE and SSP point estimates were more similar for younger 
respondents and respondents with a higher socioeconomic status. This may reflect a higher capability 
of handling probability scores.
Some limitations of this study and the methods used are noted before highlighting the implications 
of our findings. First, this study was web-based and performed in one single country. This limits its 
generalisability. Second, excluding respondents with inconsistent answers from further analyses may 
have induced a selection bias in our results. Excluded respondents more often had a lower income 
and were male. 
Nonetheless, we emphasise some important findings. First, inconsistencies in survival probabilities 
across target ages (i.e., same answers to all five SSP questions, increasing SSP for higher ages) were 
quite common (n=49). Inconsistencies in SLE estimates (i.e., lower SLE than their current age) were 
less common (n=3). Obviously, besides the difficulty of SSP estimates, this may reflect the fact that 
respondents answered five SSP questions but only one SLE question, providing greater opportunity 
for inconsistencies. 
Second, rounding and focal point answers were common, as observed before.[11,12] One in five 
respondents reported a SLE point estimate of exactly 80 years, for instance. While this may reflect a 
genuine expectation, it may also emanate from uncertainty, imprecision, or a tendency to provide 
focal answers. SSP responses also showed clear rounding issues. Here, special attention is required for 
a “50%” answer. Bruine de Bruin et al.[20] for example, suggested that such “50/50” answers may indicate 
high uncertainty (similar to “don´t know”) rather than a genuine probabilistic belief. Respondents 
reporting a 50% chance for all five target ages (n=19) were excluded from the analyses in this 
chapter. Therefore, we expect that the remaining 50% answers are more likely to represent a genuine 
probabilistic belief than high uncertainty, and thus to contain valuable information. Nevertheless, 
given that the SSP point estimate was determined using the probability of 50%, this deserves more 
attention in future studies. Adjusting for probability weighting may also be important.[21]  
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Third, sequential questioning may lead to anchoring.[22] Here, the probability of reaching the first 
target age given by respondents may have influenced probabilities at subsequent target ages. We 
tested this by comparing SSPs of respondents aged 50-59 (included in the current sample) with those 
of respondents aged 60-69 (excluded from the current sample). The younger group of respondents 
started with 60 as first target age, the older group with 70 as first target age. Interestingly, the answers 
of both groups resulted in very similar probability distribution curves, starting at almost the same 
probability, but the latter starting 10 years later (Figure 8.4). While this may relate to a rational shift of 
expectations, it may also signal anchoring. 
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FIGURE 8.4 Comparison of SSPs between respondents aged 50-59 and 60-69
Our results relate well to existing literature. For instance, the explanatory variables significantly 
associated with subjective life expectancy were largely in line with those reported by Hamermesh[13]. 
Moreover, the difference found between the two methods (probability estimates being higher 
than point estimates) was in the same direction as reported by Hamermesh[13], albeit somewhat 
larger. This may relate to methodological differences between the studies (e.g., Hamermesh[13] used 
unrepresentative samples from the US, in which academic economists and male respondents were 
overrepresented, two instead of five target ages, and a different method to derive subjective survival 
curves). Inconsistencies between these elicitation formats were also observed by Wu et al.[14] 6 
6 Note that the methodological approach applied by Wu et al.[14] differs from the current study as well. For example, 
Wu et al.[14] used a sample from a different country including respondents aged higher than in our study sample. 
Furthermore, they used a different approach to elicit SSPs. Respondents chose probabilities from a discrete list with 
ten categories representing a range of probabilities. 
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In conclusion, an increasing amount of research aims to understand (the formation of ) subjective 
longevity expectations and their relation to health behaviours and outcomes. Different elicitation 
methods are used across studies. The results from this chapter suggest that findings may not be 
directly comparable across studies, especially in certain subgroups of the population. Future work 
may compare both approaches in relation to objective survival expectations and predicting economic 
choice behaviour. More research on how to measure subjective expectations is therefore warranted.  
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
The wish for a long and healthy life is often heard. Still, not everyone will live such a life. Differences in 
life expectancy and healthy life expectancy between groups remain large.[1] Many individuals will have 
subjective expectations regarding their own length of life and their future health-related quality of 
life, which may differ (substantially) from objective projections. Such subjective expectations remain 
understudied, especially regarding future health-related quality of life, but they may be relevant for a 
number of reasons. 
First, subjective expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life may be 
important if they influence decisions. If people have specific ideas about how old they will become and 
how they will become old, this may influence current decisions in several life domains. For instance, 
expectations may influence the decisions to invest in their future health and length of life or choices 
regarding pensions and savings. Therefore, understanding (the formation of ) subjective expectations 
enables us to learn more about, and possibly influence, decision-making. For the health domain, this 
is important given the preventable mortality and morbidity attributable to modifiable, unhealthy 
health behaviours.[2] People who expect old age to be associated with low quality of life regardless 
of current investments may be less likely to engage in preventive actions. Moreover, individuals who 
expect ageing to be associated with unavoidable deterioration of health may also be less prone to 
use healthcare. For example, Sarkisian et al.[3] found that older adults with low expectations regarding 
ageing believed seeking healthcare to be less important for age-associated, modifiable ill-health 
conditions. As such, subjective expectations for length and future quality of life can influence current 
decisions. Especially when subjective expectations are inaccurate (for instance too pessimistic) this 
may result in non-optimal decisions. 
Second, the demand for healthcare services and need for long-term care may increase as societies 
age and the proportion of elderly rises, which is the case in most developed countries (e.g., Yang et 
al.[4]). This poses important challenges for the future sustainability of healthcare systems and society in 
general, both in terms of financing and planning. Subjective expectations obtained from individuals, 
instead of actuarial data, may provide more insight into future healthcare needs and demands if they 
contain (private) information other than what is accounted for in actuarial data.[5]
Third, subjective expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life may also play 
a role in research. For instance, in explaining discount rates observed in experiments or when valuing 
health states using the time trade-off (TTO) method (see van Nooten and Brouwer[6] and van Nooten 
et al.[7]), these expectations may be important. 
Several large household surveys include questions regarding longevity expectations, mostly elicited 
as subjective survival probabilities. Studies using these data have focused on the accuracy of such 
longevity expectations compared to actuarial figures[e.g., 8-12] or investigated their ability to predict 
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mortality[e.g., 10,13-16]. Other research has studied these subjective survival probabilities in relation 
to (economic) decisions regarding retirement, saving and lifestyle[e.g. 9,17-22]. In general, subjective 
survival probabilities contain information not found in objective measures, are found informative in 
predicting mortality, and are relevant for explaining economic and lifestyle decisions of individuals. 
Thus far, the study of subjective expectations regarding future health-related quality of life has 
received less attention. Recently, Péntek et al.[23] explored subjective expectations regarding future 
health and treatment effects among patients with rheumatoid arthritis (and their rheumatologists), 
and concluded that such expectations may be important in the context of treatment decisions and 
compliance. The authors advocated more work in this area.
Our study therefore set out to investigate these subjective expectations regarding length and also 
future health-related quality of life in more detail. It elaborates on previous work of Brouwer and van 
Exel[24] and Péntek et al.[25] who studied (the accuracy of ) expectations regarding both length and 
future health-related quality of life. Expectations regarding length of life were not based on survival 
probabilities in these studies, but directly elicited by asking respondents their expected age of death. 
Brouwer and van Exel[24] found in a sample from the Dutch general public that individuals generally 
overestimate their life expectancy (males more than females), as had been found before,[8] but 
(considerably) underestimate future quality of life from age 70 onwards. Furthermore, age, current 
health status and perception of own lifestyle compared to others each explained a significant part of 
the variance in the expectations regarding length and future quality of life. What is more, the average 
age of death of next of kin was related to subjective life expectancy. Péntek et al.[25] conducted a 
similar study in members of the general public in Hungary and found results which were largely in line 
with those from Brouwer and van Exel[24]. 
In this chapter, we present new data on subjective expectations regarding both length and future 
health-related quality of life. Our study adds to the previous two studies Brouwer and van Exel[24] and 
Péntek et al.[25] in a number of ways. First, Brouwer and van Exel[24] combined two unrepresentative 
Dutch convenience samples from two independent studies, while Péntek et al.[25] used an 
unrepresentative Hungarian sample gathered through a Hungarian web journal. In our study, we 
used a representative sample of the Dutch general public instead. Second, in contrast to these two 
previous studies, we used a more elaborate set of background, health and lifestyle variables, which 
are potentially important in the context of subjective expectations. A final, specific feature of our 
study that adds to those reported by Brouwer and van Exel[24] and Péntek et al.[25] is that we combine 
subjective expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life into one single 
composite measure. In other words, we extend the concept of subjective life expectancy by adding 
(and correcting for) self-estimated quality of life during these years. Using this method, we assess the 
subjective expectations regarding the remaining number of life-years after age 65 adjusted for the 
quality of life in these years lived. Moreover, we examine the relationship between these expectations 
and background characteristics, objective health indicators and, in particular, lifestyle, since subjective 
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life expectancy is increasingly considered important in relation to lifestyle choices. We investigate 
whether this latter hypothesis holds for a measure that combines subjective life expectancy with 
expectations regarding future health-related quality of life. We also discuss the implications of using 
different methods to construct our composite expectations measure.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we discuss our data, methods and analyses. 
In particular, we describe how we constructed our combined subjective measure of expectations. 
After that, we present our results. We end this chapter with a discussion of our main results and the 
implications resulting from our findings. 
9.2  METHODS
Data collection and outcome measures
For our study, we developed a web-based questionnaire that was administered to a sample of 18- to 
65-year-olds from the Netherlands, representative in terms of age, gender and level of education. The 
overall objective of this survey was to investigate how Dutch people think about (future) health and 
choices in healthcare. 
We included a measure of subjective life expectancy as well as a measure of expected health-
related quality of life in our survey to operationalise our main outcome variable ‘subjective future 
quality adjusted life-years (QALYs) expectation from age 65 onwards’. The concept of (objective) 
QALYs is frequently applied in the evaluation and comparison of healthcare interventions,[26] but not 
in the context of individuals’ subjective expectations.1 After introducing the concept of subjective 
expectations we elicited a point estimate of the subjective life expectancy for each respondent 
(see Box 9.1). Respondents were allowed to fill in any integer between 0 and 120. This method was 
successfully used before by Brouwer and van Exel[24] and Péntek et al.[25] 
What age do you expect to reach yourself?
… years
BOX 9.1 Question used for eliciting a point estimate of subjective life expectancy
Next, to elicit respondents’ current and expected future health states we employed the EQ-5D 
instrument[27] (see also http://www.euroqol.org), as was done previously[24,25]. The EQ-5D is a generic 
health-related quality of life instrument comprising five health dimensions: ‘mobility’, ‘self-care’, ‘usual 
activities’, ‘pain/discomfort’ and ‘anxiety/depression’. For each dimension the respondent could 
indicate to (expect to) experience ‘no problems’, ‘some problems’ and ‘extreme problems’. Thus, 243 
distinct health states can be distinguished for which preference scores exist which were obtained in 
1  In this chapter, when we refer to QALYs or expected QALYs, we mean subjective QALY expectations.
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the general public.[28] The EQ-5D instrument was designed to measure current health. Box 9.2 specifies 
how we asked questions regarding future health using the EQ-5D dimensions. This method was also 
used in the previous two studies.[24,25] 
What do you think your health state will be at the age of 60? I expect that at the age of 60 I will have… 
No Some Severe
   problems in walking about
   problems with washing or dressing myself
   problems with performing my ususal activities
   pain or discomfort
   anxiety or depression 
This question was repeated for the ages of 70, 80 and 90. 
Respondents aged 60 or older automatically proceeded to target age 70 (instead of 60). Note that in all other situations 
respondents were ‘forced’ to complete all future quality of life questions, even if the target age was higher than their self-
estimated life expectancy.
BOX 9.2 Questions for eliciting expectations regarding future health, using the dimensions of the EuroQol-5D
Combining the expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life presented 
above provides us our main, single outcome variable, i.e. a measure of subjective expectations 
regarding the remaining amount of QALYs from 65 onwards. In Box 9.3 we present two examples to 
explain our computation method.
Since we had no information on respondents’ expected quality of life at time of death, except for 
those respondents that reported a subjective life expectancy equal to one of our target ages used 
for the quality of life questions, we imputed these scores. As can be seen in Box 9.3, we differentiated 
our imputation method according to the subjective life expectancy of respondents. For respondents 
who reported a subjective life expectancy of 90 or lower, we computed the quality of life at time 
of death based on the QALY scores of two subsequent target ages. Respondents with a subjective 
life expectancy higher than 90 were ascribed a quality of life score of 0 at time of death, since no 
information on quality of life expectations was available for ages higher than 90.
In order to retain all respondents while ensuring that the future QALY expectations for all respondents 
started at age 65, we imputed quality of life scores at age 65. For the respondents aged between 18 
and 60 (60-year-olds not included), we used quality of life scores at age 60 and 70 to come up with a 
mean quality of life score at age 65 (see ‘example a’ in Box 9.3). For respondents aged between 60 and 
65, we used their current self-reported health state and the expected quality of life score at age 70, as 
is the case in ‘example b’ from Box 9.3.
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Example a) 
Consider a 50-year old respondent with the following self-
estimated values:
§ Subjective life expectancy = 85
§ Self-estimated future health-related quality of life 
(EQ-5D):
- at age 60: 1.0
- at age 70: 0.9
- at age 80: 0.7
- at age 90: 0.3
 
The expected amount of QALYs for this respondent from age 65 onwards can be calculated as follows:
§ For the age range 65-70, the quality of life score at age 65 is estimated using linear interpolation of the 
expected HRQoL values at ages 60 and 70: (1.0+0.9)/2 = 0.95. The expected QALYs can then be calculated as: 
((0.95+0.9)/2)*(70-65) = 4.6.
§ For the age range 70-80, the expected QALYs can then be calculated as: ((0.9+0.7)/2)*(80-70) = 8.0.
§ For the age range 80-85, the quality of life score at age 85 is estimated using linear interpolation of the expected 
HRQoL values at ages 80 and 90: 0.7-((0.7-0.3)*((85-80)/(90-80))) = 0.5. The expected QALYs can then be calculated as: 
((0.7+0.5)/2)*(85-80) = 3.0.
§ The total expected amount of QALYs from 65 until the expected age at death of 85 years then is calculated as: 
4.6+8.0+3.0 = 15.6.
Example b) 
Consider a 64-year old respondent with the following self-
estimated values:
§ Subjective life expectancy = 94
§ Current quality of life (EQ-5D) = 0.9
§ Self-estimated future health-related quality of life 
(EQ-5D):
- at age 70: 0.8
- at age 80: 0.7
- at age 90: 0.5
 
 
 
The expected amount of QALYs for this respondent from age 65 onwards can be calculated as follows:
§ For the age range 65-70, the quality of life score at age 65 is estimated using linear interpolation of the HRQoL value 
at current age 64 and the expected HRQoL value at age 70: 0.9-((0.9-0.8)*((65-64)/(70-64))) = 0.883. The expected 
QALYs can then be calculated as: ((0.883+0.8)/2)*(70-65) = 4.2.
§ For the age range 70-80, the expected QALYs can then be calculated as: ((0.8+0.7)/2)*(80-70) = 7.5.
§ For the age range 80-90, the expected QALYs can then be calculated as: ((0.7+0.5)/2)*(90-80) = 6.0.
§ For the age range 90-94, HRQoL at expected age of death age 94 is set at 0. The expected QALYs can then be 
calculated as: ((0.5+0)/2)*(94-90) = 1.0. 
§ The total expected amount of QALYs from 65 until the expected age at death of 94 years then is calculated as: 
4.2+7.5+6.0+1.0 = 18.7.
BOX 9.3 Computation method for combining expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life into a single 
outcome variable measuring expectations regarding remaining QALYs from age 65 onwards
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Other variables / instruments
The survey included questions on socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, marital 
status and net income. Moreover, respondents indicated their height and weight and were asked about 
the following lifestyle indicators: physical (in)activity, eating habits, smoking and alcohol consumption. 
Respondents were asked to indicate how many days a week they performed at least 30 minutes 
of (vigorous) exercise, such as walking, cycling or sports. The Dutch guidelines for healthy exercise 
require at least 30 minutes of exercise at least five times a week.[29,30] Then, respondents reported 
how many days a week, on average, they ate healthily (i.e., balanced meals including a wide variety 
of food in the right proportions and amount). A minimum of six days per week was set to classify 
respondents as having a healthy diet. We distinguished non-smokers from occasional smokers and 
current smokers. Male and female respondents were considered heavy drinkers when their weekly 
amount of alcohol consumption exceeded 21 drinks and 14 drinks, respectively, or when consuming 
six drinks or more on one occasion at least once a week.[31] 
After general questions regarding the (past) presence of a severe disorder and any current chronic 
diseases (both physical and psychological), a vertical, visual analogue scale ranging from 0 (‘worst 
imaginable health’) to 100 (‘best imaginable health’) was used to obtain respondents’ own valuation 
of current health. A similar format was used to elicit a general happiness score. Respondents were also 
asked to state their preference between a shorter life in perfect health and a longer life in a less than 
perfect health state and to give an indication of the average age most of their next of kin had reached.
Finally, we used an instrument that measures expectations regarding ageing (ERA-12). This validated 
12-item survey measures expectations regarding ageing on three domains of four items each, i.e. 
expectations regarding physical health, expectations regarding mental health and expectations 
regarding cognitive function. These three subscales combine to one general scale measuring 
expectations regarding ageing.[3,32] 
Descriptive statistics 
First, sample characteristics are presented. Due to the way we constructed the survey, we avoided 
missing values on any of the variables. However, two respondents reported a bodyweight of 0 
kilogram (kg). We imputed these values based on height, gender and education in our sample.
We constructed a ‘lifestyle index’ based on the four aforementioned indicators of risky behaviour 
(based on Dutch health norms), i.e. smoking (on a daily basis), excessive alcohol consumption, 
physical inactivity and unhealthy diet. The index ranged from 0 to 4 with higher values indicating an 
unhealthier lifestyle. For example, a lifestyle index of 3 may indicate a person who smokes daily, drinks 
excessively and is physically inactive. For our analyses we combined groups 3 and 4 because of low 
numbers (2%) in group 4.
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Descriptive statistics of subjective expectations of life expectancy and future health-related quality 
of life expectations are presented. Subsequently, this is done for our main outcome variable, i.e. 
the subjective expectations of future QALYs from 65 onwards. Since the answers to the questions 
regarding subjective life expectancy and future health-related quality of life differed importantly (and 
therefore automatically also regarding our main outcome variable) between respondents from the 
age groups 18-59 and 60-65, we focused in particular on these differences throughout our analyses. 
Finally, for validation purposes, we analysed the extent to which our measure of expectations 
regarding future QALYs remaining from age 65 onwards correlated with the 12-item ERA survey and 
its three 4-item subscales.
Multivariate analyses
We used linear regression analysis to identify explanatory variables for the number of subjective 
expected QALYs from 65 onwards. Explanatory variables were included based on the previous findings 
of Brouwer and van Exel[24] and Péntek et al.[25] We defined four models, each model nested in the 
previous one, which successively introduced (i) socio-demographic characteristics and socioeconomic 
status, (ii) health indicators, (iii) age of death of next of kin and finally, and (iv) the lifestyle index. Due 
to notably different results on our expectation variables for the groups 18-59 and 60-65, we included 
age both as a dummy variable, differentiating between both age groups, and as a continuous variable. 
Furthermore, we paid particular attention to the explanatory power of the lifestyle index/indicators 
and also conducted our regression analysis for men and women separately. 
Sensitivity analyses
We performed several sensitivity analyses in order to test several choices we made. Most importantly, 
an alternative computation method for the expected total amount of future QALYs from 65 onwards 
involves using a quality of life score of 0 at time of death for all respondents, instead of using the 
quality of life score at the subsequent target age. Alternatively, we altered our initial approach only 
for those respondents reporting a subjective life expectancy over 90 years old. Instead of assuming 
a quality of life score of 0 at time of death we used the reported quality of life score at target age 90 
(i.e., assuming no decline from that point onwards). Other aspects that deserved attention regard 
(the elimination or adjustment of ) possible outliers and the examination of the impact when age and 
lifestyle indicators are included differently into our regression analysis. We ran our multivariate analysis 
incorporating these adjustments. All analyses were conducted using STATA 11 IC (StataCorp, College 
Station, TX).
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9.3 RESULTS
Sample characteristics
A sample of 1,223 respondents representative of the general population from the Netherlands in terms 
of age, gender and level of education completed the web-based survey. We excluded observations 
based on the time it took to complete the survey. In our sample, all respondents completed the survey 
between 5 and 62 minutes with mean length of almost 26 minutes (SD=9.0 minutes). A small pilot 
exercise indicated that the minimal time necessary to complete the survey quickly but carefully was 
15 minutes. Therefore, we excluded 157 respondents who completed the survey within 15 minutes 
(12.8% of total sample). We also excluded respondents who reported a lower life expectancy than 
their age at the time of the interview (n=3). Our final sample therefore consisted of 1,064 respondents. 
The main sample characteristics are shown in Table 9.1.
Respondents excluded from the final sample were younger and more often male (p<.01), so that our 
final sample for analysis was no longer completely representative for the Dutch population aged 18-
65 years old. Mean subjective life expectancy and subjective QALY expectation were not significantly 
different (p<.01) between included and excluded respondents.
Subjective life expectancy
The mean expected age of death in our sample was 81.1 years (SD=10.9 years). Respondents reported 
life expectancies in a range between 19 and 120 years old. The distribution of these subjective life 
expectations is presented in Figure 9.1. A considerable part of the respondents used round numbers 
in expressing their longevity expectation: 41.0% of the predictions were rounded to tens (60, 70, 80, 
etc.) and 71.3% to fives or tens (70, 75, 80, etc.). Clear peaks were present at 75, 80 and 85 (12.2%, 19.5%, 
13.4%, respectively). The time gap between the respondent’s age at the time of the survey and their 
subjective life expectancy ranged between 0 and 102 years and was on average 37.9 years (SD=17.0). 
As expected, this time gap diminished as respondents’ age at the time of the interview increased. 
Analysis by age group showed that the mean subjective life expectancy was significantly higher in 
the group 60-65 compared to the group 18-59, 84.8 and 80.5 years, respectively [t(1,062)= -4.4964, 
p<.001]. No variation in subjective life expectancy was found between respondents aged below 60. 
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TABLE 9.1 Sample characteristics (n=1,064)
Variable Category Mean (SD) / %
Male 50.1
Age (Mean [SD]) Range (18−65) 43.2 (13.6)
Educational levela (%) Low 27.3
Middle 42.0
High 30.7
Marital statusb Living alone/divorced 32.2
Married/living together 67.8
Having child(ren) (%) 60.2
(Self-)Employed (%) 53.0
Incomec Low 30.1
Middle 47.3
High 22.7
Health (EQ-5D) [Mean (SD)] Range (-0.13−1) 0.84 (0.23)
Disorder (currently/ever) (%) 28.2
Chronic disease (%) 36.6
Health (VAS) [Mean (SD)] Range (0−100) 75.1 (16.5)
Happiness (VAS) [Mean (SD)] Range (0−100) 74.5 (18.0)
Obesed (%) 19.2
Physically inactive 50.9
Healthy diet 47.5
Smoking (%) Never 60.5
Yes, sometimes 11.0
Yes, daily 28.5
Alcohol consumption No 35.9
Moderate 52.6
Excessive 11.5
Lifestyle index 0 20.5
1 33.4
2 32.4
3 or 4 13.7
Next of kin’s age of death < 75 19.5
75 to 85 53.7
≥ 85 26.9
a ‘Low’ = Primary or lower secondary education; ‘Middle’ = Upper secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education; 
‘High’ = bachelor, master, doctoral or equivalent.
b The category “Married/living together’ also included 37 respondents (3.5%) who indicated ‘Do not want to say/other’. 
c ‘Low’ = <1,500; ‘Middle’ = 1,500-2,999; ‘High’= >=3,000 in euros. 
d ‘Obese’ indicates BMI>=30 kg/m2. Mean (SD) BMI= 26.4 (5.1).
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FIGURE 9.1 Distribution of subjective life expectancy (n=1,064)
Subjective expectations regarding future health-related quality of life 
Respondents were asked to report their expectations regarding future health-related quality of life at 
the target ages of 60 up to 90. Average scores declined steadily with age, from 0.77 to 0.69, 0.51 and 
0.32 at the ages of 60, 70, 80 and 90, respectively [recall that respondents aged 60 or more (n=143, 
13.4%) did not need to predict health at age 60]. The scores ranged from -0.329 to 1 at all ages, 
equalling the possible minimum and maximum scores according to the EuroQol system. 
Figure 9.2 presents the future health-related quality of life expectations for two age groups, 18-59 and 
60-65. Similar as for life expectancy, values were significantly higher for the older group. Interestingly, 
the initial (i.e., first) reported score was fairly similar for both age groups. The gap between the scores of 
both groups increased at advanced target ages, from 0.105 to 0.173 at the ages 70 and 90, respectively. 
Interestingly, 1.6% of the respondents indicated the same expected health profiles for all target ages, 
while an additional 0.6% of the respondents indicated the same profiles for the ages of 70, 80 and 90. 
These respondents apparently did not expect their health to deteriorate over time. In addition, 8.4% 
of the respondents gave at least one score at a certain target age that was higher than the score at a 
lower target age.
Respondents were presented with all future health-related quality of life questions despite their 
subjective life expectancy. Similarly to Brouwer and van Exel[24] and Péntek et al.[25], further analysis 
revealed significantly lower scores at the target ages 60-90 for respondents that did not expect to 
live up to these given ages compared to those who did expect to be alive at these ages. The average 
scores for the first group and the latter group at ages 60, 70, 80 and 90 were respectively: 0.34 vs 0.79 
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(Mann-Whitney, p<.001, non-survivor group n=27), 0.25 vs 0.73 (Mann-Whitney, p<.001, non-survivor 
group n=87), 0.30 vs 0.63 (Mann-Whitney, p<.001, non-survivor group n=377) and 0.26 vs 0.58 (Mann-
Whitney, p<.001, non-survivor group n=852). 
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FIGURE 9.2 Health-related quality of life (HRQoL) expectations at age 60, 70, 80 and 90 years old (n=1,064)
Subjective expectations of remaining number of QALYs from 65 onwards 
We estimated the number of subjective expected remaining QALYs after age 65 using the information 
above regarding subjective life expectations and those on future health-related quality of life. Total 
amount of expected QALYs from 65 onwards to expected death ranged from -9.0 to 40.0 QALYs and 
mean QALY expectation was 11.0 (SD=7.4). The distribution of QALY expectations is presented in 
Figure 9.3. 
Excluding the lowest and highest 1% of QALY expectations resulted in QALYs varying between -0.9 and 
30.0. Out of the respondents, 3.1% reported negative QALY expectations of which two respondents 
reported expectations lower than -6.0. Such extreme negative QALY expectations can be explained 
by the fact that these two respondents had already relatively low present self-perceived health status 
(-0.1 and 0.2), but nonetheless expected to live up to respectively 100 and 92. A longer period of 
time with such low QALYs scores cumulates to a large negative total of remaining QALYs. Out of the 
respondents, 3.0% expected to have more than 25 QALYs after the age of 65. All these respondents 
expected to reach at least 90 years (mean life expectancy of this group is 103 years) in generally 
good health. One respondent reported a QALY expectation of 40. This respondent reported a life 
expectancy of 120.
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FIGURE 9.3 Distribution of self-estimated amount of QALYs from age 65 onwards until death (n=1,064)
The highest peak was around 0 remaining QALYs. 6.4% of the respondents self-estimated exactly 0 
remaining QALYs after 65. The explanation for this is that these respondents reported life expectancies 
of 65 or lower. Considering the fact that we did not assign QALYs for the year of expected death, by 
definition, their total amount of expected future QALYs after 65 amounted to 0.
As expected based on the results above, the mean subjective QALY expectation for the age group 18-
59 was 10.5 and significantly lower than the mean expectation of 14.2 of the group 60-65 [t(1,062)= 
-5.6353, p<.001]. Again, no significant variation was found within the age group 18-59.
A small majority of the respondents (56.1%) preferred a shorter life in perfect health over a longer life in 
a less then perfect health state. These respondents had a significantly lower mean QALY expectations 
compared to others, respectively: 10.3 vs 11.9 [t(1,062)= -3.6577, p<.001].
Expectations regarding ageing (ERA)
Analysis of the correlation between our future remaining QALY measure and the 12-item ERA resulted 
in r=.25, which was significant at the p<.001 level. The three 4-item subscales correlated in the same 
direction as the 12-item version of the ERA Scale: r=.20, r=.20 and r=.19 (p<.001 for all correlations) for 
the expectations regarding physical health scale, mental health scale and cognitive function scale, 
respectively. 
Multivariate analyses
Table 9.2 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with expected remaining QALYs from 
65 onwards as dependent variable. We started with a block of background characteristics. Successively, 
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we then added the objective health indicators, two dummy variables representing next of kin’s age of 
death and finally our lifestyle index. 
TABLE 9.2 Multivariate analysis of remaining QALYs from age 65 to expected death (n=1,064)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Male  0.64  0.44   0.63   0.76*
(0.468) (0.445) (0.424) (0.420)
Age dummy  4.82***  4.04***   3.63***   3.45***
(0.839) (0.774) (0.761) (0.742)
Age -0.03  0.03   0.02   0.01
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Low education -1.08* -1.41** -1.26** -1.08**
(0.588) (0.551) (0.521) (0.512)
High education  0.30  0.40   0.39   0.30
(0.541) (0.512) (0.483) (0.477)
Low income -0.23  0.19   0.13   0.12
(0.581) (0.542) (0.523) (0.517)
High income  0.89  0.66   0.36   0.30
(0.559) (0.532) (0.493) (0.487)
Married  0.58  0.48   0.62   0.39
(0.555) (0.521) (0.505) (0.502)
Having child(ren)  0.79   0.43   0.55   0.77
(0.547) (0.516) (0.498) (0.492)
(Self-)employed   1.55***   0.49   0.49   0.45
(0.484) (0.465) (0.443) (0.438)
Chronic disease -2.34*** -2.25*** -2.23***
(0.547) (0.510) (0.499)
Disorder -4.02*** -3.73*** -3.66***
(0.559) (0.540) (0.526)
Obese -0.20 -0.02   0.08
(0.586) (0.562) (0.555)
Kin’s age of death low -2.93*** -2.71***
(0.500) (0.493)
Kin’s age of death high   3.44***   3.30***
(0.511) (0.508)
Lifestyle index -1.12***
(0.210)
Constant   9.85***   10.01***   9.76*** 11.99***
(0.966) (0.927) (0.936) (1.021)
R2   0.07   0.17   0.25   0.27
Adjusted R2   0.06   0.16   0.24   0.26
Note. Unstandardised coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
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The fourth, final model explained 27% of the variance in our outcome variable. In this final model, the 
age dummy, reflecting the difference between the two age groups 18-59 and 60-65, having a chronic 
disease and/or disorder, the age of death of next of kin and the lifestyle index were most importantly 
associated with expectations regarding future QALYs. Less healthy respondents expected to have 
fewer QALYs from 65 onwards. The same accounts for respondents with an unhealthy lifestyle, a low 
education and respondents whose next of kin generally died younger. When family members became 
older, respondents reported higher QALY expectations. For the lifestyle index, each additional type of 
risky behaviour (i.e., smoking, drinking excessively, etc.) decreased the total amount of future QALYs 
with 1.12 QALYs. It becomes clear from the beta weights (not shown here) that having a disorder 
had the strongest effect on the outcome variable. Interestingly, being obese was not a significant 
explanatory variable for the amount of expected QALYs while being employed was only significant in 
the first, most restricted model. 
We repeated the fourth model of the regression analysis, but replacing the lifestyle index with the 
individual behavioural risks. Furthermore, we performed the regression analysis for men and women 
separately. The results are presented in Table 9.3. 
TABLE 9.3 Multivariate analysis of remaining QALYs from age 65 to expected death: risk factors instead of lifestyle index and 
distinction male/female 
Variables Model 1 Female Male
Male   0.76*
(0.429)
Age dummy   3.40***   1.76   4.65***
(0.745) (1.112) (1.068)
Age   0.01   0.04 -0.03
(0.020) (0.027) (0.032)
Low education -1.07** -0.77 -1.34
(0.518) (0.634) (0.860)
High education   0.22   0.51 -0.01
(0.481) (0.707) (0.681)
Low income   0.16 -0.23   0.73
(0.521) (0.653) (0.889)
High income   0.27 -0.12   0.39
(0.490) (0.759) (0.659)
Married   0.41   0.51   0.18
(0.505) (0.724) (0.780)
Having child(ren)   0.80   0.34   1.34*
(0.491) (0.634) (0.807)
(Self-)employed   0.48   1.05*   0.00
(0.441) (0.577) (0.698)
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TABLE 9.3 Continued 
Variables Model 1 Female Male
Chronic disease -2.25*** -2.49*** -2.15***
(0.502) (0.710) (0.720)
Disorder -3.64*** -3.46*** -3.85***
(0.529) (0.727) (0.774)
Obese   0.01 -0.94   1.17
(0.561) (0.699) (0.912)
Kin’s age of death low -2.69*** -3.28*** -1.98***
(0.495) (0.656) (0.744)
Kin’s age of death high   3.31***   3.17***   3.69***
(0.511) (0.714) (0.736)
Smoking -1.30*** -0.89 -1.56**
(0.450) (0.605) (0.661)
No alcohol -0.09 -0.25   0.13
(0.453) (0.575) (0.747)
Excessive alcohol -0.49 -2.87***   0.59
(0.624) (0.931) (0.826)
Physically inactive -0.78*   0.10 -1.75***
(0.411) (0.556) (0.623)
Unhealthy diet -1.52*** -1.80*** -1.39**
(0.421) (0.558) (0.631)
Constant  12.15*** 11.08***  14.01***
(1.014) (1.412) (1.502)
Observations 1,064 531 533
R2 0.28  0.29 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.27 0.26
Note. Unstandardised coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
The regression model in which the lifestyle index was replaced performed similarly in terms of 
adjusted R² to the final model from the regression analysis that included the index. An unhealthy 
eating habit and smoking were the strongest health behavioural explanatory variables in this model. 
On average, these variables may be relatively strongly associated in people’s perception with morbidity 
and mortality, therefore. Both dummies regarding alcohol consumption did not have a significant 
effect. As can been seen in Table 9.3, there were some striking differences between men and women 
regarding the explanatory variables. First, the age dummy had a much stronger effect on expected 
future QALYs for men than for women. Second, as in the first model shown in Table 9.3, the alcohol 
variables were not significant for men. However, excessive alcohol consumption was a significant 
explanatory variable for the expected future QALYs for women. Finally, the effect of physical inactivity 
13465_Rappange_BW.indd   183 23-03-16   10:15
184
Chapter 9
on expectations regarding remaining QALYs only held for men in the separate analyses. Overall, both 
gender models performed very similarly in terms of explained variance. 
Sensitivity analyses
The final analyses were done to test our findings incorporating some adjustments. First, recall that 
we only used a QALY score of 0 at time of death for respondents who expected to live beyond 90, 
since we did not have any expected quality of life score beyond that age. We reran our analysis using 
a QALY score of 0 for all respondents at the expected age of death. This resulted in a lower mean of 
remaining future QALYs: 9.5 (SD=7.2). We repeated the fourth model regression analysis from Table 9.2 
using this estimation. This regression model explained less variance than our original model (R²=.25 
vs R²=.27) and, furthermore, the significant explanatory variables were less strong in this model than 
the results shown in Table 9.2. Replacing the QALY score at time of death with the QALY score at target 
age 90, instead of a score of 0 for those respondents who expected to live beyond 90 (n=129), slightly 
increased the mean expected QALYs from 65 onwards to 11.4 QALYs (SD=8.2). Since the impact of this 
adjustment seems limited, we did not use this estimate in any further analyses.
Second, our results showed that a few outliers were present both at the minimum and maximum 
endpoints. A 1% trimmed mean excluding these outliers resulted in a mean future QALY score of 11.0 
(SD=7.2), ranging from -2.9 to 31.6. We repeated our main regression analysis and this resulted only 
in minimally lower robust standard errors compared to our original regression analysis from Table 9.2.
Third, in our analyses we integrated age simultaneously as a continuous variable and as a dummy 
variable differentiating between age groups 18-59 and 60-65. We tested for several variants of age, 
e.g., introducing age only as a continuous variable and only as a dummy variable in the regression. The 
regression model with only age as a continuous variable, which was significant (p<.001), performed 
slightly worse in terms of model performance (R²=.26). No differences were observed for our most 
important explanatory variables (except for the age weight itself ). 
Fourth, we used several alternatives to our lifestyle index. The (beta) coefficient of the lifestyle index 
(as well as the other results) did not alter when we used the original 0-4 score in which the two final 
categories were not combined or when we applied an index in which the 0-3 score was squared. 
When we used dummy variables instead of a continuous score of 0-3, i.e. a dummy for score 1 (one 
lifestyle risk), score 2 (two lifestyle risks) and score 3 (three or four lifestyle risks), we found coefficients 
of -0.83 (0.573, n.s.), -1.83 (0.571, p=.001) and -3.56 (0.703, p<.001), respectively. 
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9.4 DISCUSSION
In this study, we have presented subjective expectations regarding the amount of QALYs left from 65 
onwards until death in a representative Dutch sample of 18- to 65-year-olds in terms of age, gender 
and level of education. In contrast and addition to previous studies, we have combined expectations 
regarding length of life and future health-related quality of life into one single measure of healthy life 
expectation and investigated its relation to a relevant set of background, health and lifestyle variables. 
The average amount of subjective expected QALYs from 65 onwards was 11 QALYs and ranged from 
-9 to 40 QALYs. The final multivariate model from Table 9.2 explained 27% of the variance in the 
amount of future expected QALYs. Lifestyle importantly explained variance in the amount of expected 
QALYs from 65 onwards. An unhealthier lifestyle was related to lower QALY expectations. Replacing 
the lifestyle index with the risky behaviours separately – see the first model from Table 9.3 – showed 
that only individuals who smoke or have poor nutritional habits expect less QALYs from 65 onwards. 
Interestingly, excessive alcohol consumption and physical inactivity did not lower respondents’ 
subjective QALY expectation. However, interesting gender differences may exist (Table 9.3). Female 
heavy drinkers reported significantly lower expectations, but this did not hold for men. Smoking 
and physical inactivity, however, were only associated with a lower amount of expected QALYs for 
male respondents. It should be noted, however, that the relation of excessive alcohol consumption 
and smoking and QALY expectations showed a somewhat similar pattern for both genders (except 
for their statistical significance). In other words, both risky behaviours were associated with lower 
expectations for both men and women, but with a slightly different magnitude. Moreover, the group 
of female excessive alcohol consumers was rather small (n=40), which may have influenced our results. 
The impact of an unhealthy diet on the number of expected QALYs was similar for both men and 
women. The association between the expected future QALYs and lifestyle and possible differences 
between men and women in this respect, especially regarding alcohol consumption, warrant further 
investigation. 
Another important point here is that the causality of the relation between QALY expectations and 
lifestyle may work in both directions. On the one hand, individuals with an unhealthy lifestyle may 
incorporate the adverse consequences of their behaviour into their QALY expectations and adjust 
their expectations downwards. On the other hand, individuals with low QALY expectations may adopt 
an unhealthy lifestyle since they may believe that unhealthy habits do not matter that much for them 
(given low expectations) or may feel unable to influence their expectations regarding length and 
future health-related quality of life. This may be related to the findings of Sarkisian et al.[3] regarding 
seeking medical treatment. It would be interesting to study this circular relationship in more detail. 
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Our multivariate regression analysis further showed that respondents with a severe disorder (now or 
in the past) or chronic disease expected fewer QALYs in the future compared to healthy respondents. 
Interestingly, being obese did not explain any variance in our outcome variable. Although respondents 
with a disorder (now or in the past) and/or chronic disease had significantly higher BMI scores, 
excluding obesity or, alternatively, the variables regarding having a disorder or chronic disease, did 
not alter any of the relevant coefficients. Finally, the average age of death of next of kin predicted our 
outcome variable as well, in the expected direction, as was found before[24,25]. 
Limitations 
A few limitations of our study should be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, we 
excluded a considerable proportion (i.e., 13%) of initial respondents, largely based on supposed 
speeding through the online questionnaire. Consequently, the final sample available for analysis was 
no longer completely representative of the Dutch population, with younger and male respondents 
slightly underrepresented. However, since mean scores on our main outcome measure did not differ 
significantly between included and excluded respondents, we believe that elimination of respondents 
did not introduce a disturbing selection bias, and therefore does not greatly affect the generalisability 
of our results. 
Second, the EQ-5D is a validated instrument and widely applied as health outcome measure. However, 
its use for eliciting expectations regarding health-related future quality of life is less common. We 
slightly adjusted the wording of the EQ-5D questions to make the instrument suitable for obtaining 
health expectations, analogous to the format used by Brouwer and van Exel[24] and Péntek et al.[25] 
These authors concluded that individuals seem to answer the questions as intended, since the scores 
for expected and actual health at age 60 were similar. The correlation of our outcome variable and the 
ERA provides some further validation for our application of the EQ-5D. Obviously, further validation 
is required and exploring other methods for obtaining expectations of future health is encouraged.  
Third, the design of our survey and the questions posed to the respondents may have influenced our 
results. For example, in the expectation section of our questionnaire, respondents were first asked 
to indicate their subjective life expectancy. Then we administered the EQ-5D to elicit expectations 
regarding future health-related quality of life. It is unclear whether this sequence influenced 
respondents’ answers. Moreover, respondents answered the future health questions successively for 
the target ages 60, 70, 80 and 90 years old. This may induce respondents to indicate a decline in health 
with age. 
Fourth, respondents answered all questions regarding expectations of future health despite their 
subjective life expectancy. As Brouwer and van Exel[24] noted in this context, “…one may expect that 
health-related quality of life expectations for ages at which one does not believe to be alive anymore are 
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irrelevant and perhaps unrealistically low, because respondents try to indicate their expectation of longevity 
in the indicated health profile.” Indeed, we found significantly lower quality of life expectations for ‘non-
survivors’ vs ‘survivors’, which raises the question of the validity of answers to questions regarding 
future health-related quality of life beyond the expected age of death. 
Another point is that more explanatory variables could have been included in this study. For instance, 
it could have been interesting to investigate the associations between future health expectations 
and choices related saving and insurance coverage. These are interesting options for future research.  
A final limitation is that we did not explicitly ask about the expected quality of life close to the time of 
death. We therefore imputed these scores. The sensitivity analysis showed that using a QALY score of 
0 did alter our findings somewhat. This may be investigated in more detail in future research.
Age
The role of age in our analyses should be interpreted with some caution. We found that respondents 
aged 60-65 reported significantly higher QALY expectations than younger respondents (see the 
coefficient of the age dummy in Table 9.2). For respondents in this older age group, we calculated the 
amount of expected QALYs for the time frame 65-70 differently, i.e., we used their current self-reported 
health state instead of their quality of life expectation at target age 60 (see Box 9.3). Nonetheless, we 
observed higher QALY expectations for the 60- to 65-year-old respondents also for the age periods 
of 70-80, 80-90 and 90-death, as well as higher expected quality of life scores at 70, 80 and 90 (Figure 
9.2) and a higher subjective life expectancy. Therefore, our computation method does not explain 
the higher expectations for the older age group. A possible explanation for the fact that we found 
higher expectations for the age group 60-65 than for the other respondents is that achieving a certain 
age (in a certain health state) may increase expectations. Indeed, the expectations that young and 
middle-aged adults have about ageing may differ importantly from those of older adults who have 
more experience with ageing. The negative images associated with ageing such as illness, memory 
loss, dependence on others and loneliness may differ between age groups as well. Moreover, younger 
individuals may draw the line between young and old at a lower age than older people do.[33] 
Interestingly, more than half of the respondents in the age group 60-65 (n=146) were retired. This 
group of ‘early retirees’ reported a better mean current health state and a significantly higher amount 
of expected QALYs compared to the other respondents in our sample, 15.8 QALYs vs 10.6 QALYs, 
respectively. Retirees’ QALY expectation was also significantly higher than the other respondents 
within the age group 60-65. This effect on the amount of expected QALYs only held for men when 
conducting our multivariate regression analysis for men and women separately, which may be 
explained by the fact that 81% of the retirees were male. 
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Subjective life expectancy and future health-related quality of life
Explanatory variables may be associated with either subjective life expectancy or future health-related 
quality of life, or with both. Brouwer and van Exel[24] mainly found significant associations between 
age, health status and perception of own lifestyle compared to others and both types of expectations, 
whereas the average age of death of family members only related to subjective life expectancy. Péntek 
et al.[25] found similar results for expected health (but kin’s age of death was also significantly related to 
expected health), whereas all included explanatory variables were significantly related to subjective 
life expectancy (also due to their large sample size). 
Although our study methods and sample in some respects differed from the methods used in 
these studies, our analyses for our composite outcome indicator of expectations leads to similar 
conclusions.2 We conducted separate regression analyses similar to those in Table 9.3 using subjective 
life expectancy and expected health as dependent variables. First, we found that having children and 
smoking became especially relevant in explaining the variance in subjective life expectancy. Second, 
having a chronic disease was only significantly related to expectations regarding future health-related 
quality of life. Drinking behaviour (both abstaining and drinking excessively) and physical inactivity 
were slightly negatively associated with future health at age 65, while an unhealthy diet mainly played 
a role regarding future health at older ages. Third, age of death of relatives was related to expectations 
regarding both length and quality of life. These results altered somewhat when the analyses were 
conducted for men and women separately. These additional analyses indicate that individuals 
relate different consequences in terms of life expectancy and future health-related quality of life to 
different behaviours. Moreover, apparently men and women perceive some risks differently. These 
are important implications for designing health promotion strategies targeted at specific unhealthy 
behaviours and groups. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we combined two concepts of expectations into one composite indicator of the 
expected amount of QALYs from the age of 65 onwards until death. With this, we extended the 
concept of subjective life expectancy by correcting expected longevity for the expected quality of 
life during these years. As such, it provides more information than subjective life expectancy alone 
and therefore may prove more valuable for understanding people’s perceptions regarding ageing 
and, consequently, demand for health services and long-term care needs. It may also provide 
important information on the perceived impact of health behaviour on expectations (and vice versa), 
which could be relevant for health policy strategies aimed at improving lifestyles. More insight into 
individuals’ subjective expectations remains warranted.
2 The average subjective life expectancy in our study was 1.5 year higher than the mean found by Péntek et al.[25], and 
two years lower than the mean found by Brouwer and van Exel[24]. Furthermore, our results showed a much more 
gradual decline in health with age than the expected sharp decline found in these previous studies, i.e. from around 
0.8 at age 60 to around 0.06 at age 90. However, comparisons should be interpreted with caution due to the different 
study samples (for example, mean age was around eight years higher in the present study) and study design.
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10.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis aimed to explore two perspectives on future health: the policy perspective and individual 
perspective. The overall objective of this thesis was to increase our understanding of decision-making 
at the policy and individual level. Regarding the policy perspective, this thesis studied elements 
of decisions regarding the investment in future health. From the individual perspective, this thesis 
investigated in more detail (the measurement of ) individuals’ consideration of future consequences 
and individuals’ own (health) expectations. In the following sections, the main findings of this thesis 
are highlighted, following the order of the research questions posed in the introduction of this thesis. 
Subsequently, study limitations, policy implications and future research areas are discussed. 
10.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
PART I: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
The first research question of part I of this thesis, ‘How does the operationalisation of the primary 
decision criteria for delineating the Dutch basic benefits package influence the evaluation of lifestyle 
interventions?, was the main focus of chapter 2 and further addressed in chapters 3 and 4. In order 
to allocate scarce healthcare resources in an optimal way, transparent and fair decision criteria are 
important. In the Netherlands, the debate on such criteria intensified in the last two decades following 
recommendations of the Committee on Choices in Healthcare (or Dunning Committee) on how to 
delineate the basic benefits package.[1] Three criteria are central in the debates on the allocation of 
healthcare resources: (i) necessity, (ii) effectiveness and, (iii) cost-effectiveness or efficiency.[2,3] 
The first criterion, necessity, basically assesses whether some kind of (collectively financed) medical 
intervention is necessary given the severity of the illness or health problem involved (e.g., measured 
as disease burden). In other words, the criterion addresses the question whether a particular disease 
or health problem is serious enough to justify a claim on solidarity. The second criterion, effectiveness 
of an intervention, is the least controversial of the three criteria. It indicates whether an intervention 
achieves its goal, for instance, whether it improves health or prevents health deterioration. If an 
intervention is not effective in achieving desired outcomes, the rationale for financing it collectively 
is lacking. The third criterion, cost-effectiveness, which comprises the former effectiveness criterion, 
determines to what extent an intervention offers value for money. It balances the costs and (health) 
benefits of an intervention relative to a relevant comparator. The health gains are often expressed as 
quality adjusted life-years (QALYs). 
In recent years, the operationalisation of the criteria in the decision-making framework has received 
more attention. This is important, since their operationalisation importantly defines their exact 
meaning and, therefore, directly influences decisions. In chapters 2 and 3, several discussions regarding 
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the operationalisation of the criteria necessity, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness were highlighted, 
in particular those issues relevant in relation to lifestyle interventions. 
Issues when operationalising the decision criteria
In the Dutch policy context, necessity is operationalised using the concept of proportional shortfall.
[2-9] This implies that the necessity of treatment increases with the proportion of remaining health 
(or QALYs) that will be lost due to an untreated disease. Two underexplored normative choices 
that need to be made to operationalise this concept are: (i) the (sub-)group in which proportional 
shortfall is measured and (ii) the moment that the measurement of proportional shortfall begins. 
Although several stances can be taken and defended in relation to both these issues, it is important 
to understand that ultimate choices may impact final decisions. In chapter 2, arguments were 
posed in favour of inclusion of only those individuals who (would) actually incur the health losses 
for which treatment is considered.[5] This will generally lead to a higher proportional shortfall and 
thus more priority to treating or preventing the involved illnesses. Regarding the second issue, the 
preferred option usually is to calculate proportional shortfall at the start of the treatment (instead 
of the point that the individual would potentially fall ill).[5] This leads to a lower proportion of health 
lost and therefore a lower necessity weight for many preventive interventions. Considering the fact 
that priority is generally given to the treatment of diseases with a higher proportional shortfall, the 
importance of these normative issues and explicit decisions is emphasised. 
The second criterion, effectiveness, according to the National Healthcare Institute (ZiNL), is preferably 
assessed using Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs). For lifestyle interventions, it may be particularly 
difficult to meet this standard of evidence. Reasons for this are the lack of controlled trial settings, 
the required long follow-ups to capture all treatment effects, and the use of intermediate outcomes 
(such as weight loss) instead of final health outcomes (i.e., QALYs) to report treatment effects. These 
difficulties can limit the availability of data on the effectiveness of lifestyle interventions. This may 
negatively influence the priority given to these treatments. Resolving the difficulties associated with 
collecting data on effectiveness for lifestyle interventions,[3] as well as further defining appropriate 
evidence in health policy making, remain important.  
The cost-effectiveness criterion is usually operationalised using economic evaluations of healthcare, in 
particular cost-utility analyses (CUA).[10] Guidelines exist on how such evaluations should be performed, 
also in the Netherlands.[2] Some of the important normative, methodological choices regarding this 
criterion were addressed in chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis. First, the Dutch guidelines advocate a 
societal perspective, which implies including all costs and (health) benefits, regardless of the sector in 
which they fall. Lifestyle interventions may involve costs and benefits outside the healthcare domain, 
for example, in the education sector. Those costs will be ignored if a narrower than societal (e.g., 
healthcare) perspective is chosen. This seems undesirable from a welfare-theoretical point of view. 
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Second, discounting is common practice in economic evaluations of healthcare.[10] However, the 
height of the discount rate, especially for health effects, is fiercely debated. The Dutch guidelines 
recommend different discount rates for costs (4%) and effects (1.5%). Hence, the weight placed on 
future health is higher than that placed on future costs. This practice of differential discounting favours 
lifestyle interventions that usually yield immediate costs, but future health benefits (compared to 
discounting costs and effects with 4%). However, differential discounting as prescribed in the Dutch 
guidelines is internationally speaking exceptional and discounting practices remain much discussed. 
A final important and controversial issue in the operationalisation of the criterion of cost-effectiveness 
regards one particular type of costs: unrelated medical costs in life-years gained. This cost category 
comprises medical costs in gained life-years that are not directly related to the life-prolonging 
intervention (e.g., those related to hip replacements of people saved by lung transplants). The second 
research question of part I of this thesis, ‘Should unrelated medical costs in life-years gained be 
included in economic evaluations of healthcare interventions?’, was addressed in-depth in chapter 3. 
The Dutch guidelines for economic evaluations advocate the societal perspective as described above. 
Despite this, they also explicitly recommend the exclusion of these costs.1 It is clear that their inclusion 
in economic evaluations may influence the outcomes of such evaluations. Examples in chapters 3 and 
4 of this thesis illustrated this. Most international guidelines for economic evaluation of healthcare 
reviewed in chapter 3 currently recommend the exclusion of these unrelated medical costs in life-
years gained. However, chapter 3 also highlighted that the international scientific literature appears to 
increasingly support their inclusion. Although some controversy remains, also on the practical issue of 
how to accurately estimate these costs, chapter 3 argued that excluding this important type of costs 
may lead to a sub-optimal allocation of healthcare resources. 
Decision rule 
As part of the decision-making framework, a combination of both the necessity and cost-effectiveness 
criteria leads to a preliminary recommendation regarding the reimbursement of a healthcare 
intervention. To this end, a relevant cost-per-QALY threshold is used. An important assumption 
underlying this decision rule is that society is willing to spend more (that is, allow a higher cost-per-
QALY threshold) for an intervention that targets a disease with a higher disease burden. While it seems 
that the policy support in the Netherlands for such a decision rule in healthcare decision-making is 
fairly strong, the evidence that this decision rule reflects distributional preferences in society is weaker.[9] 
What is more, the (implicit and explicit) decision rules used in the context of prevention may differ 
from those used for curative interventions. Healthcare expenditures are especially related to curative 
healthcare. In contrast, spending on preventive interventions and public health does usually not 
1 Note that, very recently, the Dutch guidelines have been reviewed and revised. The inclusion of all indirect 
medical costs is prescribed for economic evaluations performed after July 1, 2016.
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exceed 10% of total public expenditure on health.[11,12] This may reflect a tendency to judge preventive 
interventions more stringently than curative interventions. One noteworthy aspect in that context is 
the perception or claim that prevention may result in improved health as well as in lower healthcare 
expenditures. Prevention is therefore sometimes proposed as a cost saving strategy to tackle rising 
healthcare expenditures.[13,14] This not only is unlikely to hold for preventive interventions (see the 
examples throughout the first part of this thesis and in particular in chapter 5), also due to (unrelated) 
medical costs in the life-years gained. More importantly, prevention does not have to be cost saving 
to still be an attractive, that is cost-effective, strategy, to improve health. It is therefore crucial to judge 
prevention within the same decision-making framework and against the same thresholds as other 
curative interventions, with a stronger focus on value for money. This case is made in chapter 4 of this 
thesis, addressing the third research question of part I, ‘Should prevention save costs in order to be an 
attractive healthcare strategy?’
Prevention and healthcare expenditures
The fourth and last research question of part I, ‘What is the effect of obesity prevention on lifetime 
healthcare expenditures?’ was addressed in chapter 5. This chapter investigates to what extent 
prevention offers value for money. Obesity is a major risk factor for a large range of chronic diseases. 
Its prevalence is increasing worldwide and, therefore, obesity is a rising public health concern. The 
relevance of developing and implementing strategies to reduce and prevent obesity is undisputed 
from a public health perspective.[15] However, the health economic impact of such strategies is 
less clear. Chapter 5 presents the effect of obesity prevention on annual and lifetime healthcare 
spending for the Netherlands. For this purpose, the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) Chronic Disease Model and Dutch Cost of Illness data were used.
The results in chapter 5 showed that lifetime drug expenses are higher for obese people than for 
‘healthy-living’ people, despite shorter lifespans for the former group. Preventing obesity results in 
drug savings for diseases related to obesity. These savings outweigh any additional drug expenditures 
unrelated to obesity in life-years gained. Moreover, preventing obesity increases long-term care 
expenditures substantially. Savings in other healthcare segments are very small. Overall, obesity 
prevention may thus result in higher instead of lower lifetime medical expenditures. Using higher 
discount rates for costs will mediate this outcome since the present value of costs for the long-
term segment will be lower. Therefore, whether obesity prevention is a cost-effective strategy will 
importantly depend on the amount of health gained.
Conclusion part I
The first part of this thesis focused on elements of decisions regarding investments in future health 
from a policy perspective. In particular, the operationalisation of the three main decision criteria 
to delineate the Dutch basic benefits package and some of the normative issues that arise in that 
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context were addressed and related to investments in future health. Furthermore, the extent to which 
such investments (through prevention) may offer value for money was explored and discussed in 
relation to allocation decisions in the healthcare sector.
It became clear that there is still no consensus regarding the operationalisation of the decision criteria 
and decision rule.  Moreover, the inherently normative choices required to operationalise them may 
have a profound effect on the quantitative evaluation of future health investments. The inclusion 
of medical costs due to the treatment of unrelated diseases in life-years gained in health economic 
evaluations has been one of the most persistent controversies. However, the inclusion of all future 
medical costs is increasingly supported. Doing so may involve inclusion of additional costs that offset 
possible savings in related diseases. While this makes prevention a less attractive option in terms of 
efficiency, such future health investments may still provide good value for money compared to other 
(curative) healthcare interventions. In any case, inclusion offers decision-makers a complete overview 
of costs and benefits. 
PART II: AN INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE
This part of the thesis investigated in more detail the measurement of two conceptualisations of 
future time perspective (FTP), i.e. individuals’ consideration of future consequences and subjective 
expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life. 
Consideration of future consequences
The first research question, ‘How reliable and valid is the original 12-item Consideration of Future 
Consequences (CFC) Scale?’, was addressed in chapter 6. The 12-item CFC Scale was developed by 
Strathman et al.[16] to measure the extent to which individuals consider and are influenced by the 
potential distant outcomes of their current behaviour. Although the CFC Scale is often applied in 
social psychological studies, little evidence was available about the performance of the scale in terms 
of reliability and validity. Therefore, in chapter 6 of this thesis, factor analysis was used to investigate 
the underlying factor structure of the 12-item CFC Scale among a Dutch sample of young adolescents. 
Most research that employed the CFC Scale assumed it to be a uni-dimensional construct. However, 
the results in chapter 6 provided evidence for a multiple factor solution. The factor solution included 
one present-oriented factor consisting of all seven present-oriented items. This factor showed good 
internal reliability and reflects the extent to which individuals are influenced by the immediate 
consequences of their behaviour. In addition, one or two future-oriented factors were found 
containing the remaining five future-oriented items. The interpretation of the structure and content 
of these future-oriented factor(s) was less straightforward. This result raises questions about the 
construct validity of the original 12-item CFC Scale. 
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The main result from chapter 6 was similar to Petrocelli,[17] who also reported a multiple factor solution. 
Recent research also found evidence for distinguishing between two subscales: the CFC-Immediate 
and CFC-Future subscale.[18] More recently, two new future-oriented items were added to the future-
oriented factor (i.e., the CFC-Future subscale).[19] The properties and importance of this 14-item Two 
Factor CFC Scale in the context of investments in future health are still being studied. 
Subjective survival probabilities 
The second research question of part II of this thesis, ‘To what extent do subjective survival 
probabilities differ across Europe, also in relation to lifestyle?’, was addressed in chapter 7. Research 
increasingly aims to understand (the formation of ) subjective life expectancy and their relation to 
health behaviour. Subjective survival probabilities (SSPs), i.e. the expected probability of surviving to 
a certain target age, are increasingly elicited in large-scale household surveys, including the Survey 
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Evidence regarding the relevance of SSPs in the 
context of lifestyle decisions such as smoking is starting to come available.[20] Chapter 7 of this thesis 
adds to the existing literature and explored individuals’ SSP in a population of elderly (i.e., 60 years 
and older) from 15 European countries using SHARE data. Moreover, the relation to a variety of health 
behaviours was addressed.   
The total sample average subjective probability of surviving the next 9-15 years was around 57%. 
Important cross-country differences were found: from the lowest mean in the Czech Republic 
(42%) to the highest mean in Denmark (64%). The results further indicated that SSPs correlated 
with socio-demographic, socioeconomic and also strongly with objective health characteristics 
(except for obesity). Regarding lifestyle, smokers reported lower SSPs compared to non-smokers, 
but no difference was found between non-smokers and former smokers. Overall, less explicit and 
straightforward relationships were found for SSPs with alcohol consumption and physical activity. 
Again, large cross-country differences were observed here. These results emphasise that SSPs and 
their relevance in relation to lifestyle decisions may vary importantly across Europe.
Measuring subjective life expectancy
The third research question of part II, ‘How do subjective survival probabilities relate to point estimates 
of subjective life expectancy?’, was addressed in chapter 8. The definition and measurement of 
subjective life expectancy may differ across studies. Two commonly applied elicitation approaches 
are the probabilistic approach used in chapter 7 (SSPs) and the non-probabilistic approach (i.e., a point 
estimate). Directly providing a point estimate seems cognitively easier for respondents than providing 
SSP estimates, which may lead to less inconsistent data.[21,22] A fundamental difference between the 
two elicitation techniques is that SSPs allow expressions of uncertainty.[23] Very little research has 
focused on the comparison of both approaches. Chapter 8 compared both elicitation methods within 
the same sample and showed that the point estimate computed from the SSPs was, on average, 
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about 3.5 years higher than the directly elicited point estimate. This indicates that individuals seem 
more optimistic about their longevity expectation when this is expressed in a probabilistic format. The 
findings further indicated that specific groups of people, in particular older individuals or those with 
a lower socioeconomic status, express their longevity beliefs differently depending on the elicitation 
method used. Overall, the results are in line with previous research[24,25] and suggest that the two 
elicitation methods are not fully comparable. 
Future health-related quality of life expectations
The final research question of part II of this thesis, ‘How can subjective expectations regarding future 
health-related quality of life be measured and combined with subjective expectations regarding 
length of life?’, was addressed in chapter 9. While subjective life expectancy is increasingly being 
studied, subjective expectations regarding future health-related quality of life are still underexplored. 
In chapter 9, subjective expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life were 
combined into one single measure of subjective future health expectation: the subjectively expected 
amount of QALYs from the age of 65 onwards until (the expected age of ) death. 
The average amount of expected QALYs from 65 years onwards in a representative sample of the Dutch 
general public was 11 QALYs and varied from -9 to 40 QALYs. Individuals with a relatively unhealthy 
lifestyle or lower health status reported lower QALY expectations. Furthermore, additional analyses 
showed that demographic characteristics, health, and lifestyle were varyingly associated with either 
subjective life expectancy or future health-related quality of life, or both. These findings show that 
correcting subjective life expectancy for personal beliefs regarding the quality of life during these 
years seems to provide important additional information about people’s thoughts on their future 
(health).
Conclusion part II
The second part of this thesis focused on (the measurement of ) individuals’ consideration of the 
future and individuals’ own expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life. For 
this purpose, some of the more commonly applied elicitation formats were explored in more detail 
and described in the context of future health investments.
This thesis has added to the existing literature by providing some evidence of the usefulness of future-
focused thoughts and considerations in the context of future health investments. The extent to which 
individuals consider and are influenced by near and distant outcomes of current actions may vary and 
can provide meaningful information to further unravel individual decisions regarding future health 
investments. In that context, adequate measurement of subjective expectations regarding length and 
future health-related quality of life is important as well. The operationalisation and measurement of 
these FTP conceptualisations are still not resolved and more work in this area is needed.
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10.3 LIMITATIONS 
This thesis has attempted to further knowledge on future health from a policy perspective and an 
individual perspective. Several limitations of this thesis should be taken into account when interpreting 
the results from the different chapters.
Part I
From a policy perspective, this thesis aimed to increase understanding of decisions and the decision-
making framework in relation to investments in future health. To that end, in the first part of this 
thesis, most research focused on the Dutch decision-making framework and its decision criteria. In 
particular, the assessment phase and the operationalisation of the corresponding criteria have been 
discussed in-depth in chapters 2 to 4. Two aspects that are important in this context have not been 
(fully) addressed. 
First, in the Dutch decision-making framework the assessment phase is followed by an appraisal phase. 
In this phase, broader societal concerns (including ethical and cultural considerations) are discussed 
in relation to the assessed intervention. Considerations in this phase could alter the recommendations 
based on the assessment phase. Although important, this appraisal phase fell outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
Second, this thesis studied the decision-making process within the Dutch context. In the discussion 
of the operationalisation of the criteria, practices from other countries were considered, in particular 
regarding the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained in economic evaluations. 
However, this was not done systematically. Future work in this area could investigate decision-
making frameworks in other countries (with other healthcare systems) to learn about their healthcare 
decision-making processes in relation to investments in future health.
Several aspects in the context of future health investments that are relevant from a policy perspective 
have not been addressed in this thesis. Some of these aspects are mentioned next. For example, many 
investments in future health in the Netherlands are not based on the decision criteria and decision rule 
discussed in this thesis. Thus far, the decision-making framework has been predominantly applied for 
the assessment of new pharmaceuticals for inclusion in the statutory insured basic benefit package. 
The unresolved, normative issues that arise when operationalising the decision criteria and the lack of 
clear decision rules add to the scarce utilisation of the framework in practice. Although the framework 
has received an increasing amount of support, it seems that it is predominantly used as a conceptual 
framework.[9] 
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Following on from this, other influential factors that drive or restrict future health investments may 
be in place since “the policy process, irrespective of the nation or health system, is not a linear, rational 
model in which an idealised solution for a public problem can be ascertained and optimally implemented”.
[26] Therefore, non-evidence-based drivers of policy decisions, for example, the influence of interest 
groups (e.g., consumer and patient organisations) and industry groups (e.g., tobacco and alcohol 
industries), should be taken into account as well in order to fully grasp healthcare policy decisions. 
[26,27-30] This thesis did not focus on such factors since it requires a different study design.
Moreover, future health investments may not only depend on the willingness to invest from a policy 
perspective (or macro level), but may also require investments at the meso level – i.e. from actors like 
health insurers, municipalities or hospitals, depending on the organisation of the healthcare system.
[31] This level was not within the scope of this thesis, but deserves consideration in this context as well.
Part II
In the second part of this thesis, aspects of the individual perspective on longevity and future health 
were explored. In this context, some comments on the empirical data that was used, need to be made. 
A first comment relates to the matter of generalisability of results. In chapter 6, the construct validity 
of the CFC Scale was assessed in a Dutch sample of young adolescents. Adolescence is a crucial “life 
phase in which the opportunities for health are great and future patterns of adult health are established”.
[32] Although this makes it worth investigating expectations and considerations of the future among 
adolescents, the use of data from such a specific age group may limit the generalisability of the results. 
In this respect it is sometimes claimed that young adolescents have immaturity of judgement and have 
less ability in foreseeing future consequences.[33-35] Hence, the degree of consideration of consequences 
(current and especially future) of present actions may be less strong in this group. Furthermore, the 
studies in chapter 6, 8 and 9 were performed in one single country (i.e., the Netherlands). This may 
(further) limit the generalisability of the findings based on these datasets. 
Second, the questionnaires used in the research presented in chapters 6 and 9 included instruments 
to elicit conceptualisations of future time perspective. For purposes of the research in these chapters, 
some of these instruments were slightly altered or used in another setting than for which they were 
originally intended. For example, the wording of the CFC Scale in chapter 6 was slightly simplified 
in order to make it more appropriate for use among young adolescents. Moreover, the CFC Scale 
consists of general statements and was not specifically designed for use in the health context. The 
EQ-5D instrument employed in chapter 9 for measuring expectations regarding future health-related 
quality of life, is a validated and much applied health outcome measure.[36] However, its use in the 
context of expectations is not very common, with Brouwer and van Exel,[37] and Péntek et al.[38] as 
notable exceptions. Moreover, to make elicitation of expectations possible, the wording of the EQ-
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5D had to be adjusted. The exact consequences of these adjustments have not been tested and 
therefore, the validity of the answers remains contestable. 
Third, all chapters from the second part, except for chapter 7 which used SHARE data, relied on data 
from web-based surveys. These surveys consisted of mostly close-ended questions and were designed 
for self-completion. This gave the opportunity to collect data in relatively large samples. A drawback 
was that no specific (qualitative) information was gathered on the way individuals actually think 
about the issues presented to them. For example, rounding and focal point answers were common 
phenomena in chapters 8 and 9, as more often observed.[39,40] In some cases, such as in the case of a 
“50%” answer to a probability question, it may even be unclear what a respondent’s answer actually 
reflects: a 50% chance or ambiguity? The same accounts for inconsistent answers (e.g., a higher SSP for 
target age 70 than for 60 years). The research in these chapters could have benefited from face-to-face 
data collection or follow-up questions asking for clarifications. It should be noted, however, that in 
the SHARE data used in chapter 7, which is gathered using Computer-assisted personal interviewing 
(CAPI), rounding and focal point answers were found as well.
A final important limitation of the research from part II of this thesis concerns the use of cross-
sectional data, especially in chapter 7. Panel data might have increased the understanding of the 
formation of SSPs and their relation with lifestyle decisions. However, it should be stressed that even 
with panel data, causal relationships between expectations and behavioural decisions would have 
been difficult to establish, due to endogeneity issues. Nevertheless, future research should aim for 
this and longitudinal SHARE data is now available (at the time of the research in chapter 7 only 
two prospective waves with a relatively short interval were available). Exploring this in more detail 
would offer additional information on the individual decision-making process and provide more 
opportunities to study the incentives for investing in future health at the individual level.
Similar to part I, it should be noted that many other interesting questions could have been addressed 
in part II as well. For example, it would have been relevant to investigate the subjective trade-off 
between quitting smoking and possible health gains. In other words, how much do people think they 
can gain from smoking cessation? These perceived health benefits may determine the commitment 
to stop smoking from an individual point of view. But many other factors may influence such decisions 
as well. More generally, investments in future health from an individual perspective will depend on 
many different factors apart from the factors addressed in this thesis. A notable example in this respect 
is healthcare insurance. Such knowledge is important for the development of healthcare strategies 
aimed at improving future health from a policy point of view, the actual uptake of such strategies, and 
therefore the materialisation of the potential benefits of future health investments. This thesis could 
have benefitted from bringing together and interacting views from both the policy and individual 
perspective. This remains an important future research area.
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10.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Several health policy implications and areas for future research that follow from the main findings of 
this thesis are highlighted below. 
Part I
Transparent and fair healthcare policy decisions require a consistent use of a broadly supported 
decision-making framework. However, it seems that many inherently normative issues still need 
to be (explicitly) resolved before the Dutch decision-making framework and its criteria are fully 
operationalised. Only then it can be successfully applied in practice (as discussed in chapters 2, 3 
and 4). Moreover, it seems that parts of the Dutch framework are still only predominantly applied for 
reimbursement decisions about pharmaceuticals. Therefore, an important issue is extending the scope 
of the decision-making framework to other (or all) types of healthcare interventions and technologies. 
A further quantification of the decision criteria in the assessment phase of the framework is required, 
also in order to make the decision-making framework suitable for this purpose. As shown in this thesis, 
this may strongly affect the priority given to investments in future health (for better or for worse). 
An important aspect of the framework concerns the guidelines on how to perform economic 
evaluations of healthcare. These guidelines should have a proper theoretical foundation. Important 
arguments have been put forward in this thesis regarding one of the issues that has been fiercely 
debated, i.e. the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained (chapter 3). This cost category 
is especially relevant for the proper evaluation of future health investments. Knowledge and tools to 
incorporate these costs in economic evaluations are coming available,[41] but future research could 
aim to measure and model these costs even more precisely.
The decision rule that should be used to decide whether some intervention should be included in 
the basic benefits package, i.e. the threshold value of costs per QALY, is also still a much-debated 
issue. It is unclear what the threshold represents or should represent. The same applies to the height 
of the threshold. Moreover, there is an increasing desire in this context to relate equity and efficiency 
considerations, linking the necessity criterion to that of efficiency. This reflects the assumption that 
society is willing to adopt a higher threshold value for cost-per-QALY for interventions that target a 
disease with a higher disease burden. In this respect, it seems that prevention is required to meet 
higher standards than other healthcare interventions. A stronger theoretical and empirical foundation 
should come available to establish the (exact form of ) relationship between necessity and cost-
effectiveness, applicable to all types of healthcare interventions. More research and explicit debate in 
this area is most certainly warranted. 
The appraisal phase constitutes an important part of the Dutch decision-making framework, 
allowing the evaluation of more normative, non-quantifiable judgments to take place. Some of 
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these considerations may be of particular interest in case of future health investments, such as the 
culpability argument and own responsibility argument discussed in chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis. 
Other relevant (public) preferences and attitudes, such as those related to the fact that prevention is 
often targeted at statistical lives (rather than ‘identifiable victims’), the ‘rule of rescue’ that gives priority 
to those most urgently at risk of severe health loss, and the uncertainty of the costs and benefits of 
prevention, should be discussed openly. The important point here is that such considerations in this 
(less quantifiable) phase could decisively alter the recommendations based on the assessment phase. 
Moreover, arbitrariness, inconsistency and lack of transparency should be avoided. 
It is also important to emphasise that further improvement of the decision framework need not 
necessarily promote investments in future health. The goal is rather to support an optimal allocation 
of scarce resources, in terms of public health and healthcare expenditures. Promoting prevention as 
an instrument to reduce healthcare spending is contestable. Prevention need not be cost saving, 
nor needs to be so in order to be an attractive option. Prevention should be judged in the same 
way as other healthcare interventions, within the same framework and using the same criteria and 
decision rule. This implies a strong focus on value for money. Other potential barriers to future health 
investments, such as the influence of relevant stakeholders and public opinion, should also be 
addressed.[30]
Part II
The success of interventions aimed at improving future health may importantly depend on decisions 
made at the individual level. As discussed throughout the second part of this thesis, it is increasingly 
shown that future health investments at this level may be related to the extent to which individuals 
consider the consequences of current behaviour and (the formation of ) subjective expectations 
regarding length and future health-related quality of life. 
Many health behaviours and lifestyle decisions involve a trade-off between short-term and long-
term consequences. The degree to which individuals are influenced by immediate and/or future 
consequences is considered one of the factors that may predict health behavioural decisions.[19] The 
findings from chapter 6 of this thesis (and recent further work in this area) provided more insight 
into the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of temporal orientation. In other words, “concern with 
future and concern with immediate consequences are not polar opposites”.[19] The proposed two-factor 
solution of the CFC Scale (i.e., the distinction between the consideration of immediate and future 
consequences) enables better understanding of individual health behaviour. For example, Adams[42] 
only found associations between (higher) consideration of immediate consequences and body 
mass index (BMI) and smoking. The distinction between the consideration of immediate and future 
consequences may therefore be important, for example, in the context of temporal framing of health 
promotion strategies (e.g., framing health communication, smoking bans and pricing of tobacco). This 
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is particularly interesting in light of recent work showing that health messages focusing on the benefits 
of preventive behaviour seem to be more effective than ‘loss-framed’ messages.[43] Future research 
could further examine the structure of the two CFC subscales and “identify [underlying] mechanisms 
through which CFC predicts various health behaviours.”[19]
The relevance of subjective life expectancy in relation to lifestyle behaviour is also increasingly 
acknowledged. In chapter 7 significant cross-country differences were found, in terms of actual height 
of the subjective survival probability (SSP), and in relation to health behaviour. For instance, overall, 
smokers reported lower survival chances compared to non-smokers. However, with few exceptions 
(e.g., the Netherlands and Belgium), this pattern did not hold at country level. Although this thesis 
did not investigate this any further, this may signal that in some countries people are better informed 
about or aware of the adverse health effects of smoking than in other countries. This may be the result 
of health communication strategies (or the lack of success of such strategies). More generally, it shows 
that tailored healthcare strategies for improving future health could be required; a successful strategy 
in one country may not need to work in another country. 
Subjective longevity expectations are increasingly elicited but different elicitation techniques are used 
in the literature, e.g. point estimates and probabilities (as discussed in chapter 8). The extent to which 
individuals are able to express such expectations using probabilities, which determines the usefulness 
of such information, is still unclear. The measurement of subjective expectations regarding future 
health-related quality of life is an under-explored topic, but may well provide additional information 
to subjective length of life expectations (as shown in chapter 9). People who believe that deteriorating 
health is an unavoidable aspect of ageing, may be less prone to invest in future health. Especially 
when such expectations are inaccurate (for instance, too pessimistic), this may induce non-optimal 
future health decisions at the individual level.
If measured validly and reliably, subjective expectations, regarding both length and future health-
related quality of life, may contain valuable private information, also compared to actuarial data.[44] As a 
result, important insights into health behavioural decisions and future healthcare needs and demands 
may come available. Hence, future work on how to measure subjective expectations is warranted. 
Understanding the interaction between personal beliefs and expectations and the willingness to 
invest in future health, may well be crucial in that context.
Bridging the gap between both perspectives
The willingness to invest in future health at the individual level seems crucial for the uptake of policy 
strategies aimed at improving future health. Nowadays, healthcare decision-makers frequently 
appeal to individuals’ autonomy and own responsibility. An important question is to what extent 
individuals are able and willing to make healthy choices and on which factors such decisions depend. 
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At the individual level, removing the barriers to participate in healthcare programs (i.e., to invest 
in future health) and facilitating access can be achieved through lowering the individual level of 
participation costs. This raises important questions on defining prevention reimbursements schemes, 
from a governmental perspective as well as insurer perspective. Other policy strategies to increase 
participants’ responsiveness to preventive strategies are price and subsidisation policies, taxes and 
‘nudging of healthy behaviour’. Regarding the latter, ‘nudging’ reflects the notion of improving health 
behaviour without compulsion.[45] In other words, the government can stimulate individuals to make 
the ‘right’ (i.e., most healthy) choice or can create an environment that increases the possibility that 
people behave in a desired way. Such more subtle government interference can take multiple forms. 
For example, public health campaigns aimed at enhancing knowledge and awareness of health risks, 
changing attitudes and motivations towards them (through information) or changing (incorrect) 
assumptions or beliefs about ‘normal behaviour’. Following on from the latter, focusing on resolving 
the possible discrepancy between individuals’ expectations and perceptions and reality may be an 
important direction as well.
From a policy point of view, designing an effective intervention to change health-related behaviour 
(one that is eligible for public reimbursement) does not automatically lead to its implementation. 
Proper implementation of a reimbursed intervention will be very important in determining whether 
or not any health behavioural intervention is a success. This may depend on many factors.[46] However, 
as Lombard et al.[47] highlight in the context of obesity prevention, “a gap in research that translates 
evidence-based interventions from isolated trials toward broad effective population strategies is evident 
[48,49]”. This also applies to other lifestyle-related interventions, for example, in case of preventing 
diabetes.[50] Implementation research tries to reconcile science and practice but still requires more 
attention. One important aspect that determines successful implementation is the extent to which 
participants adhere to and comply with the intervention. Many public health interventions only 
take effect if individuals are willing to make the necessary investments (in terms of money, time, 
inconvenience, foregoing pleasures, etc.). This holds for vaccination and screening programs, but even 
more for lifestyle-related interventions (e.g., losing weight, quitting smoking, etc.). From an individual 
point of view, lifestyle interventions usually entail more drastic sacrifices for a longer period of time, 
in order to avoid relapses. The above is indicative of the importance of bridging the gap between the 
policy and individual level in order to ensure a longer life in good health.
10.5 FINAL REMARK
Investing in a long life in good health may require a focus on future health and actions at different 
levels. In this thesis, elements of decisions at two levels, i.e. the policy and the individual level, have been 
studied. Although this thesis contributed to the knowledge at both levels, there is still much unknown. 
Therefore, studying the incentives for investing in future health from different perspectives remains an 
important research area in the near future. After all, citing Virgilio: “La più grande ricchezza è la salute.”
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SUMMARY
A long life in good health is considered one of the most important goals in human life. New healthcare 
interventions play an important role in attaining this goal. They allow diseases previously associated 
with high morbidity and mortality to be prevented or cured, adding to the length and quality of life of 
individuals. Nonetheless, new challenges emerge, such as the rise of non-communicable (and often 
more chronic) diseases, including those related to lifestyle. This raises important questions on how 
to counter such diseases and further improve (future) population health. Delaying or preventing the 
onset of diseases requires, among other things, a focus on future health. Therefore, the main objective 
of this thesis was to increase knowledge on the decision-making process regarding future health, 
taking two perspectives: a policy perspective and an individual perspective. The first part of this thesis 
studied decisions regarding the investment in future health from a policy perspective (Part I, chapters 
2-5). The second part of this thesis explored individuals’ considerations of the future consequences of 
their health behaviour and their expectations about their future health (Part II, chapters 6-9). 
Part I
The trends of ageing populations and rising healthcare expenditure may undermine the future 
sustainability of healthcare systems. The claim is sometimes made that investment in future health 
through prevention or lifestyle modification strategies could alleviate the financial pressure on 
healthcare budgets. However, the willingness to invest in future health is not self-evident from a 
policy point of view, since it requires trading off short-term costs and long-term benefits. Indeed, 
investments in prevention are relatively low. To assess whether prevention is a preferable strategy and 
to allocate scarce resources appropriately, it is important that (i) the decision criteria in this context 
are clear, transparent and justified and (ii) good information on the costs and benefits of prevention 
is available. Therefore, in the first part of this thesis, the Dutch decision-making framework and (the 
operationalisation of ) its criteria to delineate the basic benefits package were discussed in relation to 
the costs and benefits of prevention.
Chapter 2 investigated how the operationalisation of the primary decision criteria for delineating 
the basic benefits package influences the evaluation of lifestyle interventions. Three decision 
criteria that are central in this decision-making framework are ‘necessity’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘cost-
effectiveness’. Necessity is operationalised using the concept of ‘proportional shortfall’, effectiveness 
using appropriate studies such as Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) and cost-effectiveness using 
economic evaluations of healthcare interventions, in particular cost-utility analyses (CUAs). It became 
clear from chapter 2 that several normative issues in order to operationalise these criteria still need 
to be resolved. First, the use of proportional shortfall requires determining the (sub)group in which 
proportional shortfall is measured as well as the appropriate measurement moment. Second, there 
are various reasons why determining the effectiveness of an intervention using RCTs is particularly 
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difficult in the context of lifestyle interventions. Third, there are still fiercely debated normative, 
methodological issues regarding CUAs, such as the perspective of the analyses, the costs and effects 
to be included in the analyses and the discount rates to be applied for costs and effects. These 
normative c h o i c e s  can have a profound impact on the evaluation of lifestyle interventions but 
need to be made explicit and transparent. Therefore, chapter 2 concluded that improvements of 
the decision-making framework in the Netherlands are required to guarantee sound evaluations 
of lifestyle interventions aimed at improving (future) health.
As stressed in chapter 2, the economic evaluation of healthcare interventions is an important component 
of the Dutch decision-making framework. In chapter 3, a controversial issue in the operationalisation 
of the criterion of cost-effectiveness was further addressed: the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in 
life-years gained. This cost category is normally ignored in economic evaluations, irrespective of the 
perspective chosen for the analysis. National guidelines for pharmacoeconomic research typically 
endorse this practice. However, the inclusion of unrelated medical costs in life-years gained appears to 
have gained support in the literature for reasons of consistency and optimality. Examples in chapters 
3 and 4 of this thesis illustrated the impact of including these costs in CUAs. Whether or not to 
include unrelated future medical costs may have important distributional consequences, especially 
for interventions that substantially increase length of life. Practical objections against inclusion of 
future costs are mitigated by the fact that accurately estimating unrelated medical costs in life-years 
gained is increasingly feasible. Chapter 3 concluded that the inclusion of unrelated future medical 
costs should become standard.
Prevention (of unhealthy behaviour) has sometimes been promoted as simultaneously reducing 
costs and improving public health. However, this will unlikely prove to be true, as shown in several 
examples throughout part I of this thesis and in particular in chapter 5. Among other things, additional 
medical costs in life-years gained due to treatment of unrelated diseases may offset possible savings 
in related diseases. The exclusion of unrelated medical costs in gained life-years may result in too 
favourable estimations of cost-effectiveness, feeding the unjustified optimism among policymakers 
regarding lifestyle interventions as a cost saving option. However, even when prevention does not 
save costs, it may still be a (very) cost-effective way to improve public health. This should be judged 
taking all future costs into account and be based on the true value for money provided by lifestyle 
interventions. This case was made in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 assessed to what extent prevention indeed results in cost savings, using obesity prevention as 
example. Obesity is a major contributor to the overall burden of disease (also reducing life expectancy) 
and is associated with high medical costs due to obesity-related diseases. Therefore, the relevance of 
developing and implementing effective strategies to reduce and prevent obesity is supported from 
a public health perspective. However, the health economic consequences of such strategies are less 
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well documented. Chapter 5 investigated the effects of obesity prevention on annual and lifetime 
healthcare expenditures for different segments of the healthcare sector, i.e. hospital care, long-term 
care, pharmaceutical care and primary healthcare segments. For this purpose, the Chronic Disease 
Model of the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) and Dutch Cost of 
Illness data were used. Lifetime drug expenditures were higher for obese people than for people with 
normal weight, despite shorter life expectancy for the obese. Obesity prevention resulted in savings 
on drugs for obesity-related diseases until the age of 74, which outweighed additional drug costs for 
diseases unrelated to obesity in life-years gained. Furthermore, obesity prevention increased long-
term care expenditures substantially while savings in the other healthcare segments were, at best, 
small. Obesity prevention will thus entail savings in the pharmaceutical segment, but also substantial 
additional costs for long-term care. Therefore, chapter 5 concluded that whether preventing obesity 
is a cost-effective strategy will to a large extent depend on the amount of health gained. Moreover, 
balancing realistically estimated costs and benefits of all types of healthcare interventions is needed 
to allocate healthcare resources in an optimal way.
Part II
Most individuals will have some idea or expectation of whether they will grow old and how they will 
grow old. Such thoughts on future health are likely to vary across individuals. Moreover, the extent 
to which individuals’ present actions are influenced by these future thoughts may vary as well. These 
notions can be considered part of a broader construct often referred to as ‘Future Time Perspective’ 
(FTP). The importance of FTP in the context of health behaviour is increasingly acknowledged. 
However, the operationalisation and measurement of future-focused thoughts and considerations 
has led to various debates and more work in this area has been advocated. Therefore, the second 
part of this thesis focused on two important conceptualisations of FTP and their measurement in the 
context of health behaviour: (i) the extent to which individuals consider the future (versus immediate) 
consequences of their decisions and (ii) individuals’ beliefs about their remaining lifetime and health 
status at later stages in life. 
The Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale is a measure of the extent to which individuals 
consider and are influenced by the distant outcomes of current behaviour. This concept is increasingly 
believed to be important in the context of health behaviours, since such behaviours often entail a 
trade-off between immediate benefits in terms of satisfaction or reduced stress and long-term costs 
in terms of chronic disease and premature mortality. However, little empirical evidence existed on 
the exact properties of the CFC Scale in terms of factor structure, reliability and validity. Chapter 6 
investigated these aspects of the 12-item CFC Scale using secondary data of Dutch young adolescents. 
Factor analysis revealed a multiple factor solution including one completely present-oriented factor 
consisting of all seven present-oriented items, and one or two future-oriented factors consisting of the 
remaining five future-oriented items. Further analyses indicated that the present-oriented factor and 
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the 12-item CFC Scale performed similarly in terms of internal consistency and convergent validity. 
The structure and content of the future-oriented factor(s) remained unclear. This raises questions 
about the validity of the original 12-item CFC Scale. Recently, more evidence pointed in the direction 
of a multiple factor solution and, therefore, two new future-oriented items were added to the future-
oriented factor. More work is needed to assess the properties of the new 14-item Two Factor CFC Scale 
and its importance in the context of future health investments.
Subjective longevity expectations are increasingly considered relevant in relation to lifestyle decisions 
as well. In chapter 7, subjective survival probabilities (SSPs) across Europe were studied, in particular in 
relation to unhealthy behaviours. Data on European elderly (i.e., 60 years and older) from the second 
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) was used for this purpose. 
The sample average subjective probability of surviving the next 9–15 years was around 57% and 
varied considerably across country samples and age categories. Smokers reported significantly lower 
SSPs compared to non-smokers, but less explicit correlations were found between other lifestyle 
behaviours and SSPs. However, large cross-country differences were found here as well. Chapter 
7 concluded that SSPs are informative and relevant in relation to lifestyle decisions, can be validly 
obtained in elderly people and show interesting cross-country variation. 
Different elicitation formats for subjective life expectancy are used across studies. A common 
approach next to SSPs is the direct elicitation of a subjective point estimate of life expectancy. 
While providing a point estimate seems cognitively less demanding than providing probabilities 
and results in a clear-cut number, SSPs allow for expression of uncertainty. The study in chapter 8 
is one of the few studies that investigated SSPs in relation to such a subjective point estimate of 
life expectancy. Data of Dutch people aged 18-65 years was gathered using a web-based survey. 
The questionnaire contained both elicitation formats. It turned out that, on average, estimates of 
longevity using SSPs were higher compared to point estimates (83.6 years vs. 80.2 years, respectively). 
Individual differences between elicitation methods were smaller for younger respondents and for 
respondents with a higher socioeconomic status. The correlation between the subjective longevity 
estimations was moderate, but their associations with respondents’ characteristics were similar. The 
main conclusion from chapter 8 was that findings from both elicitation methods may not be directly 
comparable, especially in certain subgroups of the population. Implications of inconsistent and focal 
point answers, rounding and anchoring require further attention. More research on the measurement 
of subjective expectations is therefore still required.  
In contrast to the increasing attention for subjective longevity expectations (independent of the 
elicitation format), subjective expectations regarding quality of life remain understudied. However, 
such future health expectations arguably are equally important. Chapter 9 investigated individuals’ 
subjective quality adjusted life-year (QALY) expectation from age 65 onwards using the same data as 
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in chapter 8. The EQ-5D instrument was used to elicit respondents’ expected future health states and 
subjective life expectancy was expressed as a point estimate. Information on subjective expectations 
regarding length and quality of life were combined into one single measure of subjective expected 
QALYs from age 65 onwards. The average number of subjective expected QALYs from age 65 onwards 
was 11 QALYs (range -9 to 40 QALYs). Individuals with an unhealthier lifestyle, a chronic disease or a 
severe disorder reported lower QALY expectations. The same outcome was found among individuals 
whose next of kin had a lower average age of death. Indicators were varyingly associated with either 
subjective life expectancy, expectations regarding quality of life, or both. Extending the concept of 
subjective life expectancy by correcting for expected quality of life appears to generate important 
additional information contributing to our understanding of people’s perceptions regarding ageing 
and lifestyle choices. 
In conclusion
This thesis focused on (elements of ) decisions regarding investments in future health from two 
perspectives, i.e. a policy perspective and an individual perspective. The general discussion in 
chapter 10 reflected on the main findings of this thesis. From a policy perspective, the decision-
making framework for the allocation of healthcare resources requires further operationalisation of 
the decision criteria and decision rule. This includes the consideration of all future medical costs in 
economic evaluations of healthcare interventions, including unrelated medical costs in gained life-
years. Although the latter may reveal that some investments in future health will not result in cost 
savings, such investments may still provide good value for money. From an individual perspective, 
this thesis aimed to further knowledge on future-focused considerations and subjective expectations. 
The consideration of future consequences and subjective longevity expectations seem to provide 
important information on the individual decision-making process in the context of future health 
investments. However, the operationalisation and measurement of these concepts is still unresolved. 
This holds even more for subjective expectations regarding quality of life. 
Chapter 10 addressed several limitations of the data and methods used in this thesis as well as 
important healthcare policy implications and directions for future research. Although this thesis 
contributed to our understanding of the decision-making process at the policy level and the individual 
level, more work in this research area is warranted. Therefore, investigating the incentives for investing 
in future health from different perspectives, and connecting those perspectives, remains important.  
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SAMENVATTING
Een lang leven in goede gezondheid wordt beschouwd als een van de belangrijkste doelen in het 
leven. Nieuwe gezondheidszorginterventies spelen een belangrijke rol in het bereiken van dit doel. 
Zulke interventies stellen ons namelijk in staat om ziekten die eerder gepaard gingen met een hoge 
mate van mortaliteit en morbiditeit te voorkomen of te genezen, hetgeen vervolgens bijdraagt aan 
de lengte en kwaliteit van ons leven. Desalniettemin dienen nieuwe uitdagingen zich aan, zoals de 
opkomst van niet-overdraagbare (en vaak meer chronische) ziekten, waaronder leefstijl gerelateerde 
ziekten. Dit roept belangrijke vraagstukken op omtrent hoe zulke ziekten tegen te gaan en een verdere 
verbetering van de (toekomstige) gezondheid van populaties te bewerkstelligen. Het uitstellen of 
voorkomen van ziekten vereist, onder andere, een focus op toekomstige gezondheid. Het voornaamste 
doel van deze dissertatie is dan ook om meer inzicht te krijgen in de wijze waarop keuzen ten aanzien 
van toekomstige gezondheid tot stand komen, bezien vanuit twee perspectieven: een beleidsmatig 
perspectief en een individueel perspectief. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift bestudeerde keuzen 
ten aanzien van investeringen in toekomstige gezondheid vanuit een beleidsmatig perspectief (Deel 
I, hoofdstukken 2-5). Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift onderzocht individuele overwegingen 
ten aanzien van toekomstige gevolgen van gezondheidsgedrag en individuele verwachtingen ten 
aanzien van toekomstige gezondheid (Deel II, hoofdstukken 6-9).
Deel I
De trends van vergrijzing en stijgende zorguitgaven kunnen de toekomstige houdbaarheid van 
gezondheidszorgsystemen ondermijnen. Soms wordt gesteld dat investeringen in toekomstige 
gezondheid middels preventie en leefstijlinterventies de financiële druk op de zorguitgaven 
kunnen verlichten. De bereidheid om te investeren in toekomstige gezondheid is echter geen 
vanzelfsprekendheid vanuit een beleidsmatig perspectief, omdat er een afweging dient te worden 
gemaakt tussen kosten op korte termijn en baten op lange termijn. En inderdaad, uitgaven aan 
preventie zijn relatief laag. Om te beoordelen of preventie een voorkeursstrategie zou moeten zijn 
en om schaarse middelen zo optimaal als mogelijk toe te wijzen, is het belangrijk dat (i) de criteria 
waarop keuzen worden gebaseerd duidelijk, transparant en gerechtvaardigd zijn en (ii) goede 
informatie over de kosten en baten van preventie beschikbaar is. In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift 
is daarom nader ingegaan op het Nederlandse besluitvormingskader en (de operationalisatie van) de 
bijbehorende criteria bestemd om het basispakket af te bakenen, bezien in relatie tot de kosten en 
opbrengsten van preventie.
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht in hoeverre de operationalisatie van de primaire besliscriteria voor 
pakketafbakening invloed heeft op de beoordeling van leefstijlinterventies. Drie besliscriteria vormen 
een centraal element in het afwegingskader: noodzakelijkheid, effectiviteit en kosteneffectiviteit. 
Noodzakelijkheid wordt geoperationaliseerd door het concept ‘proportional shortfall’, effectiviteit aan 
de hand van geschikte studies zoals gerandomiseerde klinische trials (RCTs) en kosteneffectiviteit door 
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het gebruik van gezondheidseconomische evaluaties, in het bijzonder kostenutiliteitanalyses (KUAs). 
Hoofdstuk 2 heeft laten zien dat er nog steeds verscheidene, normatieve keuzen dienen te worden 
gemaakt om te komen tot volledig geoperationaliseerde criteria. Ten eerste vereist de toepassing 
van proportional shortfall dat de (sub)groep waarbinnen de proportie verloren gezondheid wordt 
gemeten, evenals het moment waarop de meting van proportional shortfall begint, eenduidig worden 
vastgesteld. Ten tweede zijn er verschillende redenen aan te wijzen waarom juist het vaststellen van de 
effectiviteit van leefstijlinterventies middels RCTs lastig is. Ten derde is er nog steeds een hevig debat 
gaande over normatieve, methodologische kwesties ten aanzien van KUAs, zoals het perspectief van 
de evaluatie, de kosten en effecten die dienen te worden meegenomen en de disconteervoeten 
voor kosten en effecten. Deze normatieve keuzen kunnen vergaande implicaties hebben voor de 
beoordeling van leefstijlinterventies, maar dienen weliswaar expliciet en in alle transparantie te 
worden gemaakt. Hoofdstuk 2 concludeerde daarom dat investeringen in het afwegingskader nodig 
zijn om te komen tot zuivere beoordelingen van leefstijlinterventies die gericht zijn op het verbeteren 
van (toekomstige) gezondheid. 
In hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift is reeds benadrukt dat de economische evaluatie van 
gezondheidszorginterventies een belangrijk onderdeel is van het Nederlandse besluitvormingskader. 
In hoofdstuk 3 is een controversiële kwestie ten aanzien van de operationalisatie van het 
kosteneffectiviteitscriterium in meer detail geadresseerd: de inclusie van medische kosten in 
gewonnen levensjaren die niet gerelateerd zijn aan de behandeling. Deze kostencategorie wordt 
normaal gesproken, onafhankelijk van het perspectief dat voor de evaluatie wordt ingenomen, 
genegeerd in gezondheidseconomische evaluaties. Dit uitgangspunt wordt veelal ondersteund 
door de nationale richtlijnen voor farmaco-economisch onderzoek. Echter, het meenemen van niet-
gerelateerde medische kosten in gewonnen levensjaren lijkt op steeds meer steun te kunnen rekenen 
in de literatuur, vanwege het consistentie argument en optimalisatie argument. Voorbeelden in de 
hoofstukken 3 en 4 van deze dissertatie hebben de impact van het includeren van deze kosten in KUAs 
geïllustreerd. Het al dan niet meenemen van niet-gerelateerde toekomstige medische kosten kan 
belangrijke consequenties hebben voor de verdeling van middelen, vooral voor interventies die het 
leven aanzienlijk verlengen. Praktische bezwaren tegen de inclusie van niet-gerelateerde medische 
kosten in gewonnen levensjaren kunnen in toenemende mate worden weggenomen doordat deze 
kosten steeds nauwkeuriger kunnen worden geschat. Hoofdstuk 3 concludeerde dat de inclusie van 
alle toekomstige medische kosten de nieuwe norm dient te worden.
Preventie (van ongezond gedrag) wordt soms gepromoot als strategie omdat het tot lagere 
gezondheidszorgkosten en een betere volksgezondheid zou leiden. Dit is echter geen 
vanzelfsprekendheid, zoals is gebleken uit de voorbeelden in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift en in 
het bijzonder in hoofdstuk 5. Dit komt onder meer doordat additionele medische kosten in gewonnen 
levensjaren door de behandeling van niet-gerelateerde ziekten mogelijke besparingen met betrekking 
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tot gerelateerde ziekten kunnen overtreffen. Het uitsluiten van niet-gerelateerde medische kosten in 
gewonnen levensjaren kan resulteren in te gunstige schattingen van de kosteneffectiviteit, waardoor 
het ongerechtvaardigde optimisme onder beleidsmakers over preventie als kostenbesparende 
strategie wordt gevoed. Maar zelfs wanneer preventie niet leidt tot kostenbesparingen, kan het nog 
steeds een (zeer) kosteneffectieve manier zijn om de volksgezondheid te verbeteren. Dit dient te 
worden vastgesteld door alle toekomstige kosten mee te nemen en te worden gebaseerd op de 
werkelijke ‘value for money’ die leefstijlinterventies genereren. Dit punt is beargumenteerd in 
hoofdstuk 4.
In hoofdstuk 5 is nader onderzocht in welke mate preventie zou kunnen leiden tot kostenbesparingen, 
waarbij preventie van obesitas als voorbeeld is gebruikt. Obesitas draagt in belangrijke mate bij aan de 
totale ziektelast (evenals aan het verminderen van de levensverwachting) en gaat gepaard met hoge 
medische kosten door aan obesitas gerelateerde aandoeningen. Het belang om effectieve strategieën 
die obesitas kunnen terugdringen en voorkomen te ontwikkelen en te implementeren, wordt 
daarom vanuit het perspectief van de volksgezondheid onderstreept. De gezondheidseconomische 
gevolgen van dergelijke strategieën zijn echter minder goed gedocumenteerd. Hoofdstuk 5 
onderzocht de effecten van obesitaspreventie op jaarlijkse en levenslange gezondheidszorguitgaven 
voor verschillende segmenten van de gezondheidszorg, te weten ziekenhuiszorg, langdurige zorg, 
farmaceutische zorg en huisartsenzorg. Hiervoor is gebruikt gemaakt van het Chronisch Ziekten Model 
van het Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (RIVM) en Nederlandse Kosten van Ziekten data. 
Levenslange uitgaven aan medicijnen waren hoger voor obese mensen dan voor mensen met een 
normaal gewicht, ondanks de kortere levensverwachting voor de eerste groep. Preventie van obesitas 
resulteerde in besparingen op medicijnen voor aan obesitas gerelateerde ziekten tot de leeftijd van 74 
jaar. Deze besparingen waren hoger dan de additionele medicijnkosten in gewonnen levensjaren voor 
ziekten die niet gerelateerd waren aan obesitas. Daarnaast stegen de uitgaven aan langdurige zorg 
aanzienlijk als gevolg van obesitaspreventie terwijl de besparingen in de andere segmenten hooguit 
klein waren. Preventie van obesitas zal dus enerzijds leiden tot besparingen in het farmaceutische 
segment, maar anderzijds leiden tot substantieel hogere uitgaven in de langdurige zorg. In hoofdstuk 
5 werd daarom geconcludeerd dat de vraag of obesitaspreventie een kosteneffectieve strategie is in 
belangrijke mate zal afhangen van de hoeveelheid gezondheidswinst die wordt behaald. Bovendien is 
het nodig om realistisch geschatte kosten en effecten voor alle soorten gezondheidszorg tegen elkaar 
af te wegen om te komen tot een zo optimaal mogelijke verdeling van gezondheidszorgmiddelen.
Deel II
De meeste individuen zullen bepaalde ideeën of verwachtingen hebben over hoe oud zij zullen 
worden en hoe zij die leeftijd zullen bereiken. Dergelijke voorstellingen van toekomstige gezondheid 
zullen waarschijnlijk variëren tussen personen. Daarnaast zal de mate waarin het gedrag van individuen 
wordt beïnvloed door deze toekomstgedachten ook niet voor iedereen gelijk zijn. Deze noties kunnen 
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gezien worden als onderdeel van een breder construct dat vaak wordt aangeduid als ‘Future Time 
Perspective’ (FTP). De relevantie van FTP in de context van gezondheidsgedrag wordt in toenemende 
mate onderschreven. Echter, de operationalisatie en meting van toekomstgerichte gedachten 
en afwegingen hebben tot verscheidene discussies geleid en meer werk op dit vlak is bepleit. Het 
tweede deel van dit proefschrift richtte zich derhalve op twee belangrijke conceptualiseringen van 
FTP en de metingen daarvan in het kader van gezondheidsgedrag: (i) de mate waarin individuen de 
toekomstige gevolgen van hun beslissingen afwegen tegen de directe gevolgen en (ii) individuele 
verwachtingen ten aanzien van de resterende levensduur en gezondheid in latere levensstadia. 
De Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale is een maatstaf voor de mate waarin individuen 
rekening houden met en beïnvloed worden door de gevolgen van huidig gedrag op lange termijn. Het 
belang van dit concept in de context van gezondheidsgedragingen wordt mede ingegeven doordat 
dergelijke gedragingen vaak tot stand komen na een afweging tussen directe opbrengsten in termen 
van bevrediging en verminderde stress en lange termijn kosten in termen van chronische ziekte en 
vroegtijdige sterfte. Er bestond echter weinig empirisch bewijs over de precieze eigenschappen 
van de CFC Scale in termen van factor structuur, betrouwbaarheid en validiteit. Hoofdstuk 6 
onderzocht deze aspecten van de 12-item CFC Scale door gebruik te maken van secundaire data van 
Nederlandse jonge adolescenten. Uit de factor analyse kwam een meervoudige factoroplossing naar 
voren, waaronder een volledig op het heden gerichte factor bestaande uit alle zeven op het heden 
gerichte items en één of twee op de toekomst gerichte factoren bestaande uit de resterende vijf 
toekomstgerichte items. Verdere analyses lieten zien dat de op het heden gerichte factor en de 12-
item CFC Scale vergelijkbaar presteerden in termen van interne consistentie en convergente validiteit. 
De structuur en de inhoud van de toekomstgerichte factor(en) bleef onduidelijk. Dit resultaat roept 
vragen op over de validiteit van de originele 12-item CFC Scale. Onlangs wees meer onderzoek in de 
richting van een meervoudige factoroplossing, waarna twee nieuwe, toekomstgerichte items aan de 
toekomstgerichte factor zijn toegevoegd. Meer onderzoek is nodig om de eigenschappen van de 
nieuwe 14-item Two Factor CFC Scale vast te stellen en het belang ervan in het kader van toekomstige 
gezondheidsinvesteringen te beoordelen. 
Subjectieve verwachtingen ten aanzien van levensduur worden ook steeds belangrijker geacht in 
relatie tot leefstijlkeuzen. In hoofdstuk 7 werden subjectieve overlevingskansen (SSPs) uit heel Europa 
bestudeerd, in het bijzonder in relatie tot ongezond gedrag. Hiervoor werden gegevens gebruikt 
over Europese ouderen (d.w.z. 60 jaar en ouder), verzameld gedurende het tweede meetmoment 
van de Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). De gemiddelde, subjectieve kans 
in de totale steekproef om de komende 9 tot 15 jaar te overleven was afgerond 57%, en varieerde 
aanzienlijk tussen steekproeven uit verschillende landen en tussen leeftijdscategorieën. Rokers 
rapporteerden significant lagere SSPs vergeleken met niet-rokers, terwijl de correlaties tussen andere 
leefstijlgedragingen en SSPs minder eenduidig waren. Er werden echter ook hier grote verschillen 
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gevonden tussen landen. Hoofdstuk 7 concludeerde derhalve dat SSPs informatief en relevant zijn in 
relatie tot leefstijlkeuzen, dat dergelijke informatie goed kan worden verzameld onder ouderen, en 
dat interessante verschillen zijn te zien tussen landen.
Er worden verschillende technieken toegepast om de subjectieve levensverwachting van individuen 
uit te vragen. Een veelgebruikte aanpak naast die van SSPs is de elicitatietechniek waarbij een 
puntschatting van de subjectieve levensverwachting wordt verkregen. Het geven van een 
puntschatting lijkt voor respondenten cognitief minder veeleisend en levert een eenduidig getal 
op, maar SSPs geven meer inzicht in de onzekerheid van de verwachting. De studie in hoofdstuk 
8 is één van de weinige studies die heeft gekeken naar SSPs in relatie tot een puntschatting van 
de levensverwachting. Middels een online vragenlijst zijn gegevens verzameld van Nederlanders in 
de leeftijd van 18 tot 65 jaar. De vragenlijst bevatte beide elicitatietechnieken. De resultaten lieten 
zien dat schattingen verkregen via SSPs gemiddeld genomen hoger lagen dan de puntschattingen 
(respectievelijk 83.6 jaar versus 80.2 jaar). Individuele verschillen tussen de resultaten van de twee 
elicitatietechnieken waren kleiner voor jongere respondenten en respondenten met een hogere 
sociaaleconomische status. De correlatie tussen beide schattingen van subjectieve levensverwachting 
was middelmatig, maar hun associaties met kenmerken van respondenten waren vergelijkbaar. 
De belangrijkste conclusie uit hoofdstuk 8 was dat resultaten verkregen via de verschillende 
elicitatietechnieken mogelijk niet direct vergelijkbaar zijn, hetgeen met name geldt voor bepaalde 
subgroepen van de populatie. Implicaties van inconsistente en zogenaamde ‘focal point’ antwoorden, 
afronding en verankering zijn zaken die verdere aandacht behoeven. Verder onderzoek naar het 
meten van subjectieve verwachtingen is dan ook nog steeds nodig.
In tegenstelling tot de toenemende aandacht voor subjectieve verwachtingen ten aanzien van 
levensduur (los van de gebruikte elicitatietechniek), zijn subjectieve verwachtingen ten aanzien van 
kwaliteit van leven nog maar weinig bestudeerd. Zulke toekomstige gezondheidsverwachtingen 
zijn echter misschien wel net zo van belang. Hoofdstuk 9 onderzocht de individuele subjectieve 
quality adjusted life-year (QALY) verwachting vanaf de leeftijd van 65 jaar, gebruikmakend van 
dezelfde data als in hoofdstuk 8. Het EQ-5D instrument werd gebruikt om de verwachte toekomstige 
gezondheidstoestanden te verkrijgen en subjectieve levensverwachting werd uitgedrukt middels een 
puntschatting. Informatie over subjectieve verwachtingen ten aanzien van lengte en kwaliteit van 
leven werden gecombineerd om te komen tot één maatstaf van het te verwachte aantal subjectieve 
QALYs vanaf de leeftijd van 65 jaar. De gemiddelde QALY verwachting vanaf 65 jaar was 11 QALYs (range 
tussen -9 en 40 QALYs). Personen met een ongezondere leefstijl, een chronische ziekte of een ernstige 
aandoening rapporteerden lagere QALY verwachtingen. Ditzelfde gold voor personen waarvan de 
naaste familie gemiddeld genomen op jongere leeftijd was komen te overlijden. Indicatoren toonden 
in verschillende mate associaties met subjectieve levensverwachting, verwachtingen ten aanzien 
van aan toekomstige gezondheid gerelateerde kwaliteit van leven, of beide. Het uitbreiden van het 
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concept van subjectieve levensverwachting door te corrigeren voor verwachte kwaliteit van leven 
lijkt belangrijke, aanvullende informatie te genereren hetgeen meer inzicht oplevert in hoe mensen 
aankijken tegen het ouder worden en leefstijlkeuzen maken.
Afsluitend
Deze dissertatie richtte zich op (elementen van) keuzen ten aanzien van investeringen in toekomstige 
gezondheid vanuit twee perspectieven, namelijk het beleidsmatige perspectief en het individuele 
perspectief. De algemene discussie in hoofdstuk 10 reflecteerde op de belangrijkste bevindingen 
van dit proefschrift. Vanuit een beleidsmatig perspectief behoeft het besluitvormingskader voor het 
toewijzen van middelen in de gezondheidszorg verdere operationalisering van de besliscriteria en de 
beslisregel. Dit omvat de inclusie van alle toekomstige medische kosten in de economische evaluatie 
van gezondheidszorginterventies, waaronder de niet-gerelateerde medische kosten in gewonnen 
levensjaren. Alhoewel dit tot gevolg kan hebben dat bepaalde investeringen in toekomstige 
gezondheid niet tot kostenbesparingen zullen leiden, kunnen dergelijke investeringen nog steeds 
waar voor ons geld opleveren. Vanuit een individueel perspectief heeft dit proefschrift getracht 
meer inzicht te genereren in toekomstgerichte overwegingen en subjectieve verwachtingen. 
Het overwegen van toekomstige gevolgen en subjectieve levensverwachtingen lijken relevante 
informatie op te leveren over het individuele besluitvormingsproces in het kader van toekomstige 
gezondheidsinvesteringen. De operationalisering en het meten van deze concepten is echter nog 
niet uitgekristalliseerd. Dit geldt zelfs nog meer voor subjectieve verwachtingen ten aanzien van 
kwaliteit van leven. Hoofdstuk 10 is nader ingegaan op een aantal beperkingen ten aanzien van de 
data en methoden die in dit proefschrift zijn gebruikt alsmede op belangrijke beleidsimplicaties en 
richtingen voor vervolgonderzoek. Hoewel dit proefschrift heeft getracht meer inzicht te geven in het 
besluitvormingsproces op beleidsniveau en individueel niveau, is meer werk op dit onderzoeksgebied 
aangewezen. Het onderzoeken van de prikkels om te investeren in toekomstige gezondheid vanuit 
verschillende perspectieven, en het verbinden van deze inzichten, blijft daarom van groot belang.
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